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Prelude: trajectory of a PhD project 
This could be a foreword. This could simply be a ‘thank you’ to all the people that have 
supported, inspired, rightfully criticized, or in some other way pushed forward my project of 
writing a thesis. Credit where credit is due, but this standard procedure has to wait until the 
end of this prelude, as it is supposed to be a little more than a simple foreword. First of all, it 
is supposed to clear the intellectual mess that has amounted in my head over the past three 
and a half years. Second, it is supposed to reflect the position of this thesis among the topology 
of academia. But mainly it is supposed be a brief genealogy – a look back at difficult, yet highly 
enjoyable times and a reflection about how, and through which particular processes and 
events, this thesis has evolved and at the same time changed its author – both in terms of 
disciplinary premises and a general stance towards academia itself. Hence, although by no 
means required in any university regulations, I seek here to retrace the trajectory of a PhD 
project. 
The idea to reflect on that multi-year process that has led me up to this point has not entirely 
been my own, admittedly. Flashback (1): February 2013, Stirling, Scotland: LiSS Doctoral 
School on Surveillance Studies. First day of class. William Webster discusses the actual process 
of planning and executing a PhD project and its embeddedness in a multitude of social (power) 
relations, institutional constraints and the increasing personal progress of getting a grip on 
both academic theory and the real world. During that session, William put forward one 
particular question that stuck in my head, and which is the main reason for writing this little 
reflection piece that is supposed to exceed the usual forewords that we find attached to the 
many theses published each year. 
The question, paraphrased, was: “When eventually defending your thesis, and one of the 
committee members asks you whether you would have done anything differently in your 
work, what would be your answer?” Well, what if? The only right answer to such a question 
must obviously be: “Yes, of course – in hindsight I would have handled a lot of things 
differently. But only now do I know.” Only in such fashion can you demonstrate that you are 
critical of your own work, that you are willing to admit mistakes and at the same time benefit 
from them, and that you are someone who cherishes the age-old method of learning through 
trial and error (which is a harsh, yet effective one, I guess). And however counter-factual that 
‘what if’ question is, it is a great trigger to think about your choices, not only in ontological, 
epistemological, theoretical, methodological, and empirical terms – thus in the strict academic 
terms of your actual thesis – but also in terms of your individual and institutional choices, of 
your personal encounters and inspirations, of your enjoyable and frustrating times as a young 
scholar. In short: about your own path of flight as part of academia. 
One might be inclined to say that such a reflection necessarily includes a commitment to 
radical openness. As Brian Massumi (2002: 18) puts it: “If you know where you will end up 
when you begin, nothing has happened in the meantime. You have to be willing to surprise 
yourself writing things you didn’t think you thought. […] This means you have to prepared for 
failure.” Failure, that giant specter that haunts all of us young scholars – it certainly haunted 
me more than once. When Germany was struck by the discovery of academic fraud (primarily 
in terms of plagiarism) that reached (and still reaches) into the upper echelon of national and 
supranational politics – there was the specter of failure that made you question every single 
citation you ever inserted into one of your manuscripts. Every time I presented a piece of my 
work in front of a large audience (be it academics or practitioners) and it drew critical 
comments – there was the specter of failure that makes you question your smarts. Every time 
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I received crushing (and sometimes overtly hostile) reviews for a paper that I had submitted 
to a journal – there was the specter that insisted your writing was not good enough to ever 
perform at that level that was required in the competitive environment that is academia. 
Those specters and many more, they were ever looming on the horizon, just like the ominous 
‘event’ that security politics strive to cancel out. An ironic parallel to the topic that I was 
concerned with in my work, admittedly. Yet all those specters, though numerous enough to 
fill a blockbuster horror-movie, served their purpose quite well. In the vein of both Massumi 
and the preemptive security politics of our times: they kept me alert. 
Flashback (2): September 2013, Brussels, Belgium: EIRSS Summer School on borders, security, 
and mobility. Didier Bigo provides some feedback on a (in hindsight not so brilliant) piece that 
I had presented. The feedback, surprisingly, was quite benign, but one question did, once 
again, stick in my head. While I was arguing about rationalities and logics from a systems 
theoretic perspective, he asked whether I had adequately thought about the involved actor’s 
trajectories. Well, in short: I had not – at least not adequately enough. Social trajectories, 
however, are just as important when it comes to academia as they are when it comes to 
empirical research. As Thomas Biersteker (2010: 602) puts it, particularly with regard to 
(critical) security studies, “we should ask questions about who funds our research, why that 
research is funded, for which audiences we are writing, and how our research either reinforces 
or challenges dominant scholarly research programs, doctrines, policy practices, and 
ideologies.” Well, let’s ask, then! Who did actually fund my research and what implications 
must be derived from such funding? 
By the time I am writing this prelude, I have been involved in four different research projects 
– two of them funded within the security theme of the European FP7 framework, and two of 
them funded within the “high-tech strategy” of the German federal security research 
framework. This involvement has been both a blessing and a curse. Obviously, the grants paid 
my rent, which is not so bad for a start. Plus, they almost instantly got me in touch with the 
security research community – which is a strange breed of mostly engineers and a couple of 
social scientists and legal scholars uttering concerns about the new technologies to be 
developed (I am oversimplifying!) – that reflects the political program of security at the 
national and supra-national level. Moreover, the external funds freed me from any teaching 
obligations that eat up so much time of my fellow PhD candidates (in my third year, I opted to 
teach voluntarily nonetheless, but at this point I was already beginning to see the light at the 
end of tunnel). So much for the upside. 
However, there is a downside. Put simply: you become part of the machine. The “security-
industrial complex” machine, that is, in Ben Hayes’ (2009) quite radical terms. The security 
research programs of both the FP7 framework and the German high-tech strategy feature a 
clear-cut economic agenda that has been shaped by the security industry in the first place. 
This is not a matter of moral corruption per se, but rather the acknowledgment of, most 
notably, the EU as a political union that has historically evolved through the desire to 
cooperate for the sake of creating wealth surplus. And nonetheless, the machine at times 
appears to be deeply stuck in a neo-liberal agenda that favors technological development 
regardless of social consequences. As David Harvey (2005: 68) puts it, “the neoliberal theory 
of technological change relies upon the coercive powers of competition to drive the search 
for new products, new production methods, and new organizational forms.”  
From the awareness of those mechanisms, I personally derived two consequences. First of all, 
I re-defined my own research agenda such that it now not only incorporates political and social 
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questions of ‘security’, but also political, social and economic questions of ‘security research’ 
– the latter often being the predecessor of the former. This is reflected by one of the analytical 
pieces of this PhD project ([Inquiry 3], the only one that is not directly concerned with aviation) 
that deals with the evolution of the presumed conflict between privacy and security. And 
second, I quickly learned to critically cherish the institutional frame that my own institution 
provides. The IZEW at the University of Tuebingen as a dedicated ethics institute occupies a 
rather awkward position within security research. On the one hand, ethical coverage within 
security research has been strengthened and is now mandatory under the European Horizon 
2020 framework, but on the other hand, this turns you into the guy who could potentially red-
flag the ‘products’ of research projects based on ethical concerns. And after all, the majority 
of your colleagues is likely to be composed of engineers, computer scientists, physicists and 
such who, according to my own experience, often see ethics more as a ‘disturbance’ than as 
a necessary virtue. As an institution, the IZEW has thus opted to enact an approach that our 
former colleague Michael Nagenborg (2009) has deemed “ethics as partner in technology 
development”, seeking to implement social and ethical impact assessment early on and to 
establish an active dialogue with engineers and designers in order to avoid or at least mitigate 
detrimental social consequences of ‘security’. In hindsight, this is something that for instance 
should have happened in the case of body scanner technology, as is pointed out in one of the 
analytical pieces of this thesis. 
Being part of externally funded research projects, moreover – and this presumably was the 
most important impact for me personally – means that you get ‘empirics-by-design’. Or rather: 
you can make use of synergy effects between empirical research that is conducted in the 
context of your everyday activities as part of a project team and your own analytical scope. 
And this is what I, of course, opted to do. Thus, the expert interviews and field observations 
that provided the empirical foundations for some of the analytical inquiries of this thesis were 
right in front of me, just waiting to be analyzed and connected to questions from the field of 
critical security studies. 
Flashback (3): October 2013, San Diego, USA: 4S Annual Meeting. Small-talking to a colleague 
whom I had just met for the first time. Being asked what my PhD was about for arguably the 
hundredth time over the last couple years, I started my usual routine of explaining that my 
PhD project does not come in the classical shape of writing a book, but in a cumulative fashion 
that consists of a series of papers that are thematically connected, and that are either already 
published, accepted for publication, or even still under review at distinct journals. So far, so 
good. The response I got to that often-practiced explanation was not the usual one, however. 
She just nodded and said: “Oh, then you have like 10 supervisors, huh?” I had never really 
seen it this way, but there is certainly some truth in that statement. I definitely feel like I have 
largely benefited from being under review far more than I would have been during the process 
of writing a book. 
Preparing a manuscript for submission to a journal, you are constantly forced to write at the 
highest level that is possible at the given moment – which in hindsight clearly pushed my 
limits. Also, you can manage to get a certain ‘feel for the game’ that is academia. There are 
wide debates about whether peer review would not empower (particularly senior and 
established) scholars to hide behind a protective veil of anonymity that allows them to defend 
their own research agendas while sabotaging others, but on the other hand, peer review is 
such an effective mechanism to receive feedback. As one colleague fittingly put it: “You can 
always use peer review processes and conferences as a test-bed, even if you feel that your 
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paper might still be flawed or is really not more than an initial idea.” So I guess it’s time to 
grind one’s teeth and actually say thanks to all those people who have been going on my 
nerves with their nagging, their misunderstandings, their pointless proposals to “improve the 
quality of the manuscript” by turning it upside down and changing the core argument. After 
all, they are helping to improve the quality of the manuscript, because the force you to defend 
your arguments and thereby to sharpen them.  
And since I have now incidentally started to say thanks, I shall continue to do so in a more 
proper fashion. I want to thank all of those who accompanied me through those last years – 
those who opted to engage with my ideas, those who went on to develop them with me, and 
most of all those who had the guts and the expertise to continually destroy, and then 
reconstruct them. In random order: Thank you Thomas for being the best supervisor 
imaginable. You have no idea how much of a role model you have been. Thank you Regina for 
always being supportive and for providing that necessary open space to pursue intellectual 
side strands apart from project work – and for finding money to keep me employed when two 
research grants were considerably delayed. Thank you Christian for making it clear early on 
that organization, efficiency, and output orientation are true academic game changers. More 
appreciation must go out to Michael and Tobias for numerous inspiring conversations. To 
Christina and Anja for being such great office mates and field research partners. To Birgit and 
Matthias for taking on the cold monster of bureaucracy. To Marijn and Nat for working stuff 
out together. To Marieke, Louise, and Didier for engaging with my work. And of course to 
everyone else whose names I have not mentioned here, however not forgotten, either. 
And most of all thank you Elli – you know why.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Security
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly 
the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.”  
(Foucault, 1984a: 343) 
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Foundations 
There is no such thing as security. And yet security is a constituting part of our world. What at 
first glance appears as a glaring paradox, is in fact very much one of the central vanishing 
points of contemporary societies – both in political and social terms. As Anderson (2010b: 228) 
frames it, “security and securing are both dependent on nonexistent phenomena – threats 
and promises.” And those threats and promises are where the political slips in, of course. In 
this introductory section to my PhD dissertation, I aim at unpacking the paradox of security 
and the way it plays out politically (and socially) through a variety of narratives. The narratives, 
yet capable of telling their respective distinct stories about security, must nonetheless be 
regarded as inextricably intertwined and overlapping. It could even be argued that they 
cumulatively build on each other in order to paint a more complete (and more problematic) 
picture of security. Once they will have been laid out and re-combined at the end of this 
section, the foundations for an understanding of security that thrives both on the impossibility 
of its very ontological existence and on its political transformations will become clear – or at 
least so I hope. The ensuing task will then be to use this framework to connect the analytical 
pieces that form the main section (III.) of this thesis. These ‘assorted inquiries in aviation’, 
which build the core of my project, are empirical takes on the politics and practices of security 
within a field that is often considered key for contemporary societies: aviation. As it embodies 
the time-space compression of globalization and the powerful desire for connectivity and 
mobility, aviation presents a prototypical field for the multiple narratives of security that will 
be told, and clearly points out their impact on the social – eventually leading to a necessary 
framing of the politicality of security as a normative question in section IV. With the eventual 
outlining of such a framework of normativity, I hope to put forward a modest contribution to 
the challenging of contemporary security politics and security practices, that at times stand in 
such a stark contrast to the fundamental values that the fluid concept of security originally 
was set to cherish and protect. 
I aim not to solidify this fluidity. Security, almost by definition, perpetually escapes our 
attempts to grasp it and hold on to it. As such, security can be conceived of as an imaginary 
that can only exist ex negativo as opposed to something that threatens the fragile status quo 
in which we feel ‘secure’. However, such threats are manifold, and in their social construction 
only limited by what indeed appears to be the limits of imagination – or what former US 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has infamously framed as “unknown unknowns.” But 
only what is somehow known (or at least suspected) can be the target of precaution, 
prevention, and preemption – contemporary security politics have thus been dominated by 
the desire to identify threats, to calculate risks, and to harness and commodify the future in 
order to rid security of its persistently liquid character. Threatening events are simulated 
(Boyle and Haggerty, 2012), performed (Anderson and Adey, 2012), thought through 
(Anderson, 2010a; 2010b), driven by the media (Grusin, 2010; de Goede, 2008a), and, if need 
be, indeed just ‘made up’ (Salter, 2008b). Subsequently, the horizon of the manifold 
(in)securities we face today appears indeed a “politics of possibility” (Amoore, 2013), and as 
such is closely related to imagination. 
Conceiving of security as a non-materiality then opens up a space to think about the multiple 
political transformations that security becomes subjected to. Or rather: how security is 
imagined throughout distinct theoretical and empirical registers. My aim here is not to add 
another layer to the multiple definitions of security, but to retrace and connect its 
potentialities that converge in my analyses in the broad field of aviation. There is a large and 
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ever-growing body of academic work that is continually concerned with those very questions, 
and countless spotlights have attempted to illuminate the shady nature of security. And yet, 
while particularly in critical security studies, once distinguished disciplinary discourses have 
started to merge, a considerable amount of (social scientific, broadly conceived) research on 
security still stands rather disconnected (Bigo, 2008a). In fact, “one finds people working on 
security and yet seemingly talking about very different things” (Neocleous, 2008: 6). I do in no 
way claim to build a definitive or even comprehensive link between these literatures here, but 
I feel that it is indeed helpful to consider the many ways that security has been researched as 
in order to add some brightness to the dispersed array of spotlights. Thus, I hope to both 
emphasize and connect the fragmented landscape of distinct perspectives in order to attempt 
to get a (temporary) grip on security. As Der Derian (1995: 28) frames the problematic, “the 
tension of definition is inherent in the elusiveness of the phenomenon it seeks to describe, as 
well as in the efforts of various users to fix and attach meanings for their own ends.” 
Subsequently, I have opted for a different way of approaching this shy phenomenon that is 
security. In order to theoretically underpin the empirical pieces of my thesis, this introductory 
section will tell a total of ten short narratives about security. The narratives feature distinct 
disciplinary roots, as well as a variety of ontological and epistemological assumptions that 
frame security according to a multiplicity of underlying rationalities, and, most of all, are 
connected to the perspectives that I have chosen to apply in my work. In no way does this 
selection of narratives claim to be complete or even indicate the possibility for completeness. 
Moreover, there is no specific linearity underpinning the narratives, although it could be 
argued that they ‘complicate’ matters throughout the process. However, they should rather 
be conceived of as a topological toolbox that increasingly fills as the theoretical foundations 
proceed. Thus, I seek to carve out major lines of inquiry for the manifold politicalities of 
security and to construct a solid basis for cross-references with my empirical pieces in order 
to engage “the ways in which security has been coined, shaped and deployed by political, 
commercial and intellectual forces” (Neocleous, 2008: 7). Put differently: I aim to tell a story 
of security through a variety of lenses, that, so much I hope at least, later on become reflected 
in the analytical part of this thesis. 
 
Initial narrative: security as value 
“A security threat is threatening precisely because it stems from what we value and what we 
fear” (Burgess, 2009: 309). Even if we accept the notion that security has no material form, 
security is by no means devoid of meaning. Security, as Burgess (2011: 2) has it, “embodies 
the social and cultural needs of a society, its hopes and fears, its past and its ambitions for the 
future.” Security itself is a value, and as such it has been central to the history of political and 
social thought. Der Derian (1995: 25) even goes so far to claim that “within the concept of 
security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics”, starting most prominently with 
Hobbes’ (1651) mid-seventeenth century construct of the Leviathan as the foundation of 
society that can only exist through the fundamental basic desire for security. The Leviathan as 
a figure of thought embodies state sovereignty with the first and foremost task of putting an 
end to the war of everyone against everyone, such that mankind can escape its anarchic state 
of nature. As Huysmans (1998: 245) argues, “in the Hobbesian text security is a life strategy 
which manages uncertainty and ambivalence by producing truth and thus certainty and 
predictability.” Thus, in the writing of Hobbes, security becomes framed as a constituting 
element of both power and of the state. The notion it carries, however, is a predominantly 
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positive, or, at best, a neutral one. This should remain so for quite some time. Indeed, as 
Neocleous (2008: 4) claims, throughout the main trajectories of classical political theory, “the 
common assumption remains that security is the foundation of freedom, democracy and the 
good society, and that the real question is how to improve the power of the state to ‘secure’ 
us.” 
Such a positive reading of security, however, in its core, is deeply rooted in rather isolated 
anthropological assumptions that do not adequately account for empirical contextualization. 
Its perspective on society is an external one, but it neglects the internal part. Subsequently, 
an overly positive notion of security has been fundamentally challenged throughout the 
twentieth century. As opposed to an abstract reading of security as something that has 
empowered the foundations of society early on, more contemporary engagements with 
security have sought to move beyond security as an isolated value, and engaged security as 
part of society. As Huysmans (1998: 228) argues, “the meaning of security does not just 
depend on the specific analytical questions it raises, it also articulates particular 
understandings of our relation to nature, other human beings and the self.” Subsequently, the 
scope was re-calibrated to issues of how security actually plays out in the realm of the social. 
Thinking of security then becomes a normative premise and entails questions that are 
“concerned with the definition of the ‘good’ regarding security” (Browning and McDonald, 
2013: 236), and subsequently with the ‘good life’ that security is set to protect (Ammicht 
Quinn, 2014). It is those very questions, however, that security constantly – and often 
incidentally – challenges through its very own mechanisms. Security, as de Lint and Virta 
(2004: 471) clearly put it, “produces the pathology it alone may cure.” The effects of security 
thinking, of security politics, of security techniques and technologies, and of security practices 
carry a potential of backfiring at their creators such that they undermine other important 
values. In other words: security perpetually creates friction, and this friction can be felt and 
experienced in many registers of our everyday lives. As Martin and Simon (2008: 289) have it, 
security “is charged with preserving ‘the way of life’ or that which makes us insecure.” Most 
prominent have been the recent debates on ‘security vs. liberty’ that had been reinforced in 
the post-9/11 era. The events of 9/11 should not be misunderstood as some kind of caesura, 
though, but rather as a catalyst that brought about a window of opportunity to legitimize and 
accelerate a plethora of minor and major security legislations, of tightened regulations and 
practices, and of technologies of surveillance and control. 
Critical scholars have subsequently pointed out the detrimental effects of such a renewed 
desire for security on the social level: constant intrusions into spheres of privacy and intimacy, 
discrimination and social sorting, and, more generally, the undermining of a societal frame 
that was once outlined under the label of liberalism. As Bigo (2008a: 12) summarizes the 
critiques, security constantly runs the risk of becoming “disconnected from human, legal and 
social guarantees and protection of individuals.” The oft-proposed image of a ‘balance’ or a 
‘trade-off’ between security and other values such as fundamental rights or (civil) liberties, 
suggesting a more recent ‘adjustment’ of the relationship against the backdrop of terrorism 
and such, however, is a flawed one. First of all, in the vein of rather common critique, Hayes 
(2010: 158) claims that “in this ‘trade-off’ scenario, civil liberties and human rights have 
effectively been reduced to ‘ethical concerns’ that must be ‘balanced’ with the needs of 
security, and, by implication, can be restricted when the case for security has been made.” It 
appears indeed a rather odd notion that some values could be diminished to the status of 
mere ‘concerns’, while others would remain untouchable. And second, as Waldron (2003: 193) 
argues, it starts from the questionable assumption that some optimal balance between the 
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two concepts could be struck in the first place. The very idea of a balance is an overly simplistic 
one, as it disregards the multiple (and competing) meanings of both security and liberty. 
Moreover, it disregards common objections to a purely consequentialist approach as well as 
questions of distributional justice and unintended (side) effects (Waldron, 2003: 195). It is 
precisely those questions that have become an integral part of a critical security studies 
agenda, and instrumental to the normative challenging of short-sighted security arguments. 
As Monahan (2006a: 21) points out, debates about ‘trade-offs’ or ‘balances’ “artificially 
constrain inquiry by offering little room to talk about deeper social changes underway.” 
Security is not something to be treated lightly. Too many questions remain in between the 
Hobbesian notion of the founding principle of society and the contemporary notion that at 
times implies the status of a trump card. Questions of security must be inquired into with due 
care. After all, as Burgess (2011) notes, “we have come to understand that security comes 
with its own special ethical baggage.” 
One should thus be careful not to confuse the many different layers that security presents. 
Security is inextricably linked to forms of political and social organization, and as such 
connected to questions of power, authority and government. A lot of critique that at first sight 
seems to be directed at security itself, is in fact directed at a politico-economic agenda that 
operates under the paradigm of security. If, as Buzan et al. (1998: 4) claim, “security should 
not be thought of too easily as always a good thing”, such an evaluation builds on its 
embeddedness on the political level. The distinction between the value of security and the 
political power of security, even if blurry, must thus always be kept in mind. A critique of 
security, as Neocleous (2008: 4) rightly points out, conceptualizes security “not as some kind 
of universal or transcendental value, but rather as a mode of governing, a political technology 
through which individuals, groups, classes, and, ultimately, modern capital is reshaped and 
reordered.” Thus, as Burgess (2009: 310) adds, “the key to understanding security threats 
therefore lies in understanding the systems which link human values to the technologies that 
put them under threat.” It is not so much the value of security itself that upsets and endangers 
societies, but rather its political transformations and social implementations. Those are the 
issues that I seek to explore throughout the ensuing narratives. After all, as Buzan and Hansen 
(2009: 26) remind us, “what is at stake in security debates is [..] often that empirical arguments 
and abstract ones challenge each other and this stacks the arguments in such a way that it is 
hard to find a resolution or even a common ground from which to debate.” 
 
First narrative: security as transformation1 
The initial narrative has shown that security has been a driving force when it comes to the 
organization of the social, and subsequently the establishment of the political. But, as has also 
become apparent, the state-wielding security of Hobbes is not the security that Neocleous 
(2008: 5) rants against – the security that provides “the master narrative through which the 
state shapes our lives and imaginations (security risks here, security measures there, security 
police everywhere), producing and organising subjects in a way that is always already 
predisposed towards the exercise of violence in defence of the established order.” Security as 
                                                     
1 More precisely, this narrative should be entitled ‘security in transformation’, as it is deals with the (academic) 
transformation of security itself, rather than with the transformative potential of security. Although the 
title might appear a little misleading, I have kept it for the sake of coherence with the rest of the 
narratives. 
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such has always been subjected to transformation. This first actual narrative will engage with 
the changing notions of security that have become reflected in the way that academia has 
dealt with questions of security in the past (roughly) three decades. As Walters  (2012: 2) has 
it, “that we live in times of profound transformation and uncertainty is, perhaps, something 
of a cliché” – however, there appears to be some truth in this oft-repeated mantra that 
becomes reflected in the evolving nature of security studies itself. The confusing multiplicity 
that we find in the academic landscape of security studies, broadly conceived, might be 
summarized such that security is very much a rapidly moving target. By asking a simple 
“Security! What do you mean?”, Huysmans (1998) has programmatically summarized the 
debates around questions of means and actors, of reference objects, of scopes and limits, of 
fields and modalities, of threats, dangers and emergencies, of epistemologies and 
methodologies (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 21). 
While “security studies has been mixed up with strategic studies” (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008b: 
1) from early on and as such came into being as part of the classical IR agenda, the field has 
undergone major transformations that stand connected to a changing world (the end of the 
Cold War dichotomy, globalization processes, climate change, increasingly asymmetrical 
conflicts and ensuing migration movements, and many more), but also to new ways of thinking 
critically about security, and not least the incorporation of novel and multiple disciplinary 
perspectives (for instance, sociology, criminology, history, and law). As Lakoff (2006: 269) 
frames it, “to an observer a decade before, it might have been surprising that a natural disaster 
and a terrorist attack would be considered part of the same problematic.” And yet here we 
are in a contemporary mode of security politics that desperately strive to cancel out every 
event that in some way could inflict harm on somebody (or something), and, in case this is not 
possible, at least be prepared to manage and mitigate disaster. And yet here we are in a 
contemporary field of security studies that has evolved throughout multiple layers of thought, 
that has challenged the conceptualizations of security over and over, and that has struggled 
to find a way to effectively bridge the gap between academia and ‘real world security’. In 
short: the field of security studies now appears more dynamic, but also more fragmented than 
ever, and security discourses remain filled with contradictions in both epistemological and 
ontological terms. Whereas security was once framed as something that existed between 
sovereign nation states, and that could be counted in terms of military capacities (strength of 
standing armies, guns, tanks, and, most of all, nuclear weapons) and operationalized in 
positivist terms, its meaning over the last decades has substantially expanded in width and 
depth. As Lipschutz (1995: 8), paraphrasing Morgenthau, puts it, now “there are not only 
struggles over security among nations, but also struggles over security among notions.” As 
such, new ways of thinking about security in a critical and multi-disciplinary fashion have also 
ascended to “refute the narrative of security as a ‘branch’ of International Relations” (Bigo 
and Tsoukala, 2008b: 6), and to pry away security studies from IR as its core discipline. 
During the “interregnum” (Booth, 1991) of “soul-searching debates on widening and 
(sub)disciplinary identity” (Wæver and Buzan, 2007: 385) in the 1980s and 1990s, the general 
agenda of security studies arrived at a forking path. As Buzan et al. (1998: 2) argue, “the ‘wide’ 
versus ‘narrow’ debate grew out of dissatisfaction with the intense narrowing of the field of 
security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsession of the Cold War.” 
Subsequently, scholars started to open up the field for new and challenging currents such as 
peace research, post-structuralism, feminism, constructivism, human security, and post-
colonialism (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 187-8), thus “deepening the referent object beyond the 
state, widening the concept of security to include other sectors than the military, giving equal 
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emphasis to domestic and trans-border threats, and allowing for a transformation of the 
Realist, conflictual logic of international security” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 188). Particularly 
in Europe, scholars turned to the philosophical foundations of (security) thought and went on 
to challenge and transform the concept of security itself (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 224).  
On the other hand, scholars in the US stayed much closer to the original agenda. Some even 
uttered fears about the “risk of expanding ‘security studies’ excessively” (Walt, 1991: 213), 
which would, so the argument, ultimately undermine the intellectual coherence of the field 
and detach the academic agenda from the real world problems it was supposed to be 
concerned with. Particularly in the US, security debates remain predominantly framed around 
questions of power that derive from (neo)realist schools of thought, and that establish 
positivist narratives of causality in security politics. In what Wæver and Buzan (2007: 394) have 
identified as a rather pragmatic, problem-solving approach to security, analytics evolve not so 
much around the concept and meaning of security itself (and subsequently around its social 
implications), but around concrete approaches to concrete problems. Such a rationalist stance 
appears, in a sense, closely entangled in the core disciplinary roots of IR. Its analyses run along 
the lines of the nation state as the central actor in the international system, and as such 
paradigmatically enact Morgenthau’s (1948) dictum of “politics among nations.” Security, 
through this particular lens, then becomes predominantly framed as a matter of territorial 
integrity and the capacity to fight off enemy armies/military forces. 
This is of course not to say that the ideal-typical US school of thought in security studies would 
not acknowledge the constant changes that our world is subjected to. On the contrary, with 
the events of 9/11 the latest, security scholars from all around the world have re-calibrated 
their foci – now zooming in on new forms of threat that come into being as “terrorist 
networks”, “international crime”, and such. Still, the positivist agenda of security studies is 
very much focused on foreign policy and warfare/armed conflicts. The European fork, on the 
other hand, has evolved in a particularly distinct direction. As Wæver (2004: 4) summarizes, 
there is now a vibrant debate of competing ‘schools’ in Europe, including the likes of critical 
security studies, the Copenhagen and Paris approaches to securitization theory, post-
modernism, feminism, sociology of the international, and still almost ‘classical’ realist 
positions. Thriving on intellectual discourse rather than on analyses of the public level, security 
scholars went on to “reflect and problematize the concept – in order to understand and unveil 
the practices by practitioners in the name of security” (Wæver and Buzan, 2007: 394). There 
is, however, not much agreement on how exactly this should be done. Should the modality of 
security be constituted through threats, danger and corresponding exceptional states and 
measures, or rather through mundane practices and everyday bureaucratic routines (Hansen, 
2008: 652)? As Buzan and Hansen (2009: 224) state, “there is, in other words, no one shared 
definition of what ‘expanding security’ should entail.” 
Where does this leave the current state of the art of studying security, then? There has not 
been one general trajectory, one straight path of flight that would have catapulted security 
studies beyond the intellectual challenge that was presented by the post-Cold War world. 
Rather, we find ourselves in an academic field that is struggling to find a common frame of 
identity. Against such struggle, I would, however, argue, that such an identity might not be 
necessary in the first place. The important lesson learned here is that the nature of security as 
such forbids a unified research agenda. Too manifold are its empirical manifestations, too 
manifold are its political applications, and too manifold are its ensuing social ordering 
processes to subsume them under one grand agenda. On the contrary, the ramifications of 
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security studies have had, after all, a positive effect. The toolbox of security studies has been 
substantially expanded and now provides a multiplicity of instruments that allow us not only 
to analyze, but also to challenge and critique security politics and practices. The latter is of 
utmost importance, if we keep in mind the initial narrative. 
Thus, the picture that has been sketched out so far has introduced the fragmented nature of 
the academic field of studying security. A more or less common ground can be identified, 
however, in the acknowledgement that security problems have escaped the grip of the nation 
state. Be it the fact that terrorism is now framed as a global and border-crossing phenomenon, 
the insight that the ‘classical’, twentieth century warfare has been extinct for decades in favor 
of asymmetrical conflicts, or the awareness that all-encompassing threats such as climate 
change and resource scarcity cannot be resolved in national solo efforts. Modernity in its 
globalized fashion, simply put, has boiled down to the ontological blurring of the once distinct 
policy fields of external and internal security. What we find today, as Burgess (2009: 321) puts 
it, is a “growing de-differentiation between previously distinct activities: fighting wars abroad, 
controlling populations at home and managing the border between these two spheres.” By 
any means, should the police or the army be responsive to cyber-attacks? And is a global 
pandemic an issue of maintaining internal order or one of fighting the disease abroad? 
The diversification of both threats and the field of studying security have arguably evolved 
alongside each other. As internal security, traditionally concerned with crime fighting and 
policing, with civil protection and with the maintenance of (social) order, and external 
security, traditionally concerned with defending the territorial integrity of the state and 
possibly warfare (Eriksson and Rhinard, 2009: 245), started to converge, security issues 
demanded new ways of thinking in order to be analyzed, and the academic field of security 
studies did just that. Modernity has turned out to be complex and fast-travelling, and so have 
threats and, accordingly, security policies. As Eriksson and Rhinard (2009: 246) have it, 
“because modern security issues travel along systems that stretch across functional and 
geographical boundaries, ‘transboundary security issues’ offer prima facie evidence of at least 
some bridging of the internal-external security divide.” The divide has become a nexus. As 
Bigo (2008a: 14) puts it, “we can no longer distinguish between an internal order reigning, 
thanks to the police, by holding the monopoly on legitimate violence, and an anarchic 
international order which is maintained by an equilibrium of national powers vis-à-vis the 
armies and diplomatic alliances.” The transformation of security has in fact managed to 
transcend old-fashioned dichotomies, as today “it is not possible to draw a new boundary 
between internal and everyday politics on one side, and the international and exceptional 
politics also called security on the other side. The two are intertwined or more exactly related 
as if in a Möbius strip” (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008b: 5). 
Thus, what this narrative of security as transformation once more emphasizes is the fluidity of 
security. It undergoes constant challenges in both epistemological and ontological terms – and 
subsequently also in political and social terms. This leads to the next narrative: while scholars 
have long argued (and still continue to argue) how best to think about security, politicians are 
rather concerned about the ways in which to enact security. And while those two sides might 
not necessarily have a lot in common, they are yet unified by at least one question: what is 
the external condition that suggests, enables, imposes, and eventually legitimizes security? 
Or, put differently: how is security reasoned? This is what the ensuing narrative is about. 
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Second narrative: security as securitization 
The first narrative has established the transformative notion of security that depends on the 
intellectual and political lens through which it is looked at. It has also introduced the rather 
limitless, constructivist notion of security as something that becomes defined by threats 
(which in terms also undergo constant transformation). Ultimately then, as Huysmans (2002: 
42), paraphrasing Wendt, puts it: “security is what agents make of it.” Thus, among such 
agents, security has entered a contested arena. Along the lines of this new way of thinking 
security, not only have concepts of security widened and deepened, but also has the 
theoretical toolbox of the discipline been substantially expanded. This second narrative looks 
into this toolbox. More specifically, it looks into securitization theory as a main theoretical 
framework that is concerned with how to analytically grasp the transformative processes that 
are induced by security reasoning. The seminal works of Wæver and his colleagues at the 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (now mostly referred to as the “Copenhagen school”) 
established a frame of security as the construction of threat on the public and political level 
(Wæver, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998). They propose to look at security as “the move that takes 
politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind 
of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23), eventually leading to securitization of 
areas/issues that had dealt with in the realm of regular politics before. Where threat in 
positivist theoretical stances was hitherto conceived of primarily as military capacities of 
states, this constructivist turn in security studies introduced an understanding of threats that 
emerge through discursive formations. As Buzan et al. (1998: 26) argue, “it is the utterance 
itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done.” Put simply: threats are socially 
constructed through speech acts – “threats have to be staged as existential threats to a 
referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency 
measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (Buzan et al., 1998: 5).  
Such an utterance must not be misunderstood as a statement about the materiality of the 
threat itself, but in terms of the public and political perception of something as a threat. 
Through speech acts, any given risk (that might even be a part of everyday life, and that we 
pay no particular attention to) can be discursively lifted to the state of acute, existential 
threats that must be dealt with swiftly and decisively, since, so the argument goes, ”if we do 
not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will 
not be free to deal with it in our own way)” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). This re-calibration of the 
analytical scope has considerably contributed to a re-conceptualization of security itself. 
Securitization theory is not so much interested in the nature of the threat, but in its 
transformation on the political level. By turning to the simple question of “what really makes 
something a security problem?” (Wæver, 1995: 54), the production of security against the 
backdrop of constructed threats emerges as the main scope for any analysis. Such a reading 
proposes an understanding of security that presents itself as flexible, fluid, and possibly all-
encompassing, as it depends on the prevalent (political) discourse. In fact, as Guzzini (2011: 
330) points out, in this vein “security is understood not through its substance but through its 
performance.” 
Framing something as a security issue then triggers a number of political consequences. Most 
notably it empowers the creation of an exceptional space where security threats can be 
tackled by the use of extraordinary means. Thus, the construction of threat on the political 
level transforms the political toolbox from what is at disposal in ‘normal’ politics to measures 
that would not be acceptable except for the state of emergency that had been induced by the 
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discursive framing of said threat. Notably, as will be dealt with in detail in the empirical 
section, the aviation system has been considerably securitized after 9/11, and against the 
backdrop of a presumed terrorist threat. As will be shown, new technologies, protocols, and 
modes of anticipatory governance have been implemented as a political response [Inquiries 
1; 4; 6], bringing about major changes in how we experience security today [Inquiry 2]. To be 
quite concise here: for securitization theory, it is not so much the threat itself that is being 
constructed, but its acknowledgement as an existential security threat on the political agenda. 
Once such acknowledgement has been achieved, security politics exit the realm of democratic 
legitimization, and enter an exceptional void which is determined exclusively by the argument 
of bare survival. In the vein of Carl Schmitt (1922), exception must be defined as “a situation 
of radical danger and contingency for which no prior law, procedure or anticipated response 
is adequate. It is a perilous moment that exceeds the limits of precedent, knowledge, 
legislation and predictability” (c.a.s.e. collective, 2006: 465). Post-9/11 security politics have 
largely been analyzed as outcomes from such exceptional political spaces, having allowed for 
the implementation of laws and technologies that would not have been acceptable if not for 
the framing of terrorism as immediate and existential threat. 
The notion of the exceptional has been contested, however. Especially when considering the 
extended duration of legislative processes and technological roll-outs and implementations, 
arguments that build on the immediacy to act right now appear rather unsuitable to hold up 
for multiple months or even years. And although several scholars have targeted the political 
attempts to permanently uphold states of threat and fear (Massumi, 2005; Bigo, 2002; Robin, 
2004), others have pointed out the unlikely role of the exceptional as a driver in multi-level 
institutional processes (Neal, 2009). A second strand of securitization theory thus argues that 
it is processes of normality and routine, rather than discursively constructed states of 
exception, which play a major role in securitization. The so-called Paris school, which evolved 
around the works of Bigo and his colleagues (Bigo, 1994; Bigo, 2001; Bigo, 2002; Bigo and 
Tsoukala, 2008a; Bigo and Walker, 2007), thus pays attention to the professionals that manage 
and enact security on an everyday level. Through this layer, so the argument goes, 
“exceptional security practices can be understood in the context of ongoing processes of 
technocratic, bureaucratic and market-driven routinization and normalization” (c.a.s.e. 
collective, 2006: 466). Simply put, such an approach frames securitization as a long-term 
process that is not necessarily located on the political level, but that evolves through the 
administrative and practical layers, closely entangled with the economy and the development 
of new security technologies. Such a perspective will highlight the role of industrial stakes, 
research and development in the case of body scanners in [Inquiry 4]. Subsequently, discursive 
‘grand narratives’ of security, as highlighted by the speech-act centered approach of the 
Copenhagen school, move to the background of the analytical picture. The main scope, on the 
contrary, lies on the underlying processes, rationalities, and practices of security. As Bigo 
(2002: 73) has it, “securitization works through everyday technologies, through the effects of 
power that are continuous rather than exceptional, through political struggles, and especially 
through institutional competition within the professional security field in which the most 
trivial  interests are at stake.” 
The everyday, however, even though ontologically strongly opposed to the exception, does 
not imply a straight path of flight. On the contrary, as the c.a.s.e. collective (a collaborative 
project of, broadly conceived, critical security scholars, 2006: 456) points out, “normality is 
simultaneously a field of struggle, where technologies for constituting subjects and ordering 
the social come up against the intransigence of political agency and the resistance of political 
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subjects.” Security, in this vein, remains contested, only that scholars inspired by the Paris 
school seek this contestation not on the public level of discourse, but rather in mundane 
activities and bureaucracies, in networks of experts and professionals, and in their claims that 
are underscored by the very expertise their occupation grants. As Balzacq (2011: 15) states, 
“the thrust of the argument is that beneath and above the ‘discursive’ level loom subtle yet 
decisive processes of securitization that only an approach through practices can disclose.” 
Such a struggle for power entails claims of authority, which arguably at times gives 
practitioners an edge over politicians. They can rely on their field expertise when it comes to 
making a case for, or against, specific tools and technologies of security. The outcome of 
securitization processes, through this lens, remains very much open, and depends on a 
multiplicity of stakes. As Bigo (2002: 76) puts it, “the security process is thus the result of a 
field effect in which no actor can be the master of the game but in which everyone’s 
knowledge and technological resources produce a hierarchy of threats.” 
In general, Paris school scholars start from the assumption that “practices of security are not 
given by nature but are the outcome of political acts by politicians and specialists on threat 
management” (Bigo, 2002: 68). Such a notion stems from the original focus on police work 
and police cooperation in Europe (Bigo, 1994; Bigo et al., 2007), as well as from the disciplinary 
roots of the Paris school that are located in political theory and sociology rather than in IR. 
Drawing particularly on the works of Bourdieu and Foucault, Bigo explicitly puts normative 
questions that derive from questions of security and its government on top of the research 
agenda. Mainly from research on EU migration policy and border control practices, he 
sketches out the dispositif of the ban-opticon, which is “characterized by the exceptionalism 
of power (rules of emergency and their tendency to become permanent), by the way it 
excludes certain groups in the name of their future potential behaviour (profiling) and by the 
way it normalized the non-excluded through its production of normative imperatives, the 
most important of which is free movement” (Bigo, 2008a: 32). Inclusion and exclusion, the 
permeability of borders and more generally the management of global flows of mobility in his 
analysis become closely entangled with the Foucauldian notion of a neoliberal agenda of 
letting productive elements (capital, goods, highly skilled and educated professionals) 
circulate while detaining those who cannot immediately contribute to the creation of 
economic surplus (asylum seekers, refugees, unskilled workforce). 
Security analyses thus entail fundamental questions of human rights and civil liberties, 
especially when their violations fade into seemingly ‘normal’ bureaucratic routines, the 
invisible and irretraceable automated calculations of risk scores in large databases [Inquiry 6], 
or the permanent intrusions of privacy not only through physical means but through 
ubiquitous practices of data collection and storage [Inquiries 1; 3]. It is precisely this 
unspectacular level of ostensibly harmless and mundane measures that Huysmans (2011) has 
identified as “little security nothings.” The by-default collection of credit card data, the 
retention of phone call details, or the CCTV camera on the street might not appear harmful. 
However, such nothings, when added up and used in the vein of a specific political agenda, 
can very much turn into security somethings that unfold the power to effectively (re-)order 
the social. The Paris school has made a strong case to look into those nothings/somethings 
through a sociologically informed methodology that is capable of probing the deeper levels of 
the emergence of security, and to subsequently drag them back to the light of the public, 
where harmful practices can be put under scrutiny and exposed to critique. 
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To even further complicate the intellectual configuration of securitization theory, a third 
‘school’ has evolved in Aberystwyth, mainly through the works of Booth and Wyn Jones 
(Booth, 1991; 2005b; Wyn Jones, 2001). In the tradition of critical theory and thus 
predominantly aiming to challenge political notions of realism and positivism, scholars of this 
rather incoherent ‘Welsh’ variant of securitization theory highlight a vision of security that 
does not in any way oppress, but rather empowers individuals and thus unfolds an 
emancipatory potential – thus most notably “thinking about security from the perspective of 
those people(s) without power – those who have been traditionally silenced by prevailing 
structures” (Booth, 2005a: 14). As such, the normative aspects of Paris and Aberystwyth 
interpretations of security do not so much differ in their goals than in their intellectual 
foundations. Where the former builds on the works of Foucault and Bourdieu, the latter draws 
on Frankfurt School authors such as Adorno and Horkheimer. 
The notion of schools, although compelling to structure the academic field, should however 
not be mistaken as a dogmatic distinction. In fact, as the c.a.s.e. collective (2006: 444) points 
out, “this categorization can be misleading if taken too seriously”, as it would imply 
disconnected strands of thinking about security. While this is certainly true for the scope of 
the analytical levels and their respective methodologies, the normative core premises of 
Copenhagen, Paris and Aberystwyth scholars strike very much into the same direction. The 
‘abuse’ of security as a means to enforce any political agenda, as opposed to the value of 
security as such, needs to be challenged – be this abuse constituted through the discursive 
construction of exceptional states of emergency, through incremental everyday practices and 
routines, or through the creeping power of the security industry, fostered by political means. 
This is ultimately the reason why Wæver (1995) initially called for the need to re-capture 
security and to re-establish it in the realm of regular, democratic politics: “desecuritization is 
the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as ‘threats against 
which we have countermeasures’ but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and 
into the ordinary public sphere” (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). 
If anything, the different strands of securitization theory can complement each other in order 
to close in on this normative goal. As Bigo (2002: 84) argues, “multiple discursive practices 
must be understood, as well as the heterogeneity of the nondiscursive practices as part of the 
same ‘dispositif’ (legal devices, political rhetoric, police practices, surveillance technologies, 
discourses on human rights, resistances of actors, and so on) in order to understand the 
articulation of knowledge and power relations.” After all, security politics emerge through a 
“kaleidoscope of practices non-reducible to a core meaning or/and a linguistic formulation” 
(Balzacq et al., 2010), and which are not likely to be easily captured through one ‘school’ or 
another. Stritzel (2007) has thus argued to overcome the analytical fragmentation and aim for 
a holistic approach that incorporates the distinct theoretical advances and re-combines their 
strengths in terms of analytical levels and methodologies. After all, a more comprehensive 
theory of securitization must aim to interpret security and its capacities of power and 
knowledge both in “symbolic and institutional contexts” (Huysmans, 2002: 52), and possibly 
even beyond that. As the c.a.s.e. collective (2006: 451) summarizes, the aim must be “to go 
beyond the artificial boundaries in order to combine a variety of critical approaches under a 
common framework without, nonetheless, reducing one approach to another.” 
However, despite those attempts to mainstream the agenda of critical security studies, 
particularly the sociological approach of the Paris school has, at an early stage of critical 
scholarship on security, opened up an analytical agenda that moves beyond the ‘classical’ 
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inquiries of the international and national political levels, and threat-centered security 
reasoning. As Huysmans (2011: 375) puts it, “securitizing in contemporary world politics 
develops significantly through unspectacular processes of technologically driven surveillance, 
risk management and precautionary governance. These processes are less about declaring a 
territorialized enemy and threat of war than about dispersing techniques of administering 
uncertainty and ‘mapping’ dangers.” This is what the next couple of narratives are about. 
 
Third narrative: security as future 
The third narrative explores a different strand of security politicality. If securitization is threat 
reasoning, then security epistemologies provide the underlying arguments for such reasoning. 
As is every other politics, security politics is concerned with the possibilities to actively shape 
the future according to a certain agenda or a particular (party) program, with the specificity 
that “for security policy, the assessment of dangers is essential” (Daase and Kessler, 2007: 
415). However, unfortunately, the future (threat) can never be known until it eventually 
materializes. And yet politics are regularly evaluated retrospectively by their anticipatory 
performance. Faced with this dilemma, distinct attempts of getting a grip on the future have 
evolved in order to predict it and subsequently fold it back into the present where it can be 
rendered actionable and its outcomes can supposedly be modulated. Put simply, it is the very 
essence of any politics to extend its potential into the temporally unknown and by one means 
or another make it knowable such that political agency is created. As Anderson (2010a: 778) 
argues, “in the enactment of better worlds, the future is constantly being folded into the here 
and now; a desired future may act as a spur to action in the present.” In security politics, 
subsequently, knowledge about threats must be created such that they can be tackled, and, 
in the best of worlds, canceled out, such that their detrimental impacts can be prevented. As 
Dillon (2011: 782) frames it, “the catastrophic threat-event of the dissolution of the temporal 
order of things is continuously also interrogated to supply the governing technologies, by 
which the political order is regulated in peace to be ‘fit’ for war and is regulated so as to resist 
the same catastrophic threat-event.” It is the event that is rendered as the epitome of security 
futures, and that defines its governing technologies. 
The event, in fact, is the great unifier of temporal uncertainties – the unifier under which all 
threats might be subsumed, no matter how dispersed their typologies might appear. As Lakoff 
(2006: 266) argues, a key mechanism for understanding security politics lies in the desire for 
anticipation and preparedness, for “in the imperative of preparedness, we find a shared sense 
of what ‘security’ problems involve today.” The event is the ontological form of all that which 
in some fashion or another might disturb the state of security, and yet the acknowledgement 
of the event itself is an acknowledgement of the very impossibility of security. As soon as we 
speak of the event, its actualization, and subsequently the materialization of a security threat, 
is always already implied. The politicality of the event then hinges on the modes of addressing 
it, and arguably two major trajectories can be distinguished here. The first mode of security 
futures accepts the eventual actualization of the event, and subsequently turns to questions 
of disaster management in order to mitigate the consequences of the event. This opens up a 
wide array of actions. As Lakoff (2006: 267) has it, “preparedness is an ‘abstract technology’ 
that can be made concrete in diverse ways, according to different political aims.” 
Preparedness can come into being through scenario planning, through simulation, or through 
the enactment of disaster and catastrophe. What those techniques have in common is the 
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creation of practical experience that can act as a guideline for behavior in similar (or different) 
contingencies.    
The second mode of addressing the future is to actively intervene into contingency and to try 
to cancel out the event. Even though especially post-9/11 security politics have emphasized 
such a need, both modes are not by any means mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they can 
be found throughout contemporary security policies in a multiplicity of empirical forms and 
combinations. What both temporally divided modes have in common is an epistemological 
quest – a quest for knowledge about the future, that is. As indicated above, there can be no 
certainty about the future, but only the twisted notion of certainty about the radical 
contingency of life. And yet, security politics must strive to come to actionable terms with this 
basic human condition of being incarcerated in the present. As Daase and Kessler (2007: 419) 
argue, “dangers are always conceptualized in terms of a ‘lack’ of knowledge. Dangers manifest 
themselves owing to incomplete knowledge.” As soon as the future could be rendered 
knowledgeable, so the best world scenario goes, it could be unlimitedly modified, and hence, 
secured. The lack of actionable foresight has been subjected to countless political and 
academic debates, and has been considerably re-kindled by the event of 9/11. The main 
trajectory of political discourse in its aftermath was that the attacks should have been 
thwarted by the US intelligence services – and that they could have been thwarted if only the 
available dots had been connected and thus rendered actionable in advance. Scholars have 
since been increasingly concerned with analyses of the evolving political ways of doing just 
that.  
The political twist of security, thought of in temporal terms, is to find a suitable mode of 
addressing the future in order to be able to reason about security in the future. However, due 
to the contingency that defines our existence in the world, extending knowledges beyond 
knowledge can never render any claims about futures to be true. As Dillon (2011: 782) argues, 
“every politics of security, by virtue of the very fact is a politics of the limit”, but there is a 
regular exceeding beyond such limits that is reflected in contemporary security politics. While 
being epistemologically virtual, security creates material impact. Instead of speaking 
epistemological truth, security (politics) has found a multiplicity of distinct ways to break 
down, rationalize, and calculate the future. Arguably, the most crucial and widely 
acknowledged mode of addressing the future is through the modality of risk.  
As Beck (2002: 40) has prominently laid out, risk represents an epistemologically impossible 
attempt of capturing contingency under the umbrella of rationality: “as soon as we speak in 
terms of ‘risk’, we are talking about calculating the incalculable, colonizing the future.” 
Subsequently, such an effort to calculate what cannot be calculated would ultimately result in 
the insight that through risk we merely might “feign control over the uncontrollable” (Beck, 
2002: 41) – without ever actually controlling it. Despite those epistemological shortcomings, 
numerous scholars have shown how a risk calculus is nonetheless politically applied in the 
domain of security (Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Daase and Kessler, 2007; de Goede and 
Randalls, 2009; Amoore, 2011; Lobo-Guerrero, 2011; Amoore and de Goede, 2008b). Risk, 
politically speaking, is then not necessarily a means of knowledge creation, but a means of 
government. Security becomes governed through risk (Aradau and van Munster, 2007), a 
notion that is taken up by [Inquiries 1; 6]. 
This notion of risk as technique of government is very much reflected in its genealogy. Ewald 
(2002: 283), in his analysis of the evolution of risk, notes that “we are now re-discovering the 
existence of disaster, but with the difference that disasters are no longer, as before, attributed 
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to God and Providence, but to human agency.” Risk, by capturing contingency and folding it 
into human agency, rationalizes what was once left to the supernatural, and translates destiny 
into modifiable and manageable numbers. The logic of probability is born out of modernity’s 
attempt to create ultimate control over the world. As Daase and Kessler (2007: 417) explain, 
“the emergence of probability, in other words, parallels an overall transformation of societies 
manifested in the discovery of the subject, social contract theory, the invention of positive law 
and subjective rights, and thus a particular modern notion of knowledge and understanding 
of how the world might be known.” The overarching notion here is one of humanity actively 
striving to get in control of itself and its surroundings. Rationalization and governing are 
intertwined concepts, with risk providing a capable connector to both create an account of 
the world and to subsequently mold it. 
The concept of risk has been subjected to multiple political and social transformations 
throughout modernity. Ewald (2002) identifies a series of shifting notions, ranging from 
providence to prevention and eventually precaution, thereby tracking the incorporation of 
risk from the individual to the societal level and its evolving openness to the exceeding of 
‘hard’ science. While risk as providence is still “linked to the notions of fate, chance and 
misfortune, and hazard” (Ewald, 2002: 293), prevention for the first time seeks to establish 
calculability and as such a “rational approach to an evil that science can objectify and 
measure” (Ewald, 2002: 293). It is this very extrapolation from measurement and past 
experience that Beck has criticized as epistemologically pretentious – but nonetheless 
politically powerful. However, in this vein, as experience has time and time again 
demonstrated the factual impossibility to calculate the future, another mode of risk has 
emerged. Precaution strives to supersede the notion of statistics by addressing “threats and 
dangers that are irregular, incalculable, and, in important ways, unpredictable” (de Goede, 
2011: 9). Most prominently, Beck (1999) has shown how the “precautionary principle” has 
emerged through the uncertainties of environmental damage and the attempts to get a grip 
on its possible consequences. As such, “precautionary logics act before the identified threat 
reaches a point of irreversibility” (Anderson, 2010a: 789), thereby diving deep into the realm 
of future scenarios that are not necessarily grounded in facts. 
Anderson (2010a), in his analysis of the event, adds preemption as another layer of risky 
futurity, exceeding the previous. Preemption has come to enact a prominent role in the so-
called ‘war on terror’, as it accepts the fact that future events cannot by any means be known 
in their eventual shape, and might thus considerably differ from known events of the past. 
This insight has been (in)famously expressed by former US Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld, when he referred to the “unknown unknowns” that security faces in the proclaimed 
‘war on terror’. Preemption strongly overlaps with precaution, in which, as Amoore and de 
Goede (2008a: 11) frame it, “a desire for zero risk joins a vision of worst case scenarios in order 
to enable preemptive action against perceived terrorist threats.” However, as Anderson 
(2010a: 790) argues, preemption has to “break with the logic of risk”, as it “acts over threats 
that have not yet emerged as determinate threats.”  
In this vein, preemption appears as epistemologically puzzling, as it seeks to produce security 
against the backdrop of a double uncertainty. Neither do we know, according to its logic, what 
the event will be, nor do we know when it will occur. Due to the epistemological break with 
the rationality of risk, preemption strives to render the event knowable in different ways. As 
Massumi (2007) has argued, preemption operates in a virtual realm of potentialities that are 
folded back into the actionable real world without ever realizing their potential – therefore 
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endlessly circulating and eventually leading to what Amoore (2013) has compellingly 
described as a “politics of possibility.” Partly being grounded in the same efforts of data 
collection and modelling as risk calculus, but at the same time aware of the fact that the 
probability rationale can never suffice, preemption then opts to operate at the interstice 
between real world facts and the virtual possibilities that can be derived from them. [Inquiry 
6] looks into such practices empirically, building on proposed advanced analytics of PNR data 
in order to establish new types of threat hypotheses – and the potentially devastating 
consequences for the legal anti-discrimination framework. As a probability calculus inevitably 
fails in the face of the unknown, preemption strives to incorporate possibility and has thus in 
fact ascended to be the new and more fitted mode of political action (and reason). 
The failure of traditional modes of anticipation has been broadly made evident by 9/11. The 
event itself had obviously superseded the anticipatory capacities of US security agencies, as it 
had not been subjected to sufficient action to prevent it. In fact, as the report of the 9/11 
Commission (2004: 343) points out, “there was uncertainty among senior officials about 
whether this was just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary terrorist threat 
America had lived with for decades, or was radically new, posing a threat beyond any yet 
experienced.” It is precisely this distinction from past experiences that had disabled modes of 
probability calculus – the logics of security appeared to remain stuck in well-known patterns 
of threat and failed to engage the openness and creativity of the terrorist cell that eventually 
turned out to cause the catastrophic event. Despite recognizing that hindsight is always 20/20, 
the report goes on to state that, “looking back, we are struck with the narrow and 
unimaginative menu of options for action offered to both President Clinton and President 
Bush” (9/11 Commission, 2004: 350). If it was indeed a failure of imagination that had 
undermined security operations that could have prevented such a devastating event, then 
how to prevent this failure in the future? How to get a better grip of the future? 
Academic debates have been rather cautious about those questions. As Daase and Kessler 
(2007: 427) argue, “to the extent to which terrorist attacks are perceived as a disaster in the 
sense of the unknown unknowns, the FBI and the secret services of the world are off the hook, 
as the possibility of ‘governing’, regulating and taming terrorism diminishes [emph. in orig.].” 
Radically speaking, security epistemologies can only ever be a mere approximation of the 
future. Indeed, if there is “a clear connection between the concept of security and 
epistemology” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 32), then it must ultimately epitomize in the 
impossibility of a definite temporal epistemology of security. 
Politicalities of the future, however, need not necessarily come to logical terms with their 
epistemological pitfalls and fine-grained modalities. As O’Malley (2000: 459) summarizes the 
rather simple mechanism of anticipatory security politics: “risk is imagined, both by the 
governors who deploy it, and by those who study its deployment, as an element in the conduct 
of conduct.” Thus, politically, the modes of addressing the future serve as a means of (re-
)ordering the social. It does so through governing techniques that build on and are embedded 
in the rationalization processes of modernity that introduced risk in the first place. As 
Anderson (2010a: 784) argues, “the result is that specific futures are made present through 
the domain of number, numbers which are then visualized in forms of ‘mechanical objectivity’ 
such as tables, charts and graphs.” However, if specific futures are made present, then on the 
flipside other futures are rendered invisible by modes of non-representation, and this is the 
very mechanism that Daase and Kessler (2007: 428) identify as the point of entry for a political 
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and social agenda, as “not-to-be-wanted-to-be-known knowledge is systematically withheld 
or disregarded as soon as it does not fit with operative concepts.” 
The representation of futures easily exceeds the logics of statistical models as soon as, as 
Amoore (2011: 27) frames it, “contemporary risk calculus does not seek a causal relationship 
between items of data, but works instead on and through the relation itself.” Such an 
operation becomes even more problematic, as “risk calculation itself is never made visible” 
(Amoore and de Goede, 2008a: 6) and thus re-locates security into the realm of the opaque 
that cannot be retraced, challenged or critiqued (Rouvroy, 2013). As Amoore (2011: 30) 
argues, “there can be no certainty about the association between data on a flight route, a 
method of payment, ticket type, or a past ‘no show’, for their relation is not causal but 
correlative. What matters instead is the capacity to make inferences across the data, such that 
derivatives can be recognized, shared, and actioned.” Security as future is not constructed as 
an argument based on facts, but rather as an argument based on speculations – and if 
speculations introduce an element of suspicion which must necessarily canceled out by 
intense scrutiny on all levels, then the epistemological rifts of the future pan out in the present 
[Inquiries 1; 6]. 
Subsequently, there are major implications from the transformation of risk as a mode of 
governing. As Bigo (2008b: 113) explains, “if security is a governmentality of risk and risk is 
now associated with a worst-case scenario beyond any calculus of probability and a quasi-
astrological assessment of the future, then any contingency read as an accident, a major 
catastrophe, a possible Armageddon, re-enacts the argument of the exception inside the risk 
approach.” Here the narrative of security as future re-connects to the narrative of security as 
securitization. Futures produce virtual emergencies that could materialize at any given 
moment. If, as Daase and Kessler (2007: 418) argue, “risk names the boundary of what an 
individual can and does (not) know, what lies in his responsibility or what is subject to, for 
example, a ‘higher force’”, then the modulation of risk itself on the political level creates an 
effective mechanism that not only enables knowledges, but at the same time disables other 
knowledges – knowledges that arguably conceptualize security futures as ordinary futures 
that need not rely on exceptional political states. 
As has been shown earlier, threats create spaces of ultimate political agency, even if their 
status remains forever virtual. Managing such virtuality then becomes key for any politics of 
security, as the nature of virtuality defines what is governable. If “risk-based calculative 
models and practices are emerging as a key means of identifying vulnerable spaces and 
suspicious populations in the war on terror” (Amoore and de Goede, 2008a), then who 
controls the nature of risk can subsequently claim control over both spaces and populations. 
As Amoore (2005: 149) puts it, “from the protection of borders to international financial flows, 
from airport security to daily financial transactions, risk assessment is emerging as the most 
important way in which terrorist danger is made measurable and manageable.” The individual 
then becomes recoded into a possibly disruptive element whose detrimental potential must 
be canceled out or neutralized. This brings about major implications for any critique of security 
and its modes of analysis. As Bigo (2012: 283) points out, from a normative standpoint “it is 
then central to analyze the transformation of democracy and freedom implied by a view of 
the future as a future already known, as a ‘future antérieur’, as a future perfect.” 
Scholars have indeed been increasingly concerned with the consequences that emerge from 
such a fetish of the future, most notably in terms of social sorting and discrimination, but also 
in terms of the legal framework. As Tsoukala (2010: 44) argues, “vanishing legal personhood 
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is not a side effect but the natural outcome of the prevalence of the risk-focused mindset in 
both the crime control and the human rights realms.” Attempts to theoretically re-capture an 
enforceable legal status appear in fact rather bleak. This is partly due to the ubiquitous and 
invisible nature of contemporary data surveillance that has become a key element of the 
government through risk. As Bigo (2008b: 109) claims, “by dematerialising through data 
information-gathering, a security dispositif not only acquires a speed that transcends borders, 
but also an ambition to monitor and control the future through profiling and morphing.” We 
will in greater length come back to such issues in the fifth narrative that looks into security as 
surveillance. Another consequence from security as futurity is the increasing detachment from 
democratic mechanisms. As Aradau and van Munster (2007: 108) have it, “the infinity of risk 
does not lead to a democratic politics that debates what is to be done, but to intensified 
efforts and technological inventions on the part of the risk managers to adjust existing risk 
technologies or to supplement them.” This second strand of implications will be further 
tackled in the sixth narrative that deals with security as technology. 
 
Fourth narrative: security as government 
The preceding narrative has already laid out some of the analytical issues that are to follow. 
However, before turning to the narratives of security as surveillance and technology, this 
fourth narrative explores the seemingly banal notion of security as government. Given its 
political and social registers, it would indeed be a contradiction in terms to speak of security 
not as government. In this vein, all of the empirical inquiries of this thesis are concerned with 
security as government. However, what at first glance appears as a rather basic insight in fact 
opens up a wide agenda for research on specific governing techniques that build on security 
as their core preoccupation. As Dean (2006: 22) puts it, “an analytics of government takes as 
its central concern how we govern and are governed within different regimes, and the 
conditions under which such regimes emerge, continue to operate, and are transformed 
[emph. in orig.].” In order to come to terms with such analytics, we must distinguish between 
two major strands of literature that are concerned with the government of security. Research 
on security governance has been predominantly concerned with the changing role of the state 
and private actors in policing and the provision of security within national boundaries more 
generally. The second body of literature is rather concerned with the notion of governing 
itself, and explores how it plays out through complex assemblages and controversies, and how 
distinct techniques of governing have historically been evolving around particular 
problematiaztions. Such a notion of governmentality is deeply rooted in the works of Foucault, 
and has more recently been valued and taken up by scholars of security. 
Foucault has plainly framed the central issue of concern for any analysis of government around 
the question of how power can be exercised over individuals and populations such that their 
behavior can be modulated. “Governmentality, that is to say, the way in which one conducts 
the conduct of men” (Foucault, 2008: 186), must be understood as historically contingent and 
emergent, however not bound by some underlying trajectory or political telos, but rather as 
the resultant from temporally and spatially specific problem constellations. To think about 
government in terms of governmentality requires us to move away from state-centric 
conceptualizations, and even from the general notion of the possibility of centralized power 
that could be executed by a single instance according to a specific rationality. Traditionally, as 
Dean (2006: 9) points out, “in most cases the question of government is identified with the 
state”, but such a conceptualization of government in fact falls short of how government 
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comes into being empirically. Instead, an acknowledgment of the multitude of forces that 
consistently negotiate and re-negotiate political programs, concrete policies, and fine-
grained, capillary sets of practices then frees any analysis of government from the risk of 
reproducing simplistic binaries of state power/population submission. For Foucault, power is 
not something can be identified and pinned down in one particular location. Rather, power is 
relational and as such something that is constantly produced and re-produced among multiple 
agencies and actors. As Dean (2006: 29) puts it, “power, from this point of view, is not a zero-
sum game played within an a priori structural distribution. It is rather the (mobile and open) 
resultant of the loose and changing assemblage of governmental techniques, practices and 
rationalities [emph. in orig.].” 
Thus, we must not look for power, and subsequently government, exclusively in the domain 
of the state. As Foucault (2008: 6) emphasizes, “the state is not a cold monster; it is the 
correlative of a particular way of governing”, incorporating a multiplicity of elements and 
techniques. Thus, if “all organised social existence, including all practices of liberty, 
presupposes forms of the ‘conduct of conduct’” (Dean, 2006: 35), then how can we analytically 
come to terms with such conduct of conduct? In order to do so, we must return to the question 
of power and its re-conceptualization from a technique of domination to a capillary and free-
floating construct devoid of any presupposed agenda. As Walters (2012: 14) explains, “within 
the nominalist worldview that Foucault cultivated there is no power in general, only specific 
‘dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings’ that it is the researcher’s task to 
carefully map, and distinguish.” It is in fact an empirical research agenda that must derived 
from such an understanding of government.  
Foucault has in his works genealogically centered around the emergence of historical 
techniques of government, understood in the form of ‘events’ such as the “birth of the prison” 
(Foucault, 1977), the “birth of the clinic” (Foucault, 1994), or the “birth of biopolitics” 
(Foucault, 2008). The historical scope as well as its radical empiricism have rendered the 
notion of governmentality as “highly capable of registering all manner of subtle (and not so 
subtle) shifts in the rationalities, technologies, strategies and identities of governance” 
(Walters, 2012: 3). Governmentality, as Walters (2012: 18) has it, must indeed be interpreted 
as a call to “engage all objects – and subjects – as effects, as products, as entities that are not 
natural but as emergent within contingent historical processes”, and thus to provide an 
account of power and government as precise as possible. 
Thus, how has the government of security, and, most notably, through security, been analyzed 
empirically? As has been indicated above, a wide body of literature on security governance 
has evolved mainly through the works of criminologists and scholars of (penal) law, taking off 
in the 1980s. In the fashion of the Foucauldian scope on historical events, we might think of 
the preoccupation of this literature on private security as ‘the birth of commodification’, as it 
centers around transformations of police work and the increasing role of a growing security 
market. It is arguably this scope on the market that has led to the fact that “in a great deal of 
the literature govermentality has been used and interpreted as almost synonymous with 
liberal and/or neoliberal governance” (Walters, 2012: 10). As Wood and Dupont (2006b: 2) 
clarify with regard to the criminological notion of security governance, “the term ‘governance’ 
in this context refers to conscious attempts to shape and influence the conduct of individuals, 
groups and wide populations in furtherance of a particular objective – in this case, ‘security’.” 
Be it framed as governmentality or as governance, what unites both strands of research is 
their reluctance to ascribe a prioritized role to the state. Research on security governance has 
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been preoccupied with the transformation of police work and thus with specific constellations 
of ‘internal security’ that have become shaped by processes of rationalization and 
privatization. Subsequently, we can find a strong economic notion in these works. 
Thus, how did such a presupposed ‘birth of commodification’ come about? How come the 
provision of security through state agencies today at times appears to be equated, if not 
superseded by private security companies (and analogously the military by private military 
companies)? As Jones and Newburn (2002: 134) point out, “current developments are perhaps 
[..] better presented as the continuation of a long-term trend extending back several decades 
rather than a seismic shift occurring in the dying years of the twentieth century.” We might 
even have to go further back. As Marquis (2003: 231) highlights, “private policing, far from 
being a twentieth-century invention, was a creature of the Commercial and Industrial 
Revolutions” and as such must be conceived as a contingent phenomenon that has evolved 
alongside the emergence of increasing wealth and private property that had to be protected 
– but recently also with a fundamental shift in penal law that has profoundly affected policing 
practices. As Feeley and Simon (1992: 452) argue, this “new penology is markedly less 
concerned with responsibility, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and 
treatment of the individual offender.” Those classical paradigms of prosecution and 
punishment have been partly abandoned and re-combined with new elements that have 
arrived in the wake of liberal developments and privatizations, most prominently in the US 
and the UK. A resulting new mode of penal law, as Feeley and Simon (1992: 452) have it, is 
then “concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by 
dangerousness.” In other words, policing has been transformed into a managerial task that 
engages the future on the basis of risk.  
Such a mode of security provision strongly re-connects to the preceding narrative of security 
as future that has explored the notion of risk more in-depth. Ericson and Haggerty (1997) have 
compellingly shown how policing has been re-constituted through the paradigm of risk. As 
Ericson (1994: 151) frames the central issue, the preoccupation for the police has adjusted 
according to such a logic of risk – now “it is knowledge for security that constitutes their 
trade.” If police work is mainly knowledge work, then subsequently the task of actually 
enacting security on the ground level must not necessarily remain within the domain of the 
police, after all. Security, through such transformation, has become a tradable asset and its 
provision is “becoming ever more fragmented and commodified” (Loader, 1997: 377). This is 
not to say that state security forces would have withdrawn from their classical tasks, but that 
the emergence of a ‘market’ for security has created a multiplicity of constellations – including 
the outsourcing or out-contracting of policing to private security firms, public-private 
partnerships, and the establishment of novel security provisions such as the patrolling of a 
specific neighborhood by private companies that had not been covered by the state before – 
that subsequently have brought about a multiplicity of questions towards the normative 
implications of such new assemblages of security. [Inquiry 5] engages such new constellations 
empirically, looking into practices of out-contracting screening duties at German airports. 
Speaking in very simple terms, “governance can be good or bad” (Rose, 1999: 16), and along 
this simple question the literature is indeed very much divided. While some have argued that 
“new and re-configured forms of community governance can serve to address, and ideally 
reduce, the governance deficits [emph. in orig.]” (Shearing and Wood, 2003a: 207) that have 
been diagnosed as inherent to an inflexible apparatus of state agencies, others have uttered 
considerable doubts towards the very idea of a commodification of security provision. 
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Referring to security as value, as has been laid out in the first narrative, Loader (1997: 383) 
highlights that “there is something about security that means its provision cannot simply be 
left to the unfettered market.” From such a perspective, security as government then must be 
strongly linked to the state due to issues of accountability and democratic legitimization of 
the execution of power through state agencies. In this vein, only the state, as represented 
through the police and other state agencies, would be legitimized to provide and enforce 
security. From a normative stance, as the c.a.s.e. collective (2006: 464) summarizes, “the aim, 
here, is to understand what happens when discourses of (in)security, historically considered 
as enactments of state sovereignty, are said to refer to the presumably ‘marketized’ and 
‘democratized’ realm of private security operators.” 
In fact, as Loader (1999: 386) argues, there is a “diffuse unease about permitting market 
imperatives to determine the distribution and accountability of policing and security.” Such 
unease arguably derives from the increasingly neoliberal colonization of security as a market 
in the first place, and the ensuing reluctance to establish clear-cut regulatory boundaries for 
something as delicate as security (Zedner, 2006a: 276). After all, from a neoliberal perspective, 
such mechanisms would hurt the market equilibrium, and subsequently decrease its efficiency 
as well as the profits that can be generated through the provision of security. The seventh 
narrative of security as economy will engage with issues of marketization and privatization of 
security in more depth. For now, we must keep in mind that research on the transformation 
of policing has relatively early come to terms with the empirical notion that “on a continuum 
of a whole range of commercial services, it is now increasingly difficult to say where the private 
security sector begins or ends” (Jones and Newburn, 1996: 106). 
The messiness of such a continuum approach is the very notion that re-connects research on 
security governance to scholarship on the broader notion of governmentality. As has been 
empirically diagnosed within the field of policing, in governing processes “there is a plurality 
of governing agencies and authorities, of aspects of behaviour to be governed, of norms 
invoked, of purposes sought, and of effects, outcomes and consequences” (Dean, 2006: 10). 
Security as government then must necessarily be thought of as something that needs to be 
empirically researched in order to understand its elements and the involved stakes, 
trajectories, actors, institutions, and the problems around which they constitute themselves. 
As Rose (1999: 18) summarizes the task, such research includes “the invention and assembly 
of a whole array of technologies that connected up calculations and strategies developed in 
political centres to those thousands of spatially scattered points where the constitutional, 
fiscal, organizational and judicial powers of the state connect with endeavours to manage 
economic life, the health and habits of the population, the civility of the masses and so forth.” 
The analysis of such scattered and dispersed elements then needs to be realized through the 
opening up of assemblages of government, through their careful disassembly, and through 
scrutiny of the discourses that have rendered them powerful against the backdrop of 
particular (security) problems of government. 
In such disassembly lies powerful critical potential. As Dean (2006: 38) emphasizes, “an 
analytics of government removes the ‘naturalness’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ character of how 
things are done” and thus opens up the possibility to question the particular nature of 
assemblages of security. Why is security structured the way it is? Why have surveillance, 
technologies, and the economy evolved as such strong leitmotifs of security, as will be laid out 
in the following narratives? As Rose (1999: 18) has it, “it is within this field of governmentality 
that one sees the continual attempts to define and redefine which aspects of government are 
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within the competence of the state and which are not, what is and what is not political, what 
is public and what is private, and so forth.” Thus, an analysis in the vein of governmentality 
can not only help to diagnose the modes in which government is enacted through the domain 
of security, but at the same time expose and challenge them. Such challenge must then run 
through the registers of truth and knowledge that are constitutive of the power that enables 
the conduct of conduct. Neither of those categories are stable, however. Regimes of 
government “involve practices for the production of truth and knowledge, comprise multiple 
forms of practical, technical and calculative rationality, and are subject to programmes for 
their reform” (Dean, 2006: 18-9). 
Such continuous reform is in fact crucial for an analysis of security as government. As Dean 
(2006: 27) points out, “the key starting point of an analytics of government is the identification 
and examination of specific situations in which the activity of governing comes to be called 
into question, the moments and the situations in which government becomes a problem.” 
Government that evolves through security, as has been shown, must build on the construction 
and/or acknowledgement of specific threats. Most strikingly, for a large part of more than one 
decade by now, security politics have been dominated by the paradigm of global terrorism, 
and governing practices in the name of counter-terrorism have, based on the argument that 
terrorist attacks could happen anywhere and at any time, extended deeply into our everyday 
lives. The problems/threats to be governed are not limited to issues of terrorism, however. As 
has been shown earlier, security threats are rather limitless in their nature and can come into 
being through various layers of discourse, practices, knowledges, and technologies. 
Nonetheless, around such problematizations of security in the form of threats evolves the 
politicality of security, and thus in the Foucauldian conceptualization they must be researched 
as contingent events of shifting modes of governing. As Rose (1999: 19) frames the issue, 
governmentality presupposes “studies of a particular ‘stratum’ of knowing and acting. Of the 
emergence of particular ‘regimes of truth’ concerning the conduct of conduct, ways of 
speaking truth, persons authorized to speak truths, ways of enacting truths and the costs of 
so doing. Of the invention and assemblage of particular apparatuses and devices for exercising 
power and intervening upon particular problems.” 
In terms of the specific field of security then, as Dupont (2006: 87) lays out, “the multiplication 
of institutional actors and corporatist interests that seek to maintain or enhance their position 
has created many sources of frictions and opportunities for power struggles, over or covert.” 
Taking into account those very struggles then indeed opens up a space for normative 
intervention, as it enables an “open and critical relation to strategies for governing, attentive 
to their presuppositions, their assumptions, their exclusions, their naiveties and their 
knaveries, their regimes of vision and their spots of blindness” (Rose, 1999: 19). In summary, 
analyzing security as governmentality implies the willingness of the researcher to fully cherish 
the messy and complicated nature of government and to analytically, as well as normatively, 
thrive on the radical insight that things could have turned out different, thus in fact 
empowering distinct (virtual) conceptualizations of security. 
Numerous scholars have built on such a contingent notion and have used such spaces in order 
to put forward blazing critique towards contemporary regimes of security that at times appear 
to be dominated by an emphasis on threat and insecurity. Indeed, a common frame of such 
critiques is a reading of government through insecurity. As Neocleous (2008: 4) provocatively 
asks, “what if at the heart of the logic of security lies not a vision of freedom or emancipation, 
but a means of modelling the whole of human society around a particular vision of order?” 
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Arguably, we must keep in mind here the fact that security always prescribes its own 
pathology. As the c.a.s.e. collective (2006: 460) points out, this pathology entails a security 
trap, meaning that “one cannot necessarily establish a feeling of security, understood as a 
feeling of freedom from threat, simply by securitizing more issues or by securitizing them 
more.” As Balzacq (2011: 2) argues, “in short, security problems can be designed or they can 
emerge out of different practices, whose initial aim (if they ever had) was not in fact to create 
a security problem.” But what if this pathology was to be used and modulated by 
contemporary modes of government as a means of exercising power according to specific 
aims? As Bigo (2008b: 105) argues, “security produces insecurity. It excludes in the name of 
protection and always discriminates within society. It abnormalises the margins and creates 
boundaries within the social space.” The ensuing narrative explores how such a presupposed 
agenda of social sorting comes into being through security as surveillance. 
 
Fifth narrative: security as surveillance 
The fourth narrative has explored security as a technique of governing, both through the 
complex and contingent modes of its production, and its positioning alongside the continuum 
of the public-private divide between both state and non-state actors. Following up on this 
notion, the fifth narratives engages a particular technique of governing that is not exclusively 
limited to contexts of security, but that has nonetheless become inextricably linked to 
discourses of security: surveillance. Surveillance is not by any means a phenomenon of the 
digital age (Marquis, 2003: 226), but, as Monahan (2006a: 10) argues, “even before the 
automation of surveillance, modern bureaucracies and architectures functioned as pervasive 
technical systems of social control.” However, as Lyon (2003b: 1) notes, surveillance “now 
occurs routinely, locally and globally, as an unavoidable feature of everyday life in 
contemporary societies”, rendering it part of the array of mundane and often unnoticed 
practices that are crucial for any sociologically inspired analysis of securitization processes. 
Physical surveillance (most notably the human gaze and its electronic successor, CCTV) today 
has long been surpassed by digital surveillance, or, as Amoore and de Goede (2005) have 
framed it, “dataveillance.” 
In the data-driven and digitized environment we face today, data are almost by default 
harvested as we carry out everyday tasks such as making phone calls and writing e-mails, 
surfing the internet and shopping by credit card, or in fact just walking the streets. This has 
indeed led to a widely acknowledged notion of quasi-limitless surveillance. Subsequently, in 
their seminal article on the state of surveillance in contemporary societies, Haggerty and 
Ericson (2000: 611) have migrated Rousseau’s dictum of the impossibility of freedom to a 
rather bleak description of present times’ dataveillance. As they have it, “humans are born 
free, and are immediately electronically monitored.” Surveillance, as Lyon et al. (2012: 1) 
argue, enacts a social ordering process that “comprises the collection, usually (but not always) 
followed by analysis and application of information within a given domain of social, 
environmental, economic or political governance.” Any research agenda centered around 
surveillance must thus focus on what happens with data. How are data collected, stored, 
transformed, combined, circulated, and eventually algorithmically analyzed in order to create 
power and control? After all, “categorizing others necessarily contributes to how we treat 
them” (Jenkins, 2012: 160) and thus entails a multitude of political and social implications. 
As Ball and Webster (2003: 7-8) point out, distinct domains of application in fact foster 
different types of surveillance, ranging from the seduction of customers based on 
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consumption profiles, to the categorical exposure of personal details in the media, and 
eventually to proposed beneficial forms of surveillance for the purpose of improved services 
and care in the health sector. Especially the latter has become a fashionable argument lately, 
as it arguably depicts a benevolent form of surveillance that one can hardly be opposed to. 
However, as Monahan (2010: 91) warns, “although control could be exercised with 
surveillance systems for purposes of care or protection, such systems are most often 
characterized by coercion and repression, and offer few avenues for accountability or 
oversight.” With regard to health care, for instance, insurances have shown strong interest in 
the medical records of patients in order to improve their risk assessment models and adjust 
payment rates for given individuals. Thus, if diagnostic data of some kind of disease would 
leak from medical records, insurance rates in that scenario would quickly sky-rocket. 
Benevolence would then quickly be turned into a ruthless business case – with both angles 
hinging on the power that surveillance creates. 
Of most relevance for questions of security, however, is the categorical suspicion that 
“involves surveillance that is concerned with identification of threats to law and order” (Ball 
and Webster, 2003: 7). In this vein, as Bigo (2008a: 18) adds, “surveillance projects itself on 
spaces, states, and persons seen as a danger and a threat to national security and public 
order.” Thus, surveillance is a highly effective technique for ordering the social. As Murakami 
Wood et al. (2003: 150) argue, the all-encompassing nature of scrutiny possibly enabled by 
surveillance practices relies on a very simple mechanism of power imbalance between the 
‘watcher’ and the ‘watched’ that must be closely scrutinized in its empirical forms. Ultimately, 
as they frame the issue, “surveillance is a uniquely simple concept, but is an empirically 
complex, emergent phenomenon, and is inextricably bound up with issues of power.” 
Analyses of such issues of power imbalance often draw on Bentham’s (1995) prominent figure 
of the panopticon. The panopticon, an architectural design for a prison originally published in 
1787, would allow prison guards to visually survey all areas of the building from a centralized 
room. The prison inmates, on the other hand, would not be able to see the guards, rendering 
the panopticon an effective mechanism of control. 
Foucault (1977) has later taken up the figure of the panopticon, but analytically from a reverse 
angle. Whereas for Bentham, the idea of prison surveillance was linked to a very concrete 
empowerment of guards and his subsequent argument about improved effectiveness of 
control mechanisms, the Foucauldian angle rather highlights the effects of such surveillance 
on the prisoners. For Foucault, the panopticon enacts a power asymmetry between the 
watchers and the watched, most notably disciplining the latter by implying the mere 
possibility of being watched at any given moment. As Elmer (2012: 23) explains, “Foucault’s 
panopticon emphasizes an enactment of surveillance, a subjectivation of power, as instilled in 
prisoners who architecturally speaking must assume ubiquitous surveillance, that they may 
be under inspection at any time, night or day.” This notion of enforced self-discipline has very 
much become a dictum for scholars studying surveillance – especially as contemporary 
surveillance practices through the digital realm have become indirect and remote. As Haggerty 
and Ericson (2000) argue, data are now easily collected, disassembled, circulated, and 
eventually re-assembled for a variety of purposes. In such fashion, individuals are digitally 
encoded, with analytical relevance ultimately assigned to their “data doubles.” To stay within 
the metaphor: the panopticon has long lost its walls and has become an integral part of 
everyday life. Such a notion will be taken up by [Inquiries 1; 6]. 
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The social implications of a digital and increasingly invisible everyday-panopticon are massive. 
As Monahan (2006a: 12) claims, “a ‘panoptic’ effect on social behavior, meaning that people 
tend to police themselves and refrain from any actions that might verify their presumed status 
as deviants in the eyes of unseen others.” Individuals must then constantly question 
themselves in terms of the implications someone might derive from their data profiles. An 
analysis of surveillance must not be limited to the individual level, however. As indicated 
before, surveillance has become an effective political mechanism for the ordering of the 
social, most notably through the capacity to measure, sort, and classify populations. As Lyon 
(2006c: 221) emphasizes, “garnering personal details without the individuals concerned 
knowing about – let alone consenting to – it has become routine”, and subsequently has the 
power increased that is generated by surveillance. The scale of surveillance has risen from 
particular groups to whole populations and has enabled wide-ranging schemes of social 
sorting (Lyon, 2003d). Surveillance as social sorting has become closely intertwined with 
security politics. 
As Amoore and de Goede (2005: 150) argue, “what is new about contemporary terrorist risk 
management […] is its increasing reliance on technology and computerised data-mining.” 
Surveillance, or rather dataveillance, potentially captures and stores information about whole 
populations, and enables security politics to exploit large-scale databases in order to create 
security-related insights that had not been accessible on such a level before – “security 
becomes digital and follows up traces left by everything which moves (products, information, 
capital, humanity)” (Bigo, 2008b: 109). The insights of surveillance-based analytics, however, 
must from an epistemological standpoint necessarily be regarded as mere potentials. [Inquiry 
6] engages in-depth with such issues of knowledge generation through algorithmic analytics 
in PNR data. At this point, the narrative of security as surveillance strongly re-connects with 
the third narrative that analyzed security as future. Surveillance, in a sense, is the enabling 
mechanism for the creation of futures – be in preventive, precautionary, or preemptive modes 
of reasoning. Since in a worst-case scenario, any part of our everyday lives has been captured 
and encoded through digital traces, location-based services, communication and consumption 
profiles, futures can be extrapolated on both individual and collective levels – or at least so 
the argument put forward by security professionals goes. 
The ordering of the social empowered by surveillance works through the classification of 
potential futures. In other words: security as surveillance works as profiling. Subsequently, “as 
sociotechnical systems, then, surveillance and security are intimately intertwined with 
institutions, ideologies, and a long history of social inequality” (Monahan, 2006a: 10). The 
profile itself rests on the applied mode of addressing the future – be it through archival-
statistical forms of knowledge that are grounded in past experience, or through radically open 
forms of knowledge construction that rely on algorithmic analytics and the creation of possible 
connections between distinct types of data, as put forward by [Inquiry 6]. However, as Lyon 
(2006c: 224) argues, “many surveillance schemes that operate today tend to amplify 
stereotypes and to apply the most stringent and severe scrutiny to the most vulnerable – in 
socioeconomic, ethnic, and gendered terms.” Surveillance can thus become a technique of 
singling out and disadvantaging certain parts of the population. 
Scholars have however struggled with the panoptic notion of a central node where 
surveillance-powered analytics would converge, and where ultimate power would be created. 
With the ubiquity of contemporary surveillance, the figure of the panopticon has thus been 
profoundly challenged. Whereas in its original design, power was indeed centralized in the 
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prison control room, the societal analogy presupposes such centralized power in the form of 
the state. Surveillance, however, as has been pointed out, is not by any means limited to state 
authorities, but has become much more dispersed through a large variety of private 
companies and public-private partnerships. Scholars have thus increasingly drawn on another 
metaphor to describe the capillary systems of surveillance that characterize the digital age: 
the rhizome. Originating in biology and originally referring to the fragmented and de-
centralized system of roots that certain plants (such as for instance asparagus, bamboo, or 
ginger) feature, Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze, 1992; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) have taken 
up the notion of the rhizome in order to highlight a number of features of modern societies. 
The figure indeed opens up the concept of surveillance to the limitless possibilities that have 
emerged through digital interconnectivity. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 7) have it, “any 
point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be.”  
There are no prioritized nodes and hubs in the network – the rhizome grows and interconnects 
according to no particular logic, but through functional necessities and mere possibilities. 
Surveillance, if we accept this notion, then must be conceptualized as a multitude of 
fragmented, dispersed, and flexible processes without an overarching agenda or a center of 
power. The narrative of security as surveillance re-connects here not only with the creation of 
futures, but also with the narrative of security as government that highlights the multiplicity 
of actors in both the political and the social. It also re-connects to questions of normativity 
when it comes to limiting and controlling surveillance in the first place. Scholars of surveillance 
have never been shy to make use of pop-cultural references and dystopic scenarios in order 
to highlight such a need. Movies such as Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report (2002) and novels 
such as George Orwell’s 1984 (1949) by now have a long history as anecdotes in academic 
work, as they depict a bleak outlook into a world that would be ultimately defined by, and 
governed through, surveillance. Arguably, the reason for this is the detrimental potential of 
surveillance and its recorded increase, which can easily be expanded to worst-case scenarios 
in which human rights and civil liberties will have become discarded for the sake of ultimate 
control – framed under the premise of security. 
If surveillance must be thought of as an array of distinct, yet loosely connected and 
overlapping networks, then moral and legal accounts of its possible detrimental effects have 
become dispersed as well. Subsequently, [Inquiry 6] questions the applicability of the current 
legal framework when it comes to analytics-induced discrimination. Here, the narrative of 
security as surveillance re-connects to questions of the legitimized production of security and 
the role of the state that have been tackled in the last narrative as part of thinking about 
governing in terms of governmentality and governance. A further set of concerns emerges 
from the increased invisibility and everyday routinization of surveillance, as well as from the 
quickly emerging analytical possibilities of what is nowadays summarized under the label of 
‘Big Data’. As Jenkins (2012: 160) has it, “practices of social sorting are ubiquitous and far-
reaching in modern societies, having gradually come to occupy a role at the heart of modern 
bureaucratic governance that is all the more potent because their taken-for-grantedness 
renders them almost invisible, part of the furniture of the state and business.” Ultimately, 
surveillance practices possess the capacities to not only sort, steer and manage populations, 
but also to intrude into our spheres of intimacy and privacy in an automated fashion. 
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Sixth narrative: security as technology 
As has been argued in the preceding narrative, surveillance is inseparably embedded in 
technological infrastructures and other technological means. However, such embeddedness 
of technology within society is not only the case for security as surveillance, but, more 
generally speaking, technologies play a prominent role in discourses and practices of security. 
Thus, this sixth narrative explores the implications of security as technology. Technology is a 
concept as vague as it is powerful, and, as Der Derian (1995: 25) claims, throughout history 
“in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been 
furthered and intellectual dissent muted.” How come technology has been ascribed such a 
powerful role? 
In terms of security, we must then ask: what is the role of technology in terms of how we come 
to understand and mold the world? How has it been shaped and negotiated, designed and 
rolled out? Which actors, interests and financial stakes have been involved in its creation 
processes? How is it implemented and used in everyday security contexts and how does that 
change the ways in which we interact with other humans and with our environment? 
Technology is in fact one of the main leitmotifs of the empirical section, and [Inquiries 2; 3; 4] 
particularly deal with some of those questions. The narrative of security as technology has 
been hitherto rather underexplored in comparison with some of the other narratives told in 
this thesis. As Guittet and Jeandesboz (2010: 229) point out, “while the uses and effects of 
technological systems are increasingly scrutinized by security scholars, little work has been 
done on the practice of technology itself with regard to security” – and surprisingly so. After 
all, technology has always played a central (however contested) role throughout the evolution 
of societies. There are a “wide range of claims regarding the status of technology in society” 
(McCarthy, 2013: 473), but most notably it has been connected with progress and wealth (and 
as such also with a notion of security conceived as the absence of scarcity). Thus, technologies 
have often had to enact the role of a redeemer that arrives to create a better world. As 
Monahan (2010: 92) argues, “at least since the Enlightenment, technologies have been 
wrapped up in a mythology of social progress, which frames any new advancement as an 
unqualified good.” This very notion of the unqualified good, however, has in security studies 
more recently become increasingly challenged. 
A supposed overall reluctance to overly criticize technology can arguably be retraced to 
multiple sources. As Edgerton (2007: ix) has it, “too often the agenda for discussing the past, 
present and future of technology is set by the promoters of new technologies” who possess 
the resources and power to actively shape public discourse and thus establish a positive notion 
of technology. Moreover, the widespread contemporary economic agenda of neoliberalism 
has also considerably catalyzed and reinforced a conceptualization of technology as an 
ultimate panacea for all of life’s conceivable problems. As Harvey (2005: 68) puts forward, 
“the neoliberal theory of technological change relies upon the coercive powers of competition 
to drive the search for new products, new production methods, and new organizational 
forms” and as such appears closely entangled with the felt need to create monetary surplus. 
Underpinning such trajectories of constant search for new ways to impact markets and sell 
products, a more general desire for innovation can be identified – as Edgerton (2007: 209) 
critically argues, “to have technology or science is, it is often deeply felt, to create something 
new.” 
As Harvey (2005: 68) adds, “this drive becomes so deeply embedded in entrepreneurial 
common sense [..] that it becomes a fetish belief: that there is a technological fix for each and 
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every problem” – and most notably for security problems. This belief, as [Inquiry 3] retraces, 
is in fact deeply embedded in the European security agenda that strives to constantly produce 
new technologies in order to be able to compete at the level of a global security market. As 
has been laid out already, technology is indeed a cross-cutting phenomenon throughout most 
domains of security, be it the preemptive layer of counter-terrorism, the cooperative fight 
against transnational criminal networks, everyday policing tasks, or measures of preparedness 
and civil protection. In all of those domains we can find increasing reliance on technological 
support structures, queries in databases, sophisticated surveillance systems, and, maybe most 
importantly, constant calls from security practitioners themselves to roll out ever more 
technologies in order to render security operations more effective, efficient, and bullet-proof. 
Such technological fixes should however not be regarded as extrinsic or neutral. On the 
contrary, they must be carefully placed within the larger picture and analyzed in detail if we 
seek to understand the narrative of security as technology. 
In fact, since the early 1980s, a whole new field of academic research has evolved around 
those very issues of technology and its role in societies. Science and technology studies (STS) 
have largely been concerned with the emergence and implications of the chain of research, 
innovation, design and resulting technologies, thereby focusing on social trajectories, 
genealogical knowledges and embeddedness in complex networks, and having produced a 
rich body of literature that security studies can benefit from. Among others, STS literature has 
focused on the role of agency in socio-technical assemblages that consist of human and non-
human elements, raising questions such as: “When we act, who else is acting? How many 
agents are also present?” (Latour, 2005: 43), en route challenging the primacy of human 
security agents. Such scope on agency in non-human actors then necessarily presupposes a 
flat ontology that avoids a priori hierarchies and subsequently challenges the primacy of the 
human in the world on a more general level. Put simply: if we conceive non-human elements 
as “actants” (Latour, 2005) with the potential for creating a genuine impact on the world, then 
a whole new array of possible inquiries concerned with technology opens up. What is the role 
of algorithms, of automatic doors, of plain walls and fences, and so on? How do they shape 
and re-shape our perceptions of the world? How do the structure and re-structure the ways 
we act in the world? [Inquiry 2] empirically engages the social changes that were induced by 
the implementation of body scanners at a German airport security checkpoint, highlighting 
the surprising and unintended impacts that technologies can unfold. The narrative of security 
as assemblage will later once again return to such questions. 
One must however be careful not to over-determine the role of technology and as such drift 
into a perspective from which technology becomes the dominant element of the social. As 
McCarthy (2013: 470) points out, such “technological determinism has loomed as the 
bogeyman […] for some 30 years”, but scholars have begun to probe more deeply the role of 
technology as a means of power and government and its consequences for, for instance, 
concepts of identity and subjectivity. As Winner (2006: 278) argues, “there is growing 
awareness that technological devices, systems, and routines are thoroughly interwoven with 
the structures and processes of social and political life”, thus necessarily placing inquiries into 
technologies on the agenda of critically thinking about security. 
As Bigo (2012: 282) explains, in any study of security as technology, “the connection between 
person and machine, technological capacity and the will to use it to its fullest extent, whether 
resisted or otherwise, has to be appreciated in relation to historical and political figurations.” 
Put differently: technology, in the realm of security, must also be conceived as a means of 
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governing and ordering the social that has historically evolved and transformed, however as 
one that easily escapes narrow political agendas and that unfolds more capillary (side) effects 
that must be carefully explored. One of the overarching phenomena of security as technology 
appears to be its potential as a connector/bridge between state agencies and private 
actors/the industry. As Murakami Wood et al. (2003: 144) point out, “governments and their 
military arms are now turning to software houses and technologists for more sophisticated 
tools to track and pre-empt crime and terror”, and as such outsource not only issues of 
security architecture and design, but also willingly lose part of their political and agenda-
setting power, while at the same time empowering (national) economies through the market. 
Thus, security as technology appears to appeal to at least two (interlinked) grand notions: 
technology as general progress and technology as a means of creating wealth through 
industrial innovation. Some scholars, however, have uttered doubts about the first notion, as 
it can be read as derivative of the latter, and moreover as it seemingly becomes overshadowed 
by (intended as well as unintended) negative impacts of technology that would reverse or 
even pervert the broad notion of progress. As Haggerty (2004: 392) claims, “where modernity 
manifests a general trust in the ability of science to resolve our most pressing problems, we 
have become attuned to the truth that science itself poses risks and that these risks can no 
longer be explained away as temporary aberrations in the march of progress.” As argued 
earlier, technology has proven to be a powerful domain of government. Or, as Rose (1999: 51) 
puts forward, “thought becomes governmental to the extent that it becomes technical, it 
attaches itself to a technology for its realization.” Subsequently, critical thought must open up 
technology for close scrutiny in order to come to terms with its effects. 
Thus, what are the (normative) implications of such governmental reason through technology 
for the purpose of security? First of all, as Harvey (2005: 69) points out, the neoliberal logics 
of market dominance have become a threatening force, since “technological developments 
can run amok as sectors dedicated solely to technological innovation create new products and 
new ways of doing things that as yet have no market.” For instance, such an angle has been 
increasingly attributed to the security research framework of the European Union and its 
quasi-exclusive scope on the development of new technologies in order to create wealth 
surplus for the European security industry and subsequently for the overall economy. As de 
Goede (2011: 10) points out, “the European Security Model is fostered through research 
funding and market integration. A flavour of such cultural invocation of disaster scenarios, 
coupled with the promise of a technological security fix is given in the FP7 brochure on current 
EU security research”, leading to a deliberately simplistic conceptualization of security that 
could be realized if we just put more money into research and innovation – a notion that is 
critically dealt with in [Inquiries 1; 3]. As was programmatically argued by multiple fora 
constituting EU security research: “technology will play an important part in each nation’s 
counter-terrorist efforts” (European Security: High Level Study on Threats Responses and 
Relevant Technologies, 2006: 3), starting from the assumption that “technology itself cannot 
guarantee security, but security without the support of technology is impossible. It provides 
us with information about threats, helps us to build effective protection against them and, if 
necessary, enables us to neutralize them” (Group of Personalities in the Field of Security 
Research, 2004: 7). The next narrative will engage this thematic at greater length. 
A second strand of critique towards security as technology has evolved around the potential 
of establishing threatening and insecure affective states. As Burgess (2009: 316) explains, “the 
management of insecurities through technology and the development of new technologies of 
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security are increasingly becoming policy priorities for the EU and its member states.” 
Technologies have been conceived of as primary means for enacting a preemptive state of 
mind through the wide-spread roll-out of distinct registers of risk. As O’Malley (2004: 1) 
frames the issue, “risk frameworks form the basis of regimes of security that attempt to turn 
each of us into crime prevention practitioners and in some case to turn our homes and even 
communities into hi-tech fortresses.” Risk, in such a fashion, re-distributes accountability for 
canceling out the ominous ‘event’ to every single member of societies, while at the same time 
offering a subtle solution to overcome such burden: purchase and rely on technology. 
Conceived through such a lens, the narrative of security as technology strongly re-connects to 
previous narratives of security as future and security as securitization. Technology, so the 
argument goes, enables us to both to obtain (more precisely: feign) control over contingency 
and thereby assists to colonize ever more areas of politics. In this vein, security as technology 
again draws on the notion of security as surveillance. As Burgess (2009: 316) argues, “new 
technologies of control and surveillance, which rely in particular on evolutions in technologies 
of information and communication (TICs), are deemed crucial in this perspective because they 
allow agencies to anticipate threats and act proactively instead of being limited to reactive 
measures.” 
We should, however, keep in mind the claims made in the literature on governance and 
governmentality, as well as insights from the field of STS. As has been pointed out in the 
previous narrative of security as government, a notion of governing according to a master 
agenda, be it through technology or through any other means or technique, is an overly 
simplistic one. As Rose (1999: 53) reminds us, “technologies are not realizations of any single 
will to govern”, but they come into being through multiple and intertwined trajectories and 
actor constellations. Thus, the question for any (critical) research on security as technology 
then must be to explore which stakes are reflected and which are marginalized within any 
specific technological flight of path – after all, “it is not that technology develops outside of 
human agency, but that it develops outside of some humans’ agencies. The ability to control 
technological design and development is a significant facet of social power relations [emph. 
in orig.]” (McCarthy, 2013: 476). Thus, at least for STS, a main line of the agenda has always 
been about the “need to emphasise the social, political and historical context when detailing 
the design, development and diffusion of technological artefacts” (McCarthy, 2013: 478). In 
order to do so, Latour (2005: 80) suggests to “study innovations in the artisan’s workshop, the 
engineer’s design department, the scientist’s laboratory, the marketer’s trial panels, the user’s 
home, and the many socio-technical controversies [emph. in orig.]” that (security) technology 
is exposed to throughout its emergence. [Inquiry 1] attempts to provide such an account 
through the study of the interrupted roll-out of body scanners in Germany, tracing such 
interruption to a necessary re-design due to public concerns in terms of privacy and intimacy. 
After all, it is the “little security nothings” (Huysmans, 2011) mentioned earlier, that are so 
deeply embedded in our everyday lives, and that have been subjected to the multiple 
centrifugal tears of distinct actors interests and claims. As Lyon (2006c: 210) frames the issue, 
“taken-for-granted technologies have far-reaching implications for power relations within the 
modern, bureaucratic, capitalistic contexts where they were developed” and must therefore 
be researched carefully. However, to unveil such power relations can prove to be difficult –
especially when it comes to the domain of highly sophisticated technological infrastructures 
that tend to present themselves as black boxes of proprietary and seldom traceable 
algorithms that nonetheless “instantiate the values, epistemologies, and ontologies of their 
creators and impose them on their subjects” (Bennett et al., 2003: 155). Once again drawing 
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on the notion of a messy assemblage rather than a clear-cut divide across domains such as the 
public/the private or the state/the economy, we must then not only think about the 
emergence of technologies, but also about their agenda-setting capacities on the political and 
the social level. 
As Huysmans (2006: 8) points out, “the solutions and available technologies do to some extent 
define the problems and they develop to some degree independently from the politicization 
of events.” In this vein, technologies seem to supersede and potentially cross any straight-
forward political agenda. Not openly, however, but through a subtle creep that constitutes 
the core of the research program of the Paris school of securitization. In such fashion then, 
“much like legislation, technological systems provide a set of rules, or scripts, encouraging 
certain uses or interactions and discouraging others” (Monahan, 2010: 93), thereby unfolding 
discriminatory and marginalizing notions that need not be directly linked to a political 
program, but rather emerge through the dispersed, yet entangled, field of security 
professionals and the industry. Thus, in an attempt to link the hitherto rather seldom 
connected research programs of STS and security studies, Huysmans (2006: 13) suggests to 
“push security studies in the direction of a sociology of the technocratic politics of insecurity 
in which discursive processes are embedded in technological and professional processes and 
struggles.” This appears indeed a necessary move. After all, “software-driven systems are 
allowing further industrialization of everyday life through what appears to be a combination 
of the physical and virtual, leading to both spatial (territorial) and analytical (information-
based) exclusion” (Murakami Wood et al., 2003: 142), as has been indicated by the preceding 
narrative of security as surveillance. 
 
Seventh narrative: security as economy 
The sixth narrative has explored how the notion of security is shaped and re-shaped through 
the lens of technology and how technology is framed as an innovative driver for better security 
(and subsequently for a better society). Moreover, it has shown that a positive framing of 
security technologies has been rightfully contested by pointing out the detrimental potential 
of many technologies, especially large-scale data-based systems of monitoring and 
calculating. Along the way, we have already touched upon a crucial issue within such a 
conceptualization of security as technology: its economics. This seventh narrative zooms in 
more closely into this field and tells the story of security as economy. In fact, “we find 
numerous technologies introduced on a rapidly evolving basis, from ever more sophisticated 
surveillance cameras, to biometric identification and verification systems, full body scanners 
to motion detection systems” (Kroener and Neyland, 2012: 141), and tracing the underlying 
monetary rationales of this phenomenon arguably allows us to understand another layer of 
security. As Hayes (2012: 167) quite plainly frames the issues at stake here: “in the post-9/11 
security focused world, surveillance is big business.” Such business builds on the 
transformation processes that have rendered “the contemporary field of security [..] 
transversal not only to the inside/outside distinction, but also to the public/private 
distinction” (c.a.s.e. collective, 2006: 464), thereby opening the door for a security business 
case in the first place. 
And yet the business aspects of security, although more recently critically discussed by 
scholars such as Hayes (2006; 2009; 2010), Klein (2007), de Goede (2011), Bigo and Jeandesboz 
(2010), or Zedner (2006a), remain rather underappreciated within the field of security studies. 
As Klein (2007: 306) points out, “what is most striking is how little the security boom is 
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analysed and discussed as an economy, as an unprecedented convergence of unchecked 
police powers and unchecked capitalism, a merger of the shopping mall and the secret prison.” 
Thus, how can we make sense of such neglect to study security as a means of profit 
generation? One reason for this might be that, in fact, an entanglement between security 
politics, technological means, and strong industrial lobbyism is not by any means something 
new and thus not a field that would yield many new insights. However, as often as not, 9/11 
can be conceptualized as a crucial event here, that catalyzed long-term tendencies and 
provided a window of opportunity for the industry to make unprecedented business pitches. 
As Lyon (2003c: 18) argues, “high-tech companies, waiting in the wings for the opportunity to 
launch their products, saw September 11 providing just the platform they needed.” It 
imminently appeared rather clear that security politics would undergo significant 
adjustments, and the private sector counted on the fact that the “global market for 
technologies of repression [would become] more lucrative than ever in the wake of 11 
September 2011” (Hayes, 2006: 3). Moreover, public discourse was heavily influenced by the 
industry. As Lyon (2003c: 18) notes, “not surprisingly, almost all the ‘experts’ on whom the 
media called for comment were representatives of companies.” 
There was always money to be made through uncertainty. Be it through simple door locks, 
through alarm systems and surveillance cameras for private homes, or through wholesale, 
large-scale databases and analytics that are developed directly for (and procured by) state 
agencies. Especially the latter has been a matter of concern for many critical scholars. As Hayes 
(2012: 167) summarizes the problem, “governments outsource key aspects of security and 
surveillance policy and practice to the private sector, subsidize private innovation in 
surveillance capacities and techniques, and procure the resulting technologies and expertise 
– all of which is to the dubious benefit of both untrammeled state power and hose private 
corporations and actors best placed to profit from this relationship.” Thus, governmental 
agency is deliberately re-located, resulting in complex, and most notably proprietary, security 
solutions such as software packages for data-mining or ‘smart-CCTV’ systems that define 
deviance in opaque and non-retraceable ways. 
What we find here is indeed a close link to the narrative of security as securitization. For the 
sake of selling a security solution, there must first be a security problem. Thus, as de Lint and 
Virta (2004: 472) point out, “security economies come to depend on the regular identification 
of new risk markets that may sustain the appetite for security production.” Threats, in this 
vein, come to be constructed partly through a private sector that has no real interest in 
actually solving such security ‘problems’, but rather in maintaining them such that there can 
never be a market saturation that would delimit sales. As Schouten (2014a: 28) argues, “those 
who claim to be in the business of providing security represent it by other things, which are 
then ‘packaged’ and ‘sold’ as containing threats of promoting security [emph. in orig.].” 
Subsequently, global corporations have vital stakes in new threats, in larger risks, and 
eventually in radical contingency interpreted as constant danger. In this vein, “private security 
specialists prepare the world’s ‘hot spots’ for TNC [transnational corporations] profit making” 
(de Lint and Virta, 2004: 471), and governments appear to be willing to align with such a 
mapping of the world. As Hayes (2009: 80) rather sarcastically puts it: “the new public-private 
partnership for homeland security is based on a simple quid pro quo: profit for companies and 
power for states [emph. in orig.].” 
Security as economy must however be careful not to fall into the trap of reductionism. As 
Walters (2012: 24) reminds us, an exaggerated notion of the economy runs the risk of painting 
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a “theoretically and ontologically impoverished image of a world characterized in its entirety 
by neoliberal capitalism. There is much more to the world than neoliberalism.” This is certainly 
true, and throughout the preceding narratives we have seen that there is much more to the 
complex notion of security than simply profit-making. Nonetheless, and keeping this warning 
in mind, the rather limitless contemporary mode of neoliberal economics has drawn 
considerable critique for its all-encompassing tendencies – security included. As Harvey (2005: 
3) claims, “neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse.” When 
considering a world that is stacked with countless security measures that deeply extend into 
our everyday lives, then such a neoliberal lens on security appears not that far off. Indeed, 
how else but in a neoliberal fashion can we, as Hayes (2009: 78) drastically puts it, “conceive 
of a world characterised by mandatory surveillance and wholesale risk profiling”? 
Neoliberal economic theory in fact strikingly resembles a conceptualization of security as 
futurity through risk. Both, in the vein of Beck, presuppose a model of a laboratory-like, 
theoretical equilibrium which might even perfectly work if not for the messy nature of the 
actual real world. As Harvey (2005: 68) puts it, “the neoliberal presumption of perfect 
information and a level playing field for competition appears as either innocently utopian or 
a deliberate obfuscation of processes that will lead to the concentration of wealth and, 
therefore, the restoration of class power.” Neither is the notion of risk anything but utopian 
for any meaningful prediction of the future, and we might actually say that it restores power 
not necessarily in terms of class, but in terms of government. Or rather in terms of 
governmentality, that is. As has been shown earlier, governing must be conceived of as a 
dispersed array of techniques and actors – and in terms of political agency the security 
industry must in fact be thought of as one such actor. Albeit a powerful one. 
The entanglement of the private sector and the political level has been shown quite 
compellingly when it comes to the emergence of security within the European Union, and 
more particularly the EU’s Security Research Programme that, as Hayes (2009: 4) puts it, 
“continues to be shaped by prominent transnational defence and security corporations and 
other vested interests.” In the wake of 9/11, the EU sought to establish its own research 
program specifically dedicated to security solutions, and for the sake of exploring its feasibility, 
in 2004 a “Group of Personalities in the Field of Security Research” (GoP) was assembled, 
which however was comprised mostly of representatives of large European security and 
defense companies (Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2010). Their report came to the conclusion that 
“Europe needs to act quickly if it is to remain at the forefront of technology research, and if 
industry is to be able to exploit the results competitively in response to the rapidly emerging 
needs for sophisticated security-related products” (Group of Personalities in the Field of 
Security Research, 2004: 13), thus calling for swift political action – however not necessarily 
for the purpose of better security, but for the purpose of making a better business case out of 
the current desire for all kinds of security measures. 
Two years after such foundations had been laid, the GoP was succeeded by the newly formed 
“European Security Research Advisory Board” (ESRAB), which once more highlighted the fact 
that security technologies “could offer Europe a competitive advantage in a global market” 
(European Security Research Advisory Board, 2006: 28). Three more years later, the ESRAB 
was eventually followed up the “European Security Research & Innovation Forum” (ESRIF) 
which reinforced the presupposed need of “promotion of innovation as the foundation for a 
European security market that exploits economies of scale at European level” (European 
Security Research & Innovation Forum, 2009: 11). Thus, the emergence of the EU’s Security 
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Research Programme was closely entangled with the private sector – at the same time 
developing the general agenda and promoting their own stakes in the development of new 
technologies that would make profitable sales in a global market constituted by insecurity and 
terrorist threat. As Hayes (2009: 78) summarizes the intervention, “a small group of military-
industrial companies came together to secure substantial R&D subsidies for EU homeland 
security.” 
In fact, what becomes rather clear throughout the documents that had been produced by the 
distinct fora along the process, is the clear-cut economic agenda that appears less interested 
in the fact what is to be sold than in the fact how it can best be sold. As pointed out by ESRAB, 
“economic theory in particular can offer key insights, enabling governments to optimize their 
efforts to enhance security and growth” (European Security Research Advisory Board, 2006: 
59), and moreover, that “in order to stimulate the demand for new and innovative security 
products and services, incentives for public authorities, often seen as ‘first buyers’, should be 
introduced” (European Security Research Advisory Board, 2006: 71). Such rationales appear 
very much inspired by the neoliberal primacy that markets produce virtues (profits), and “if 
markets do not exist […] then they must be created, by state action if necessary” (Harvey, 
2005). Thus, in order to establish a security market, ESRIF in fact proposed that “analogous to 
environmental regulation which enables firms to profitably contribute to ‘green  growth’, one 
can think of regulation that stimulates ‘secure growth’ by enabling industries for security-
enhancing products or services” (European Security Research Advisory Board, 2006: 59). 
Such dominance of the private sector, especially in an area as sensitive as security research, 
and subsequently security politics more generally, has garnered considerable critique. As 
Hayes (2012: 167) plainly frames the issue, “this is an undesirable relationship within which 
political decisions are shaped not just by democratic concern for the ‘public good’ but by 
profitable courses of action for private entities”, and as such undermines the normative 
obligations of government. In fact, security conceived through the lens of the imperative of 
the economy appears very much reduced to the Paris school argument about governing 
through insecurity. In order to extract as much monetary surplus from security as possible, its 
inherent pathological tendencies must not only be slowed down, but also considerably 
extended. In other words: security as economy benefits largely from securitization.  
Private sector impact arguably touches even upon the legal system. As Zedner (2006a: 268) 
argues, “in the field of security, technological and global capital developments also create 
more elusive and inconstant sources of control than the edifices of the criminal law and the 
criminal court.” To be quite concise here: there is no fault per se with private sector 
engagement in political processes – this has in fact always been a part of politics. Rather, the 
problem here lies in the excess of interventions from the industry into the policy field of 
security, which must be handled with care. As Harvey (2005: 79) explains the issue, “at the 
heart of the problem lies a burgeoning disparity between the declared public aims of 
neoliberalism – the well-being of all – and its actual consequences.” In this case, such 
consequences entail the implementation of multiple technologies of surveillance and control 
into our everyday lives. The potential detrimental impacts of such tendencies have been 
outlined in the preceding narratives of security as securitization, as surveillance, and as 
technology. 
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Eighth narrative: security as assemblage 
As has become apparent up to this point, security comprises of a multiplicity of meanings, 
some of which have been retraced through overlapping stories that are used to ‘tell’ security 
politically. Security is continuously transformed, calculated, and encoded. Security is 
continuously enacted, imagined, and technologized. Security is continuously performed, 
routinized, and bureaucratized. And security is continuously reasoned, dispersed, and 
privatized. This last introductory narrative aims to reflect upon those multiple meanings and 
overlaps that turn security into the messy empirical and intellectual field that we encounter 
today. As Geyer (2008: 2) summarizes the issue, “even for professional observers, it is difficult 
to even glimpse the ‘security web’ that is currently being spun at national, supranational and 
transatlantic levels alike.” This eighth narrative is about security as assemblage. It draws 
mainly on literature from the field of STS, but also incorporates more recent developments 
that have been termed as “new materialism, immanent naturalism, posthumanism, 
antihumanism, speculative realism, complexity theory, object-oriented metaphysics, a 
philosophy of becoming” (Connolly, 2013: 399), and arguably in even more, shiny ways that 
highlight the “multiple connections across myriad technologies and practices” (Haggerty and 
Ericson, 2000: 609). 
Foucault (1980: 194) has famously outlined what such an assemblage can be about. What he 
has deemed a “dispositif” embodies a “heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions.” Be it framed as 
assemblage, as dispositif, as apparatus of security (the most common English translation of 
the French term dispositif), or as rhizomatic network (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) – decisive 
for such an understanding of security is the acknowledgement of the complicated state of 
things, requiring an ontological stance that comes to terms with “multiple overlapping sites of 
production of sovereign power (public, para-public and private actors) constitute in actu the 
security apparatus [emph. in orig.]” (Guillaume, 2014: 109). In fact, the notion of security as 
assemblage closely links to the notion of security as government(ality) in its relational 
conceptualization of power. However, it advances beyond the rationalization strategies of 
government. As Lisle (2014: 70) argues, “assemblage thinking does not accept the 
subject/object distinction that orders so much of contemporary life and allows us – as 
researchers – to isolate the targets of our research and subordinate them through our 
methods of inquiry.” 
In the words of Latour (2005: 25), “controversies are not simply a nuisance to be kept at bay, 
but what allows the social to be established and the various social sciences to contribute in its 
building.” Controversies as such must then become the focal point for academic analysis. Not 
looking to settle ambiguity and contradiction, but on the contrary seeking to extract added 
value from them, “assemblage thinking offers an approach that is capable of accommodating 
the various hybrids of material, biological, social and technological components that populate 
our world” (Acuto and Curtis, 2014: 2). Put very simply: assemblage thought, which Acuto and 
Curtis (2014: 3) deem “less of a theory and more of a repository of methods and ontological 
stances towards the social [emph. in orig.]”, starts from the assumption that there is no 
primacy of human agency in the world, but only “complex relations between the human estate 
and a host of nonhuman processes with variable degrees of agency” (Connolly, 2013: 400). 
The question of agency has most notably been one that STS has been concerned with – and 
one that becomes important for security studies with regard to the manifold security 
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controversies and negotiations that we encounter. How can we conceive, for instance, of the 
role of the algorithm or the automated biometric gate and their status in human/non-human 
setups? How can technology lead or prescribe human action? And through which processes 
did the algorithm or the gate evolve in the first place? Such questions have been rendered 
highly important for thinking about security. However, as Schouten (2014a: 26) states, 
assemblage thought “is only sparsely explored in security studies.” How can it provide help, 
then? 
In order to explore questions of agency in socio-technical assemblages, any assemblage-
inspired analysis must carefully scrutinize the complex and unstable power relations between 
all elements of an assemblage, not merely between human actors. As Collier (2009: 80) 
explains, “a topological analysis focuses on the broad configurational principles through which 
new formations of government are assembled, without implying that they arise from some 
inner necessity or coherence.” Such a topological analysis defines the boundaries of the field 
of research in the first place. But it must not stop at defining the field, but most importantly 
continue to analyze what is going on inside that field. As Latour (2005: 39) argues, security as 
assemblage needs to consider “the many contradictory ways in which social aggregates are 
constantly evoked, erased, distributed, and reallocated.” Such an approach must necessarily 
start in the field itself – “assemblage thinking implies an empiricist project” (Büger, 2014: 59). 
Especially actor-network-theory (ANT; for an overview see Latour, 2005) has both been 
criticized and praised for its presumed flat ontology that proceeds beyond any a priori 
assumptions about how the world is structured and how action and agency constitute 
themselves – not necessarily through human conscience, but through the mediating forces of 
such mundane objects as, for instance, doors and walls, tools, or communication devices. The 
social, through this lens, appears as something that is emergent and contingent, and that is 
constantly re-defined by transforming assemblages. As Latour (2005: 5) points out with regard 
to such a conception of ‘the social’, “it’s perfectly acceptable to designate by the same word 
a trail of associations between heterogeneous elements” rather than to reproduce the 
paradigm of ‘classical’ sociology that he blames of pre-structuring the social before 
researching it. In his account, all kinds of “mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify 
the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour, 2005: 39). As Acuto and 
Curtis (2014: 7) simplify the matter somewhat, “this ontology can provide a valuable starting 
point for the analysis of various social actors, including transnational corporations, 
institutional networks, epistemic communities, nation-states, cities and terrorist networks, 
which are often kept separate in theories founded on ontologies that make them 
incommensurable.” In short: security as assemblage radicalizes the widening and deepening 
debates in security studies that have been explored in the narrative of security as (academic) 
transformation. 
Through such a radical account, security as assemblage opens up a research agenda that builds 
on “relational ontology and post-Cartesian symmetry between people and things, discourse 
and materiality, the social and technology, and, finally, controversies in human and natural 
sciences” (Schouten, 2014a: 26). Such a notion builds a strong link to securitization theory as 
well. If, as Bigo (2008a: 32) has it, “the ban-opticon is [..] characterized by the exceptionalism 
of power (rules of emergency and their tendency to become permanent), by the way it 
excludes certain groups in the name of their future potential behaviour (profiling) and by the 
way it normalized the non-excluded through its production of normative imperatives, the 
most important of which is free movement”, then we must disentangle how such an 
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assemblage of the ban emerges, transforms, stabilizes and, eventually, might disassemble 
again. In doing so, an analytics of assemblage must always keep in mind that, just like with the 
relational power approach in governmentality, “the elements of an assemblage may have a 
concerted or emergent effect without there being an underlying organizing principle” (Salter, 
2013: 12). Such insight renders actual research both more easy and more complicated. On the 
one hand, research is made easier by simply venturing into the field without any predisposed 
restrictions or delimitations. On the other hand, however, if everything potentially can make 
a difference, then we constantly run the risk of missing out on some important element of an 
assemblage that unfolds power through unprecedented ways. 
Thus, how are we to come to terms with an agenda of security as assemblage empirically, if 
its empirics are defined by radical openness? Connolly (2013: 401) suggests a clear-cut 
“problem orientation, pursuing the contours of an issue up and down these interacting scales, 
as the issue requires.” If security politics evolve around specific security problems, in 
whichever of the manifold ways that we have sketched out so far, then the very evolution of 
complex, and at times contradictory, assemblages alongside the constitution of security 
politics provides a valuable starting point. As Adey and Anderson (2012: 106) argue, “in 
seeking to understand how life is governed in and through contingency, we should take care 
to remember the contingencies of the apparatus of security – that is, how apparatuses form, 
endure and change as the elements that compose them are (re)deployed.” Already implied in 
such a perspective is the notion that each assemblage could be formed differently – and that 
what we encounter is merely a momentary snap-shot of stabilization that might rather sooner 
than later fall apart again through the multiple contestations that security is subjected to. As 
Schouten (2014b: 88) claims, such a perspective could considerably contribute to a general 
agenda of thinking about security by “by radicalizing the insight in security studies that 
security is ‘essentially contested’ to study the on-going attempts to stabilize security.” As he 
adds: “if security practitioners ‘out there’ struggle with the very ontology of (in)security, how 
could ‘we’ as analysts a priori decide that security is a matter of discourse, practice or 
materiality?” (Schouten, 2014b: 88) 
The utility of such an approach becomes rather obvious when we call to mind the preceding 
narrative of security as economy and the ensuing “close assemblage with international 
partners and private companies that underpin the EU’s force in the domain of security” (de 
Goede, 2011: 12). Moreover, it can also contribute to the multiple layers of security as 
surveillance and technology, as government, and as futurity and securitization. Security as 
assemblage, however, is not some kind of ‘master narrative’. Neither does it occupy a 
privileged position among the narratives of security provided here. Rather, thinking about 
security as assemblage can arguably contribute to a better understanding of how all of those 
narratives come into being empirically – not necessarily through an underlying political 
agenda, but through complexity, fragility, and ambiguity. With regard to security, then, as 
Schouten (2014a: 28) explains, “this process of translation concerns ontological politics, for 
establishing security as technical rather than social, or private rather than public, 
subsequently restricts and redefines accountability; distribution of scarce output; and/or the 
scope of possible action available to different affected actors [emph. in orig.].” 
After all, as Rose (1999: 22) reminds us, “the space of government is always shaped and 
intersected by other discourses, notably the veridical discourses of science and changing 
moral rhetorics and ethical vocabularies, which have their own histories, apparatuses and 
problem spaces, and whose relation to problematics of government is not expression or 
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causation but translation.” It is this very translation that must be researched empirically if any 
analysis seeks to unpack specific security assemblages. The processes of translation mark the 
trajectories along which actor relations form and re-form, and, most importantly, become 
visible: “when security is in the making – that is, still a controversy to be settled – it is 
ontologically unstable and indistinguishable from the ‘context’ made up of economic, 
technological, medical and legal considerations” (Schouten, 2014a: 38). Scholars of 
governmentality have shown that “an analytics of a particular regime of practices, at a 
minimum, seeks to identify the emergence of that regime, examine the multiple sources of 
the elements that constitute it, and follow the diverse processes and relations by which these 
elements are assembled into relatively stable forms of organization and institutional practice” 
(Dean, 2006: 21), and thus we can once more identify a strong parallel here. 
As Rose (1999: 277) quite plainly frames the issue, “our present has arisen as much from the 
logics of contestation as from any imperatives of control”, and thus security studies must in 
fact transcend the scope on control that strikes at the heart of many inquiries into surveillance 
and technology. In the vein of Foucauldian thought, as Schouten (2014a: 38) emphasizes, the 
“critical purchase thus lies in offering us a way to study security, not in terms of stable 
arrangements that impress themselves upon us as powerful ‘cold monsters’, but rather as 
unsettled accounts of fragile security by entering in to the controversies when security is still 
in the making.” What implications must be derived from such insight? How does this narrative 
of security as assemblage undermine, underpin, challenge, or reinforce its preceding 
narratives? It most certainly thwarts any over-simplistic understanding of security that centers 
merely centers around selected rationalities, thereby neglecting others. It can serve to 
highlight how economics or technological discourses have prevailed in the arena by tracing 
how, and through which particular power relations, controversies and ambiguities have 
become settled and stabilized. And by doing so, it can most notably challenge security politics 
by exposing reductionist and epistemologically twisted arguments of governing, of 
securitization, and of futurity. As Connolly (2013: 404) rather ironically puts the added value 
of assemblage thought: “‘How come we did not anticipate this?’, ask the Intelligence agencies. 
‘How come we did not predict this?’, whisper political scientists to each other, before they 
catch themselves to recall how they only promise to predict hypothetical events under 
conditions in which the ‘variables’ are closely specified, and not to explain actual events in the 
messy, ongoing actualities of triggering forces, contagious actions, complex and floating 
conflicts, creative responses, obscure searches, ambiguous anxieties, and shifting hopes.”  
 
One crucial question remains. The question that concludes this first section: what insights for 
security as such, if any, can we gather up to this point? I would like to propose two rather 
banal findings. First: the narratives of security told so far have not exactly served to clarify 
matters. On the contrary, they have complicated things, culminating in a conceptualization of 
security as assemblage that in a way radicalizes the openness and fluidity of security that was 
highlighted from the very outset of this thesis. This is deliberately so. Once more, we should 
keep in mind that each of the narratives is more or less capable of standing on its own. And 
moreover, that many of the narratives have indeed been researched exactly as this – as a 
stand-alone perspective that strives to rationalize security alongside disciplinary delimitations 
or selected angles. However, one major goal within section I. has been to overcome such 
fragmentation in order to provide a more nuanced, more detailed, but most importantly, 
more holistic framework of security. It could even be argued that one might find an almost 
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linear trajectory throughout the consecutive narratives, starting from the simple 
anthropological search for security and ending up with the highly complex, complicated notion 
of assemblage. What such complication implies is the pressing need for empirical research. 
Second: the narratives of security told so far are for the largest part devoid of such empirical 
underpinnings and remain on a rather abstract, theoretical level. Just as well, this is 
deliberately so. The empirical underpinnings necessary for any meaningful take on security 
will be provided by the analytical pieces that are to follow in section III. They will explore 
matters of databases and algorithms, matters of privacy and data protection, matters of risk 
and imagination, matters of business and the industry, matters of professionals and authority, 
matters of research and technologies, matters of outsourcing and the private sector, matters 
of surveillance and profiling, and matters of governing and reasoning – in short: they will 
explore many of the registers of security that we can find throughout aviation. Before going 
on to do just that, however, the next section (II.), will briefly plunge into questions concerning 
this very field aviation. Put very simply: why research the airport?
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Interlude
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I remember when flying was enjoyable.” 
(User “KTD”, 22 September 2011, www.flyertalk.com) 
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Stories from the airport 
On 17 April 2012, a man, later identified as John E. Brennan, created major headlines as he 
went through security screening at Portland International Airport. As reported by “The 
Oregonian”, a Portland-based newspaper, Brennan stripped completely naked in order to 
protest against intense and invasive screening procedures. After taking off all his clothes, 
Brennan proceeded to walk through the checkpoint entirely naked and was eventually taken 
into custody by local police authorities and later accused of public nudity and disorderly 
conduct. 
Why study the airport? As has been indicated at the very beginning, security creates friction – 
and arguably there are few places where this friction can be experienced as intensely as at the 
airport. Airports have clearly been one of the focal points of security reinforcements in the 
last decade. As Schouten (2014a: 23) points out, “since 9/11, terrorism has turned their 
security into a global controversy. Airport security has become a central preoccupation of 
security practitioners worldwide.” The little sketches of actual real-life ‘stories from the 
airport’ illustrating this section are rather randomly picked incidents (similar to the many 
others which can be found throughout the news archives if one is willing to dig), but they 
suffice to highlight the conflict potential of tightened screening protocols, attempts to profile 
travelers in advance of their actual journey, and new, invasive technologies such as body 
scanners. 
Thus, why is security politics so locked in at the airport? First of all, airports have been the 
point of entry for the attacks of 9/11, and this very fact is regularly being recurred to by 
discourses of security. As such, airports have been rendered iconic for security. Second, 
airports are highly particular spaces of transit that lack many aspects of social cohesion that 
we can find in the ‘regular’ spaces that we inhabit on a regular, everyday basis. As Lyon (2003a: 
13) dubs them, “airports are ‘placeless’ sites of temporary sojourn, air-lock chambers for 
nomadic executives or sun-seekers.” Such “non-places” (Augé, 2006) of transit, only 
temporarily passed through by strangers, are arguably more likely to foster an atmosphere of 
mistrust and suspicion that must be, so the argument goes, countered by stricter security 
measures. 
Which leads us to the third characteristic: airports feature ‘more’ security than most other 
spaces. More security in terms of surveillance and control technologies, more security in terms 
of capturing and storing data on individuals, and arguably stricter regimes of behavioral 
protocol. As Winner (2006: 281) argues, airports embody the “recognition that sociotechnical 
arrangements based on trust are also sources of insecurity [that] bought a widespread, highly 
costly refurbishing of many technological devices and systems.” In short: airports are highly 
regulated environments. This does not imply an overarching security agenda for global 
aviation, or even for one single airport. On the contrary, and in the vein of security as 
assemblage, Schouten (2014a: 25) highlights that “myriad spokespersons enter stage and 
open the black box or airport security, turning it into a controversy composed of many 
unpredictable elements.” However, notwithstanding such controversy which usually remains 
invisible to the occasional passenger, airports are epitomes of contemporary security regimes 
stacked with surveillance systems, technologies, police forces and private security guards, and 
as such have garnered a lot of attention from security studies. 
Fourth, airports have been heavily marketized. Apart from being actual shopping-center like 
spaces of commerce themselves, airports are plain and simple an integral part of a global 
economy by providing the underlying infrastructure for worldwide trades and services, and as 
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such must be carefully protected as part of the critical infrastructure that enables our way of 
life – or so the common argument goes. Moreover, the provision of security at airports has 
also been subjected to transformations. As Schouten (2014a: 29) points out, “security 
governance at airports and elsewhere is performed not primarily by state security forces, but 
rather by networks of security actors that cross-cut public/private, local/global and 
formal/informal dichotomies”, thus introducing a further commercial rationale into the 
complex assemblage of the airport. Finally, and connected to the empowerment of the global 
economy, aviation, like no other means of transport, is crucial to our modern lifestyle that at 
times appears to be dominated by unlimited mobility. Such a scope on mobility has more 
recently been picked up by numerous scholars who emphasize that “mobility is no longer 
outside authority and government. Mobility itself has become part of new forms of authority 
and government” (Bærenholdt, 2013: 27) and as such strikes at the core agenda of studying 
security. 
The Austrian firm Kontraproduktion shirts (www.kontraproduktion.at) is one of those online 
shops that sell supposedly funny t-shirts that engage with life’s contradictions through mostly 
pop-cultural references. One of their products sticks out, however. In front of an airplane taking 
off, it shows a figure throwing a bottle into a trash can, with a slogan beneath it proclaiming: 
“Throwing away my half-full bottle of water won’t make your world more secure” (“Das 
Wegwerfen meiner halbvollen Wasserflasche macht eure Welt nicht sicherer”). More sarcastic 
than humorous in its message, the shirt in fact pinpoints one of the major debates around 
airport security in recent years. The ban of liquids – with the exception of separately packaged 
containers that do not exceed 100ml – has been deemed as one of the most striking examples 
of highly symbolic security politics without any real world impact. Indeed, to some, it appears 
so absurd that it has now even found its way on to t-shirts. 
The ‘stories from the airport’ that entitle this section have to be understood in a two-folded 
fashion. The brief anecdotes provided here are such stories that illuminate the friction that 
security at the airport creates every day around the globe. Just as well, however, the analytical 
pieces that constitute the next section (III.) are in some sense such ‘stories from the airport’. 
They are empirical takes on how airport security comes into being, how it plays out, how it is 
contested and stabilized, how it is made and re-made. In fact, airport security emerges and 
re-emerges around the narratives of security that we have explored in section I., and a 
considerable amount of recent research has attempted to explore such issues. Be it the fact 
that airports must be conceived of as complex assemblages of security that undergo constant 
controversies, re-evaluations, negotiations and subsequently transformations (Lippert and 
O'Connor, 2003; Salter, 2008c; Schouten, 2014a). Be it the fact that airports have become a 
focal point of governing mobile populations through a multitude of modes of power and 
authority (Salter, 2007). Be it the fact that airport security desperately strives to render the 
future actionable in order to prevent the next event of terrorism through hi-jacking or 
bombing and thus has become the center of attention for scholars engaging anticipatory 
politics (Salter, 2008b; Adey, 2009). Be it the fact of complete surveillance of airport spaces in 
both physical and digital terms and the discipline and social sorting it enacts in the name of 
security (Bennett, 2005; Adey, 2004b; 2006; Adey et al., 2012; Klauser et al., 2008; Lyon, 2008). 
Be it the dominant role of security technologies for purposes of identification, access 
management, and scrutiny at the airport (Lloyd, 2003; Cavoukian, 2009b; Jones, 2009; Tugas, 
2013). Be it the multiple securitization processes that aviation has been subjected to (Salter, 
2008f). Or be it the fact that airport security in many parts of the world has been liberalized, 
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privatized, and out-contracted (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer, 2003; Seidenstat, 2004; O'Malley, 
2006). 
In summary, airports can be conceived of as emblematic for a liberal mode of governing that 
is preoccupied with the empowerment of global flows. Flows of people, goods, services, 
money, and data, that is. Those flows, however, must nonetheless be closely monitored and 
regulated for the sake of security. As Lyon (2006c: 218) argues, “post-9/11 antiterrorist tactics 
include these three areas: travel, focusing on security at airports and borders; financial 
systems, focusing on curtailing the flow of funds to ‘terrorists’; and communications, focusing 
on the interception of suspicious messages”, all of which are domains which thrive on the 
paradigm of circulation. Mobility, however, has arguably garnered most attention, since its 
modulations in terms of monitoring and profiling, and in terms of analyzing and scrutinizing 
can be directly felt by any traveler – having turned global connectivity into some kind of 
gauntlet run. After all, in order to be granted the smooth and uninterrupted journey that is 
promoted in aviation’s advertisements, one better not stand out from the crowd in some 
suspicious fashion – be it behavior, be it dangerous objects, or be it banal data characteristics 
such as past travel destinations, a cash-paid ticket, or the dietary choices for on-flight meals. 
As Bærenholdt (2013: 20) argues, “mobility is often associated with flow and freedom; 
nonetheless, it is also about power and government.” Such an arguably odd marriage between 
lightness and regulation, between freedom and power, between circulation and stops 
becomes in fact much clearer when we underpin empirical findings from airport assemblages 
with Foucault’s work on biopolitics. 
Only one week after Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, now widely known as the ‘underpants 
bomber’, had unsuccessfully attempted to blow up Northwest Airlines flight 253 from 
Amsterdam to Detroit with explosives hidden in his underwear, a man at Stuttgart airport 
made an unwise joke about a bomb – in his underpants. And even though, as reported by 
“Spiegel Online” on 5 January 2010, it later turned out that he was merely on his way to Egypt 
for vacation with his family and had no explosives or any other forbidden objects on him, he 
was detained by the Federal Police, subsequently missing his flight and facing a fine of up to 
1.000 Euros. 
We can in fact find liberal, yet highly regulative modes of governing airport security all around 
the world. While a great deal of research has almost naturally been concerned with changing 
regimes in the US, especially after 9/11, other parts of the world, mostly through regulations 
of international aviation organizations such as the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), have quickly attempted to 
harmonize their own modes of airport security. As Bærenholdt (2013: 27) points out, 
particularly “the European Union seeks to govern exactly through mobility in its endeavours 
to produce a frictionless space, overcoming missing links and promoting transnational 
activities in ways in which the networking and mobilities involved seem to become purposes 
themselves, if not, in fact the way power is mobilised in making European society and space 
[emph. in orig.].” Thus, mobility (and subsequently aviation) must not only be regarded as a 
technical means of movement, but also as constitutive of societies, of identities, and of spaces. 
Especially the latter notion of mobility as the production of space has more recently garnered 
increased interest from geographers who have engaged the spatial dimension of airports and 
their architectures and affects (Adey, 2008a; 2010; Bissell et al., 2012). 
Liberal government at the airport in fact presents itself in manifold ways that resemble liberal 
economy. As Salter (2013: 9) compellingly summarizes the empirical situation, “the 
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contemporary mobility regime – with its various technologies of identification, examination, 
verification, and passage – functions in the same ways as the free market: a disaggregated 
system of controls for the movement of peoples does not guarantee any one outcome (and 
indeed guarantees mobility shortages just as the market guarantees shortages), but rather 
provides a structure in which certain outcomes are removed from the political realm and 
treated as either technical or economic questions.” The rationale behind such a market 
approach, as indicated above, can arguably be best retraced through a Foucauldian account 
of biopolitical regimes. As Dean (2006: 15) puts it, “certain ways of governing, which we will 
broadly define as liberal modes of government, are distinguished by trying to work through 
the freedom or capacities of the governed [emph. in orig.]”, and arguably the airport is very 
paradigm for such modes. Thus, how does airport security craft freedom against the backdrop 
of a seemingly restrictive agenda of control and inspection? The answer is rather simple: in 
liberal government as diagnosed by Foucault, freedom and security are not mutually exclusive 
concepts, but reinforce each other through population management. As he argues, “power is 
situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena 
of population” (Foucault, 1984b: 260). Through a statistically empowered analysis of the 
population itself does security come into being, then.  
If we create knowledge about the population, so the political argument goes, then we can 
exercise power in such fashion that the ‘good’ and productive parts of the population can be 
granted freedom (and subsequently unlimited mobility) while the ‘bad’ and disruptive parts 
must and can be excluded from mobility such that they cannot unfold any harm. As Foucault 
(2007: 64) frames the issue, we must think of “circulation in the very broad sense of 
movement, exchange, and contact, as form of dispersion, and also as form of distribution, the 
problem being: How should things circulate or not circulate?” It is the close proximity to the 
economy that is emblematic for the ways in which airports operate, and that has in fact 
centered around the question of how to empower and regulate flows of passengers at the 
same time. In Foucault’s (2007: 65) terms, the task of government is then “no longer that of 
fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling 
them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly 
moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the 
inherent dangers of this circulation are canceled out.”  
In order to do just that, as has been outlined above, airports circle predominantly around the 
paradigms of surveillance and data gathering, such that from those digitalized streams 
knowledge can be created and eventually power can be exercised over flows of travelers. As 
Salter (2013: 10) points out, “practices of visas, preclearance, and electronic travel 
authorities/no fly lists, were in effect creating a globalized system for the surveillance of the 
mobile public”, notably for the twisted sake of both freedom and restriction at the same time, 
divided among population categories of riskiness and trustworthiness. Such categorizations 
have been rendered the focal point for a politics of/at the airport. As Salter (2013: 10) adds, 
in fact “the global air network is essentially a slingshot orbit; good passports are like wheels; 
money is a near-universal lubricant, as well as social capital, race, language, etc.”, and major 
public disputes have arisen from such categories that define the borderlines of social sorting. 
Protests against invasive levels of airport security screening have reached such heights that in 
the US, in November 2010, an online community called ‘We Won’t Fly’ (www.wewontfly.com) 
has formed that organizes nation-wide campaigns against the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) and its practices. Having originally emerged around doubts against body 
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scanners that featured ‘naked images’ of the human body at the time of roll-out, the 
community now more generally seeks to “catapult the cause of TSA abolition and the 
importance of human dignity and human rights (especially the 4th amendment) into the minds 
of hundreds of millions of people worldwide once again.” 
Arguably, the multiple techniques, technologies, discourses, and modes of governing that can 
be found empirically have rendered airports as such intriguing spaces for research. As 
Bærenholdt (2013: 22) claims, “the ways in which mobility is involved in the constant 
processes of redesigning and government of societies needs more attention”, as, as Salter 
(2013: 15) adds, “the management of circulation is not consistent across time, space, or 
networks”, and thus requires ongoing scholarly analyses. In fact, mobility politics must be 
understood as the all-encompassing attempt to digitally encode mobile populations in order 
to extract knowledge surplus from such data. As Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008: 272) argue, 
such a biopolitical “grid of intelligibility is in short an accounting and valuing machine” that 
enables authorities to govern populations through risk, based on statistics. As has been shown 
throughout the narrative of security as future, the registers of risk themselves are manifold 
and transformative, and have historically centered around specific problems of governing. 
With the scope on mobile populations, a biopolitical mode of security adds another quickly 
transforming element to the equation. As Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008: 283-4) explain, 
“biopolitical security discourses and techniques deal with an object that is continuously 
undergoing transformation and change through the manifold circuits of production and 
reproduction which comprise the very eventalness of its biological existence”: the (mobile) 
population. 
Multiple constellations of mobilities render airport security flexible such that it can be quickly 
re-adjusted according to the definition of new threats and/or political programs, but they also 
render airport security ultimately complex and academically challenging. We have to take into 
account the multiple modes of conducting “data derived from the intensification and 
extension of increasingly novel forms of counting, accounting and surveillance” (Dillon and 
Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 277), as well as their future-related analytics that, depending on the 
modality of risk applied, may produce unstable and temporary social sorting through 
algorithmic techniques of data-mining, creating “mobile norms” (Amoore, 2011) for the 
adaptive regulation of mobility. A Foucauldian account of security highlights government as 
the management of de-territorialized, boundary-less and global flows of people and goods. 
Security, conceived through this lens, produces freedom and openness, and empowers 
modern economic principles, while at the same time shutting down those elements of the 
population that by specific discourses are rendered ‘risky’ and thus unwanted. The analytic 
pieces to follow attempt to unpack, or at least shed some light on some of those mechanisms, 
while at the same time accounting for their impact across the social dimension. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Analytics 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“These pieces are written at that border between what one knows and what one thinks it 
might be possible to think, between what little one grasps and the great gulf of ignorance 
which that partial grasp reveals.” 
 (Rose, 1999: 11)
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Empirics 
As has been indicated in the prelude, this PhD project evolved through the thematic layer of 
a research project (KRETA). Funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) 
and thematically focused on the multiple ethical, social, and political implications of body 
scanner technology, the project pursued a double approach of both empirical fieldwork and 
philosophical reflection. While conducting empirical research (ethnographic observations at 
the airport as well as a series of expert interviews with stakeholders from the aviation branch, 
broadly conceived), it quickly became clear that research on a specific security technology that 
was designed particularly for airport contexts could by no means stand on its own. As has been 
shown throughout the first two sections of this thesis, the notion of security is way too 
complex to be broken down to a mere, however multi-dimensional, analysis of checkpoint 
security and its transformation through a single technology. In order to do as much justice as 
possible to the myriads of notions and nuances of security, any analysis of airport security 
must thus proceed way beyond a single spatial and/or technological layer, and rather turn to 
a mode of problematization that incorporates the airport ‘as-a-whole’. 
This is why I decided to extend my PhD project beyond the rather narrow (however highly 
intriguing) scope on body scanners. Still, as can be witnessed by the empirical inquiries to 
follow, body scanners make an appearance as the main focus of analysis in two of the six 
pieces. [Inquiry 4] centers around the question whether body scanners can be conceived of as 
an attempt of securitization. The manuscript analyses the reasons why body scanner 
technology has not been implemented at German airports, unlike in other EU member states. 
Conceptualizing the struggle over the deployment of a new screening measure as a 
securitization process, the paper seeks to move beyond language and official discourse, in 
which the machines were framed as unsuitable in plain numeric terms. Sociological 
approaches to securitization theory thus can help to shift the scope to practices and expert 
knowledge in the aviation sector and to achieve a more profound understanding of 
securitization processes. Building on a series of expert interviews with representatives from 
relevant stakeholders, the piece argues that privacy requirements have created major 
obstacles for body scanner technology and finally contributed to the (preliminary) failure of a 
long-term securitization move. The analysis of body scanners as a thwarted securitization 
process obviously builds on the narrative of security as securitization, but it also explores some 
of the notions of security as technology and security as economy. 
Body scanners are also the central building block in [Inquiry 2], co-authored with Anja 
Koenigseder, however from a much different, sociologically inspired angle. With the 
emergence of aviation as a target for terrorism and serious crime in the 1970s, the affective 
dimension of airport security changed drastically and is now carefully engineered as a zone of 
earnest and solemn protocol. Against the backdrop of bombings and hijackings, airport 
security today enacts a ‘no bullshit’ approach in the ‘war on terror’. Humor essentially has 
been banned from screening operations. From obvious signs that say ‘No bomb jokes, please’ 
to drastic consequences in the case of non-compliance, security appears as something that is 
not to be fooled around with. However, with the introduction of body scanners at the airport, 
this atmosphere of earnest appears to change. The manuscript builds on ethnographic 
fieldwork at Hamburg airport during the German trial run with body scanners in 2011. During 
the time of observation, we found a surprising amount of reciprocal laughter and joking. We 
argue that this can be conceptualized as an attempt to break open a space for laughter, 
momentarily abandoning protocol in order to deal with issues of visualization, exposure and 
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shame that arise from the new scope on the fleshly anatomical body. The paper touches on 
the politicality of body scanners and more generally on the politics of counter-terrorism, but 
it takes a ‘detour’ through the sociality of technology. In this vein, the manuscript builds 
mainly on the narrative of security as (socio-technical) assemblage, but also on the narratives 
of security as technology and security as government. 
Another empirical analysis that has directly emerged from the KRETA project is [Inquiry 5]. 
When analyzing the interview material, there was indeed a red thread throughout the 
transcripts that could hardly be missed: most of the experts at some point during the 
conversation highlighted the problematic state of security enactment on the ground level. In 
other words: they were concerned about the actual individuals who ‘produce’ security. Airport 
security both follows general trends of risk-based and technology-led policing, as well as it is 
determined by a neo-liberal economic mode of regulation, leading to privatization and out-
contracting of most tasks, including actual screening of passengers at the checkpoint. The 
manuscript draws on those expert interviews from the aviation sector in order to scrutinize 
how German airport security governance can be located on the continuum between the public 
and the private. By combining both economic and political accounts of security, the analysis 
retraces how the particular German solution of a principal/agent relationship between the 
police and private firms remains stuck between a normative blueprint of state-provided 
security and the benefits of market regulation, and thus causes a series of problems. The 
manuscript is constructed around the narrative of security as government – more specifically: 
around the criminologically coined perspective of security governance – and draws a close link 
to the narrative of security as economy. 
As mentioned earlier, the aim for this PhD project was to provide an analysis of security and 
the airport as encompassing as possible, and the empirical material from the KRETA project 
could only serve up to a certain point here. In order to create more accounts that provide 
further perspectives of how security comes into being in complex airport assemblages, I have 
sought to explore additional dimensions. Two of the analytic pieces that follow are particularly 
concerned with the notion of “social sorting” (Lyon, 2003d). [Inquiry 1] evolves around a 
presumed conflict between risk and privacy, and the cross-cutting practices of data collection 
we find at the airport. Risk has become a ubiquitous tool for security governance. The 
manuscript analyzes the ongoing shift in airport/aviation security from rule-based to risk-
based screening. Seeking to explore the effects of data based passenger risk assessment on 
privacy through the collection and processing of personal data, the paper argues that risk is 
likely to enroll passengers into a partly voluntary, partly enforced membership in trusted 
traveler schemes in order to enhance the database, thus enabling a more precise assessment 
of risk levels. In a disciplinary spatial setting, the once distinct privacy dimensions of citizen-
state and consumer-market become increasingly blurred, as law enforcement authorities seek 
to exploit data that was originally obtained for commercial purposes to improve risk 
calculations. The manuscript strongly builds on the narrative of security as surveillance, and 
on the underlying narrative of security as future. 
The notion of security as future is in fact one that has particularly fascinated me, and [Inquiry 
6] further explores the political modes of addressing the future at the airport. The paper 
argues that with increasingly large databases and computational power, profiling as a key part 
of security governance experiences major changes. Targeting mobile populations in order to 
enact security via controlling and sifting the good from the bad, profiling techniques 
accumulate and process personal data. However, as advanced algorithmic analytics enable 
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authorities to make sense of unprecedented amounts of information and derive patterns in a 
data-driven fashion, the procedures that bring risk into being increasingly differ from 
traditional profiling. While several scholars have dealt with the consequences of black-boxed 
and invisible algorithmic analytics in terms of privacy and data protection, the manuscript 
engages the effects of knowledge-generating algorithms on anti-discriminatory safeguards. 
Using the European level efforts for the establishment of a Passenger-Name-Record (PNR) 
system as an example, and on the theoretical level connecting distinct modes of profiling with 
Foucauldian thought on governing, the paper finds that with pattern-based categorizations in 
data-driven profiling, safeguards such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union or the EU data protection framework essentially lose their applicability, expressing a 
diminishing role of the tools of the anti-discrimination framework. Besides its strong focus on 
the narrative of security as future, the manuscript also explores the narratives of security as 
surveillance and security as government and re-connects them to the narrative of security as 
value. 
The last empirical inquiry occupies a special position among the array of manuscripts on 
airport security. It is not directly concerned with aviation, but with the complex relation of 
security, technology, the industry, and the field of security research. As already indicated in 
the prelude, I have opted to incorporate questions of security research as part of the political 
program of security, as they have strong relevance for more general questions of the social, 
political, and economic role of security. [Inquiry 3] thus engages the storied relation of security 
and privacy and its transformations through the layer of security research. Privacy and security 
have long been framed as incommensurable concepts that had to be traded off against each 
other. While such a notion is rather under-complex, it has been quite persistent. In recent 
years, however, the relation has undergone a transformation and is now apparently conceived 
of as a technological issue that is set to be resolved through privacy by design. The manuscript 
retraces, through an analysis of EU security research funding, how this shift has come about, 
and critically assesses its potential to eventually resolve the conflict between privacy and 
security in a world of data-driven security measures. Thereby, it builds on the narratives of 
security as transformation and security as technology, and links them closely to the narrative 
of security as economy. 
Besides highlighting specific registers of security individually, one common narrative that all 
inquiries touch upon is the initial one that has briefly explored security as value. They all raise 
normative questions, often from a critical standpoint that seeks to challenge the modes in 
which security is used as a means of re-ordering the social through distinct modes and 
rationalities of government. Particularly, they emphasize the colonization of the everyday 
which has become so crucial for a critical security studies agenda. The inquiries understand 
themselves as deeply indebted to, as Bigo (2008a: 16) frames it, “a political sociology of 
international relations that reintroduces international phenomena, by making them normal 
and banal social facts on a daily basis” and renders them challengeable through academic 
analysis. Quite naturally, as a researcher based in Germany and funded through both German 
and European security research frameworks, their main scope is the European Union – 
however without being geographically limited in the arguments they put forward. As has been 
shown, an analysis of mobility is by default an analysis that incorporates a global perspective. 
As people, goods, and services travel, so do insights about the regimes that monitor and 
regulate such travel. The analytical inquiries presented here are at different points in their 
path of flight towards publication, as respectively indicated. They are presented in the form 
of finalized manuscripts.  
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[Inquiry 1]  
Blurring the dimensions of privacy? Law enforcement and trusted traveler programs 
 
On 27 September 2011, the European Commission held a High Level Conference in Brussels 
on “Protecting Civil Aviation Against Terrorism.” In the final document, the experts from 
Europe, partnering countries and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
recommended that aviation should turn to a more risk-based policy, stating that “security 
measures can and should relate to the risk they intend to mitigate” (European Commission, 
2011c). The conference was followed up by another High Level Conference, this time held by 
the ICAO itself, that assembled more than 700 international representatives in Montréal, 12-
14 September 2012. In its final communiqué, the conference “encouraged ICAO Member 
States and industry stakeholders to adopt a risk-based approach to aviation security” (ICAO, 
2012: 2). Those are two striking examples of a security policy shift within an area that is 
considered both as highly symbolic and vulnerable, and thus has served as a prime target for 
any terrorist and/or criminal attempts. This paper seeks to explore the effects of this turn to 
risk as a key tool in the ‘war on terror’ on privacy in aviation. Theorizing the efforts as security 
governance (Wood and Dupont, 2006a), it will be shown how dispersed actors converge in 
their desire to create transparent individuals, using trusted traveler schemes as incentives, as 
they promise both rewards and the possibility to circumvent invasive secondary screening 
measures for passengers. Considering the contextual peculiarities for privacy (Nissenbaum, 
2010) at the airport, it will be argued that individuals have little leverage in negotiating privacy 
boundaries, but are ‘softly forced’ into participation in trusted traveler programs. 
The strong emphasis on risk in debates about aviation security has arguably emerged in a 
period of time when the cross-pressures on stakeholders have become more severe. In recent 
years, in addition to pressing security needs in the ‘war on terror’, aviation has faced rising 
numbers of overall flights and passengers and the need to work even more cost-effectively, 
while still providing maximum passenger convenience. At the intersection of these cross-
pressures lies passenger screening at the airport, where in a spatial bottle-neck security 
becomes enacted through the evaluation of whether the passenger poses a threat or not. 
Modern airports have been stacked with a variety of security and surveillance measures for a 
long time, ultimately culminating in intense screening procedures at the checkpoint that 
separates the publicly accessible landside area and the secured and ‘sterile’ zone of the airside 
area. Security screening has traditionally been carried out based on a principle of equality, 
meaning that everyone has to be screened with the same intensity. A simple problem has 
been identified within this current approach to airport security though, which is nonetheless 
hard to overcome. Past implementations of security measures and technologies in screening 
can be understood as a causal chain of incident and reaction – either in form of policy change 
or in form of new technological measures. Among the most prominent and controversially 
discussed examples of this sequential logic are the ban of liquids and the implementation of 
whole body imaging devices (‘body scanners’). However, there has been considerable critique 
towards such a reactive approach to airport security. The layering of security policies and 
measures at the checkpoint leads to “large increases in costs and inconvenience to travelers 
with a small corresponding increase in security” (McLay et al., 2006: 333), “but still [does] not 
manage to capture a clever and adaptive adversary” (European Commission, 2011c). Or, as 
Jackson, Chan and LaTourrette (2012: 1-2) have put it: “Questions have been raised about the 
basic philosophy of aviation security, which is that security is applied uniformly to all.” Thus, 
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aviation experts have deemed risk as a convenient and powerful remedy to the multiple 
concerns in aviation security. Airports appear to be a perfect fit for risk management 
strategies, since security screening channels large and mobile populations into a neat spatial 
setup in which security managers strive to examine the individual carefully. As Jones (2009) 
has noted, security mechanisms at the airport essentially come down to the checkpoint as the 
single valve that ensures the integrity of the secured sectors and prevents security breaches 
via the ability to stop and to sort out. Hence, in aviation’s struggles in the ‘war on terror’, the 
screening checkpoint can be considered the key tool against high-jackings, bombings, and 
whatever other worst-case scenarios security managers have mapped out as possible events.  
Along with the introduction of risk, considerable change is coming to the checkpoint. Where 
in the past a rule-based or bureaucratic paradigm (O'Malley, 2006) prevailed, new concepts 
for future screening are taking up the notion of increased distinction based on risk categories 
and intend to introduce mechanisms for an a priori analysis and sorting of passengers, 
enabling airport authorities to either add or subtract layers of security measures, according to 
the assigned risk level of a given individual. At its 2011 conference in Singapore, the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA, 2011) has presented a concept for the 
‘Checkpoint of the Future’. Much like the US CAPPS II system that intended to compute 
statistical risk estimates for each passenger (Barnett, 2004: 912), the IATA concept is set to 
collect and process as much passenger information as can be made available. While CAPPS II 
had been “eventually dismantled over privacy concerns” (McLay et al., 2006: 334), the IATA 
concept still intends to link multiple data sources, both from the public and the private sector. 
The risk estimation model is supposed to be supported by passenger data, trusted traveler 
databases, behavior analysis, and biometric identity management (IATA, 2011: 6). Travelers 
would then be screened on different levels of intensity, depending on their assigned risk level. 
A very similar approach is being pursued in a joint effort by the Airports Council International 
(ACI) and the Association of European Airlines (AEA). Their ‘Better Security’ concept states 
that “with greater focus on intelligence-based security, passenger name record (PNR) data has 
increasingly come under the spotlight” (ACI/AEA, 2011), and thus suggests that “closer 
international co-operation and data sharing should be used to strengthen the effectiveness of 
passenger profiling, flagging suspicious individuals” (ACI/AEA, 2011). 
Within the multiplicity of identified data sources, the inclusion of trusted or registered traveler 
programs seems most notably unique, for it is based on voluntary participation. Passenger 
information is usually being obtained by airlines for commercial purposes in the form of 
‘Passenger Name Record’ (PNR) or ‘Advance Passenger Information’ (API) files. While the 
latter contains only information about the individual’s identity and passport documents as 
well as the travel itinerary, PNR goes beyond that basic data and contains also the likes of 
contact and payment information, including credit card number, baggage details, the traveler 
status and even special dietary requirements on the flight. Thus, PNR data has been turned 
into an asset for security operations by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) via 
the 2007 EU-US PNR Treaty. Also, other forms of information gathering like behavior analysis 
and identity management (either biometric or conventional) may not be circumvented by the 
passenger. Data sources in risk-based passenger screening might thus be divided into ‘no opt-
outs’ and ‘opt-ins’, with trusted traveler information being the only source that passengers 
can opt-in to. Or, as the IATA concept states: “Further assessment can be made through 
passengers voluntarily providing more information about themselves, through known traveler 
programs” (IATA, 2011). According to Jackson, Chan, and LaTourrette (2012: 2), successful 
passenger differentiation can be achieved via the identification of individuals who pose more 
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risk or via the identification of individuals who pose less risk to aviation. While the former is 
based on the ‘unknowns’ about the individual in question, the latter form is concerned with 
what is already known about a passenger and how that information can be exploited in order 
to determine the individual’s trustworthiness. “Trusted traveler status allows these 
passengers then to go through less-intense screening than would have been the case without 
the program, and the remainder of the public receives more intense screening” (Jackson et 
al., 2012: 3), effectively establishing both a re-allocation of scarce economic resources and 
providing increased customer convenience for ‘trusted’ travelers. Framed as a form of 
panacea by aviation security practitioners, the inclusion of trusted traveler data thus facilitates 
screening and provides incentives for the participation in the programs at the same time. 
Exploring the possibilities of added information sources in terms of trusted traveler status, the 
EU Commission Directorate-General Energy & Transport has issued a study on the feasibility 
of registered passenger concepts in order to “whether such passengers could be exempted 
from certain controls without compromising security” (Accenture, 2007: 2), coming to the 
conclusion that “the information submitted by a passenger for enrollment into an RP scheme 
may enable a ‘not high-risk’ judgement” (Accenture, 2007: 3). But at the same time, the 
authors recognize that clearance in terms of trustworthiness does not eliminate the risk that 
known travelers might be ‘sleepers’, or that they might be coerced or duped into terrorist 
attempts (Accenture, 2007: 3), thus claiming that trusted travelers essentially could not be 
screened with less intensity. However, analyzing a number of existing trusted traveler 
schemes, including well-known programs like PRIVIUM, NEXUS, IRIS or CanPASS, the report 
finds that screening and access to the checkpoint could at least be facilitated and accelerated 
(Accenture, 2007: 9). As for concepts like the “Checkpoint of the Future” and “Better Security”, 
trusted traveler programs would remain but one of several indicators for risk assessment, 
among other information sources including flight route and type, passenger data, double-
checks against government databases like terrorism black lists or no-fly lists, biometric identity 
management and behavioral analysis (IATA, 2011: 11). Nonetheless, trusted traveler data is 
being pursued as a valuable additional data source for risk management. 
 
Security, risk, and privacy 
This tendency falls in line with what has been deemed as anticipatory post-9/11 policy turn, 
enacting precaution and preemption based on a “quasi-permanent state of exception” 
(Tsoukala, 2010: 41). A common ground that can be observed in all of the official documents 
is the strong emphasis on the collection of data, and, more importantly, the convergence of 
databases. The aviation sector thus envisions international standards of data sharing and 
interoperability, paired with mutual recognition of risk assessments (IATA, 2011). In order to 
understand the hunger for comprehensive data on individuals in aviation security, one has to 
look closer into the concept of risk. The scope on data at the airport enacts a form of 
“surveillant assemblage” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000), encoding the individual into digital 
information profiles. Those mechanisms have empowered the turn from traditional 
surveillance to “dataveillance” (Amoore and de Goede, 2005), enabling authorities to govern 
populations based on the available individual information. The crucial assumption of risk is 
that uncertain futures could be rationalized and then managed, treating risk factors like 
business assets. In screening, this claim comes into being via individualized risk assessment, 
based on knowledge in the form of passenger data. Statistical risk assessment is realized via 
the collection, linkage, processing and finally evaluation of a sufficiently large database. 
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Featuring a clear scope on passenger information, practices of data collection and sharing in 
aviation have repeatedly drawn the attention of privacy researchers (see for instance Bennett, 
2005; 2008). Arguably, risk assessment is adding a new dimension of quality to data based 
surveillance and possible social sorting. It becomes clear then that in terms of privacy impact 
assessment, risk-based screening at the airport has to be scrutinized carefully. 
Starting from the notion that “privacy is a moving target” (Friedewald et al., 2010: 61), it 
should briefly be clarified how the concept can serve as an analytical tool for data handling 
practices at the airport. The buzzing debates on concepts, regimes and policies of privacy, 
including a lot of critique towards the concept of privacy as an adequate toolbox in the first 
place, have been reflected in Solove’s (2008: 171-2) somewhat cynic remark that privacy may 
very well serve as a generic term for a whole cluster of problems that need not necessarily be 
located along the same dimensions and therefore share not much but the lack of a common 
denominator. Nonetheless, privacy (along with the concept of data protection) has become 
one of the catchphrases in public debates when it comes to defending civil liberties against 
whatever form of surveillance and control measures they would be endangered by in the 
name of security. Today, most scholars have abandoned the classical paradigm of privacy as 
“the right to be let alone”, as it had been proclaimed by Warren and Brandeis (1890) more 
than a hundred years ago. However, there are still approaches that tend to reproduce a 
perspective that carries a somewhat individual-centric notion and emphasizes the control that 
individuals should possess over their personal data. That is, for instance, to whom information 
would be communicated, at which point in time, and to what extent (Westin, 1970). This kind 
of understanding remains within the spatial assumption that privacy should be considered as 
some kind of bubble around the individual that has to be protected from intrusion and pairs 
very well with the often proclaimed notion that privacy would be the counterpart to modern 
surveillance (for a contest of this relationship, see Gilliom, 2011). 
Concepts that solely remain on the individual level arguably neglect a broader societal 
perspective, though. Several scholars have put an emphasis on the fact that privacy must be 
regarded as a common good as well, that might be balanced against other values (Friedewald 
et al., 2010: 61). Drawing on Altman (1977), Steeves (2009) has pointed out that privacy in 
modern societies should be analyzed as a dynamic process that is constantly involved in 
negotiating personal boundaries. Building on that argument, Nissenbaum (2010) has made a 
significant impact on the debates with her notion of context related concepts of privacy. Both 
boundaries and contexts then would not only consider other individuals, but organizations 
and institutions as well (Bennett, 2011: 489). As in the case of passenger screening, it might 
very well be argued that individual claims of privacy are prone to be overpowered by the 
common good of security, and that passengers should be willing to accept certain cutbacks in 
privacy in order to guarantee the higher value of shared security for all. Considering that the 
framing of contemporary security as a means to grant protection from a ubiquitous terrorist 
threat has become the defining paradigm for shaping concrete security frameworks, the 
position of privacy claims arguably becomes weakened. Security discursively seems to trump 
individual as well as societal privacy. Along these lines, Stalder (2011) has pointed out that in 
numerous situations in everyday life, individuals have to provide personal information against 
their will, and have little or no bargaining power. Considering future-related governance, it is 
not so much security itself that poses a threat to privacy, but the notion of risk and the claim 
to calculate the probability of future events, based on individual data. 
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Thinking privacy in terms of contextuality, an analysis of aviation security poses some major 
hurdles in terms of the fragmented nature of the topic. Being an international matter that is 
regulated through an assemblage of international organizations, national regulations and 
bilateral treaties, overlapping or unclear legal frameworks of privacy and data protection 
might well be the case, as has for instance become obvious in the EU-US PNR debates. While 
in the EU passenger information is protected by the European data protection framework 
(Official Journal of the European Communities, 1995), the same data when transmitted to the 
US underlies distinct legal regulations. Moreover, airports themselves depict a prime example 
of spaces where individuals possess little to none leverage when facing screening and the 
conduct of personal information. Thus, possible negotiations of privacy boundaries are being 
suppressed in the first place. In order to assess the impact of recent developments in aviation 
security, it is important to analyze how risk is brought into being at the airport and how it 
impacts privacy. Or, put more precisely: the analysis will be focused on the way how privacy 
‘negotiations’ are affected by the notion of risk assessment and management, eventually 
leading to a situation in which fair bargain becomes blocked, since too much is at stake for the 
passenger. A refusal of information disclosure rules out the possibility to fly and essentially 
hinders any rational forms of resistance against data processing practices of airport 
authorities. On the contrary, taking up Westin’s (2003) thesis of distinct privacy dimensions, 
it will be shown that with the inclusion of trusted traveler schemes, the dimensions of privacy 
become increasingly blurred, illustrating a larger trend in which “the application of risk 
techniques in the war on terror fosters complex new spaces of governing in which public and 
private authorities, knowledges and datasets cooperate closely, and sometimes become 
practically indistinguishable” (Amoore and de Goede, 2005: 7). Not only do law enforcement 
authorities seek to exploit commercial databases, but moreover can the membership in 
trusted traveler programs potentially contribute to the assignment of a low-risk status, 
skewing the inconveniences in screening towards the less mobile and economically 
disadvantaged parts of the population, and leading to increased “self-governance” (Amoore 
and de Goede, 2005) of the passenger, who becomes likely to voluntarily disclose additional 
personal information in background checks for the sake of less distressing travel. 
 
From security governance to risk governance? 
Theorizing aviation security as governance makes it possible to turn the attention to the 
dispersed network of actors through which it becomes enacted (Yar, 2011). Emphasizing the 
achievement of desired steering effects as a result from multi-party networks including public 
as well as private sector agencies, Rhodes (2007) provides a pragmatic approach to the 
analysis of governance. However, several authors (Loader and Walker, 2006; Zedner, 2007) 
have pointed out that the diminishing role of the state in governance creates problems in 
terms of accountability, legitimacy and social justice when it comes to the provision and 
distribution of security. With the rise of risk, those problems arguably become amplified. 
While in economic contexts risk is often framed as an opportunity, more often the term bears 
a negative connotation. Risk is the probability of something happening, and while it can be 
argued that making a risky investment can indeed turn into a chance, the notion of risk as 
future harm overwhelms in security discourses. Risk then intuitively becomes connected to 
accident, crisis, emergency, catastrophe, or disaster. Thus, the assessment and management 
of risk intends to tame the possibility of harm. In the governance of mobile populations, risky 
elements are to be sorted out of the flow in order to prevent devastating events such as 9/11. 
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Risk assessment quantifies the chances that the future will indeed go wrong and that the state 
of normalcy will collapse into a chain of events that contests the ritual and breaks the habit. 
Following this logic, risk is both an indicator of the possibility of future events as well as a 
factor that should be minimized by establishing precautionary counter-measures.  
Paving the way for a social science analysis of risk, Beck (1986) has introduced his 
interpretation of the “risk society”, hinting at the ubiquitous use of the concept of risk in 
numerous areas of contemporary societies. Put briefly, risk appears as a way to cope with the 
unknown structures of the future by capturing its temporal dimension and relating it back to 
the present, where it can be dealt with in terms of management, mitigation, reduction or even 
avoidance. However, considering the fact that the unpredictability of terrorism exceeds the 
claim of control in terms of management, Beck comes to the conclusion that risk as a policy 
tool can merely “feign control over the uncontrollable” (Beck, 2002: 41). Despite this logical 
flaw, risk has increasingly found use in security governance, enabling policy makers to enact a 
pro-active role and to shape security in the name of precaution, thus acting upon an identified 
threat before it reaches the point of irreversibility (Anderson, 2010a). In the statistical turn 
towards probabilistic thinking, risk promises to grasp uncertainties and to convert them to 
plain numbers – which would then be easy to interpret, easy to understand across cultural 
and linguistic borders (Hansen and Porter, 2012), and, maybe most importantly, easy to use 
as an argumentative basis for policy makers to establish security measures that would reduce 
the likelihood of occurrence of future harm. 
As a most welcome side-effect in trying to tame the uncertainty that is “the basic condition of 
human knowledge” (Ericson, 2006: 346), the contemporary deployment of risk management 
promises to soothe some pressing concerns in times of scarce resources, thus introducing a 
notion of economic benefit into the management of future contingencies. With security 
governance in aviation increasingly becoming risk governance, the assessment of risky 
individuals is set to provide a support for decision-making on where to allocate limited 
resources in order to achieve desired policy outcomes in the most effective way. This rationale 
enables airport authorities to subtract or add screening measures in order to increase both 
speed and passenger convenience level at the checkpoint. The question whether the concept 
of risk really transfers to the social level constantly lingers over the debates on risk regimes, 
and has been deemed controversial (Aradau et al., 2008; Manning, 2006; Tsoukala, 2010) as 
it neglects the concept of free will and the unpredictability of human behavior. Risk in terms 
of precautionary politics means thinking about the intentions of individuals, based on 
available criteria and large amounts of data that are being put into predictive models 
(O'Malley, 2004: 1). In this attempt to rationalize human behavior, “technologies of risk 
management provide a logical connector for developments which seem to lack a common 
rationality”, as Aradau and van Munster (2007: 107) have noted, hinting at the sometimes 
arbitrary establishment of a causal chain between indicator variables and estimated risk level. 
The analysis and management of risk originally stem from environments that feature physical 
and material sequences in material environments, such as engineering or statistics, and 
arguably this is the area in which they work best (Manning, 2006: 455). For in those 
environments, all relevant variables and indicators for risk estimation are known and models 
can be designed adequately, so that calculated estimates can be considered robust. However, 
with regard to social and individual behavior, risk profiling can merely serve as a proxy for real 
evidence (Cavusoglu et al., 2010: 1288). 
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 Empirically, the application of risk can be found in various political and social areas, including 
fields such as insurance, health care, the financial system and border control (Amoore and de 
Goede, 2005: 149). Especially in the security sector, the problem of contingency and the ‘war 
on terror’ has been increasingly framed as a matter of risk management, thus contributing to 
the deployment of risk assessment in several contexts, most visibly at symbolic sites like 
airports and the border. As O’Malley (2004: 1) has drastically put it, risk-based routines and 
practices dominate many aspects of contemporary life, establishing a form of governance that 
not only targets, but also incorporates individuals and turns them into everyday risk managers 
themselves. Thus, risk seems to have colonized the state of normalcy (Aradau et al., 2008: 
154) in the name of the ‘war on terror’, reminding of what Agamben (2005) has tagged as the 
“permanent state of exception”, and putting security governance into the realm of emergency 
and urgency. Ultimately then, security governance shifts to risk governance. 
If this is true for society in general, it is particularly true for aviation. Extreme events like 9/11 
and the terrorist bombings in Madrid and London have painfully emphasized the vulnerability 
of the transportation infrastructure that supports liberal ways of life. Dealing with events of 
low probability but high impact, security policy makers felt the urge to find a way to deal with 
catastrophe, disaster, and emergency on a basis that was suitable for governing the future 
from within the present and to establish a maximum of both precaution and on the other hand 
preparedness for the worst-case. Consequently then, in the wake of 9/11, security policy was 
predominantly framed as a problem of risk management (Amoore, 2006: 337). International 
aviation, as the entrance point for the terrorists of 9/11 and highly symbolic for the use of 
aircraft for the attacks as well as for its promise of free and fast global movement, has arguably 
undergone the most enduring effects in terms of changing security regimes since then. Yet, as 
Jacobson (2012: 35) states, the aviation system today is at its most risky point since 9/11, still 
focusing on objects as material threats and introducing security measures and policies only as 
ex-post reactions to incidents like the 2001 shoe bomber, the 2006 liquid explosives plot or 
the 2009 underpants bomber (Jacobson, 2012: 36). The awareness of this problematic 
backwards approach that looks into past events in order to adapt the present has arguably 
fostered the turn to risk. Looking into the future, risk has to rely on predictions about the 
intentions of individuals, whose actions then might eventually materialize as worst-case 
events such as terrorist attacks. The focus thus shifts from the concrete to the vague, from 
situational crime prevention to full range surveillance of individuals and personal data.  
Risk governance aims at replacing subjective anticipations of the future with standardized 
equations which provide an outcome of most precise predictions. Or, in other words: risk 
assessment is the attempt to transform fluid uncertainties into calculable terms, based on 
‘hard’ facts in terms of passenger information. It thus represents a rationalized form of 
thinking that moves away from subjective evaluations and estimations of the unknowable, 
and strives to establish the possibility to govern the future, based on numbers. For this 
purpose, managers of risk attempt to encode individuals into categories of riskiness, 
separating the trustworthy and legitimate from the dangerous and illegitimate parts of the 
population (de Goede, 2008a: 158). Thus, risk has been tagged as an instrument for governing 
the social (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 91) by putting populations “at risk” (Aradau et al., 
2008: 151). Exposing passengers to scrutiny and categorization, it becomes possible to sort 
populations, identifying and acknowledging the ‘good’ parts, while exercising restrictions on 
the ‘unwanted’ parts, as has repeatedly been stated with regards to border control regimes 
and practices (see for instance Amoore, 2006; Bigo, 2001; Epstein, 2007; Lahav, 2008; Muller, 
2009; Pallitto and Heyman, 2008; Salter, 2004). Airport screening increasingly draws on the 
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same patterns, setting up a mechanism that resembles Bigo’s (2001) figure of the Möbius 
ribbon that identifies high-risk outsiders from the inside of the population of passengers. As 
opposed to border control and immigration, risk assessment at the airport does not come into 
being on the basis of nationalities and passports, but on the grounds of passenger information. 
Lyon (2006a) has described airport security as a mechanism of social sorting, enacting 
dataveillance as “routine and focused attention to personal details for the purpose of 
influence, management, care, and control” (Lyon, 2006a: 403). Checkpoint security 
traditionally has worked as a stand-alone measure (Jones, 2009: 98), but becomes increasingly 
linked to data-based risk assessment, providing tools that serve as decision support systems 
that complement technologies of situational crime prevention with indications on where to 
intensify scrutiny and where the screening might be reduced on the basis of an established 
trustworthiness. 
 
Context: disciplinary spaces 
As well as in case of privacy, the meaning of risk may also vary considerably, and depends on 
disciplinary contexts and concrete settings (Zedner, 2006b: 424). The major stake for security 
regimes is how to govern large and mobile populations (Martin and Simon, 2008: 287), which 
means that for the sake of managing risks, individual behavior becomes encoded in the data 
structure. At the airport, those data are being provided through “routine procedures of 
classification and categorization” (Aradau et al., 2008: 149) in the form of PNR/API and trusted 
traveler schemes, verified by (biometric) identity management and double-checked against 
remote databases, enacting aviation’s focus on identity and the gathering of data (Jacobson, 
2012: 37). As Adey (2008b: 146) notes, being “symbols of the securitization of public space, 
airports employ the latest surveillance techniques in order to identify and target terrorists, 
threats, or risks.” The ever-increasing desire to conduct as much information as possible in 
order to complete the basis for risk assessment appears to be a ticking-bomb-scenario in 
terms of civil liberties and human rights in general (Tsoukala, 2010; Zedner, 2006b: 425). 
Thinking about recent developments from a privacy perspective, surprisingly little resistance 
has manifested against data collection and data exploitation in risk governance. Especially 
practices in transportation security seem to be well tolerated when compared to commercial 
private sector operations. This lack of resistance is hard to retrace when taking into account 
that the majority of passenger information is collected and/or handled by private companies. 
In the commercial sector, more and more companies have mastered the challenge of 
providing custom-tailored and personalized services (Stalder, 2011: 510). Global trailblazers 
like Google, Amazon or Facebook, to name some of the most prominent examples, proudly 
announce that each of their users/customers will face different and individualized treatment, 
depending on their needs and wishes. But this modern promise has kindled an intense debate 
on practices of data-mining, thus raising public awareness towards the collection, storage, and 
analysis of personal information by private companies. While in a liberal market environment, 
it seems comparably easy to perform an opt-out from such practices and to choose another 
(digital) shopping venue, a different provider, or to abandon membership in social networks, 
the situation at the airport is a very much distinct one. Screening in aviation security 
fundamentally differs from free choice. Passengers are not entitled to opt out from screening, 
unless they would accept to stay grounded after all. It has been argued that in aviation, a 
business relation between customer and carrier airline is being established by purchasing a 
ticket and accepting the terms of business. But flying is arguably more than just business. 
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Besides being symbolic and part of the contemporary paradigm of mobility, aviation is a highly 
relevant area for national and international security, which is why usually public authorities 
and/or law enforcement are involved in security screening at the airport. 
Thus, the individual’s surrender to risk assessment and the disclosure of personal data 
becomes mandatory, whether or not this might be accompanied by major privacy concerns. 
The lack of resistance has partly been ascribed to an environment that is as intimidating as an 
airport in the first place. Airports have been deemed as places of extreme discipline (Lyon, 
2003a), where privacy-invading security measures were more likely to be accepted than 
elsewhere. This might partially be based on fears of terrorist attacks, but also on the ‘liquid’ 
characteristics of the airport, often compared to what Augé (2006) has deemed as modern 
“non-places” that only exist for the single purpose of transportation and feature a lack of 
permanent inhabitants and regular social interaction. In places of mobility, where everybody 
essentially remains a stranger to everybody else and travelers are constantly on the move, no 
traditional social mechanisms like trust between individuals can be built and established in 
the short period of time that a traveler spends at a transportation hub (Hansen and Porter, 
2012: 415). Thus, to be able to assess who poses a threat and who can be rendered harmless, 
knowledge about the travelers has to be created. Drawing on Haggerty and Ericson (2000), 
risk assessment in screening tackles security concerns via the creation of “data doubles.” 
Passengers become enrolled in a regime that operates on the basis of virtualized 
characteristics, encoding individuals into algorithmic risk calculation. 
The lack of resistance against privacy infringements might also be due to the invisible setup of 
data collection for risk governance. Only with the inclusion of opt-in trusted traveler schemes, 
the disclosure of personal information re-enters the sphere of public awareness. And, unlike 
accepting the terms of business with the purchase of an airline ticket, the enrollment in a 
trusted traveler program requires pro-active individual initiative. So, on the one hand, it could 
be argued that informed consent is more likely in this case, but on the other hand, practices 
of data processing and transfer still remain opaque. The use of trusted traveler data, as it has 
been proposed by the IATA and ACI/AEA in order to expand the database for risk assessment, 
features additional caveats. Trusted traveler programs today appear on a global level and in a 
multiplicity of forms that require distinct forms of registration, background checks, disclosed 
information, membership fee and benefits. This variety is due to different scopes, among 
others on border control, immigration, the coverage of complete individual journey trails or 
simple customer convenience (Accenture, 2007: 11), complicating the choice of an adequate 
analytical level. 
The US based Global Entry program, for instance, requires a profound background check which 
is being supported by an interview with a US Customs and Border Protection officer in order 
to approve of the applicant’s low risk status. If this application is deemed successful, biometric 
identifiers are collected for the purpose of identity management at the airport. Global Entry 
currently is available for US citizens and legal residents, as well as for citizens of the 
Netherlands, South Korea, and Mexico, via bilateral treaties that regulate the exchange of 
passenger information between the participating countries. For instance, the bilateral treaty 
between the US and the Netherlands is coordinated by the so-called FLUX (Fast Low Risk 
Universal Crossing) Alliance. Accordingly, Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, being one of the 
major hubs in Europe, offers the use of the Dutch PRIVIUM program as equivalent to Global 
Entry. Focused on border control and immigration processes as well, the PRIVIUM scheme 
also features a scope on passenger conveniences and provides access to lounges, valet 
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parking, shopping discounts, airport assistance, and the use of exclusive fast lanes for an 
accelerated access to security screening. Besides the collection of biometric identifiers, 
enrollment into the FLUX Alliance requires the disclosure of full employment record for the 
past five years in addition to the membership fee for the PRIVIUM scheme. Being used in 
advertisement as a unique selling point, biometric identity management is offered in form of 
the possibility to accelerate border crossing by providing an iris scan to an automated kiosk 
instead of queuing up and showing ID documents to a border officer.  
The use of technological advances like, in this case, iris recognition, is part of what has been 
identified as part of a PR strategy within aviation (Accenture, 2007: 8), demonstrating to the 
public that airlines as well as airport operators are pursuing pro-active strategies to make 
aviation more secure. And although the use of the advanced features requires the collection 
of biometric data, which can be considered as highly sensitive personal information, especially 
frequent fliers seem to be intrigued by the time-saving opportunities, combined with 
preferred treatment and ‘cool’ and ‘futuristic’ gadgets, making them part of an avant-garde 
global elite. Another example from the non-western context can be found in Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi. At Dubai International Airports, frequent fliers are offered the possibility to apply for 
an eGate Card, which is issued by the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners Affairs. 
Eligible for Dubai citizens and ex-patriates with a visa, the card holder becomes entitled to 
circumvent immigration procedures by simply swiping the card through a card reader at an 
automated kiosk and confirm with his or her fingerprint. For a membership fee of about 40 
EUR (200 AED), the registered and thus ‘trusted’ traveler receives a smart card that features 
an RFID chip, while the submitted data (passport, photo, finger print) becomes stored in a 
central database. The Dubai government advertises that entering and exiting the country 
would be possible in about 5-10 seconds when using the eGate system. 
From an industry point of view, the establishment of trusted traveler programs is indeed a 
crafty move, since they provide multiple advantages for aviation security stakeholders. First 
of all, through membership fees, revenue is generated, which might not make the programs 
cost-neutral, but which at least contributes to an efficient implementation. The second 
advantage, as already discussed, is the passenger’s voluntary disclosure of additional personal 
information, either in standardized form or in profound background checks, including 
interviews with the applicant and their family and close friends, as well as biographic data and 
biometric identifiers. The third move is the enrollment of the trusted traveler into a form of 
self-governance regime, expecting the passengers to handle security issues and other checks 
and screenings themselves. Contrary to the automatic and “hidden” (Bellanova and Duez, 
2012: 122) collection of passenger information in PNR and API files and double-checks against 
remote databases, trusted traveler programs bring the disclosure of data back into the sphere 
of visibility and individual awareness. There is nothing obscure or opaque about membership 
requirements in terms of additional information and background checks – it might even be 
argued that the enrollment into trusted traveler schemes represents a form of informed 
consent. Since it could be assumed that the status as a trusted traveler is something that is 
desired and which advantages and disadvantages might have been weighed against each 
other, passengers would simply ‘pay’ for low-risk status with their personal information. 
But such an argument appears flawed. As has been discussed, the disciplinary setup of airports 
does not allow for a real negotiation of privacy boundaries. Aviation security is a field in which 
recent developments have shown that risk-based policies do not only seek to identify risky 
individuals, but also seek to offer less intense screening to known travelers, for a number of 
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economic reasons. As Poole (2009: 101) puts it, there would be three distinct categories of 
passengers, based on the authorities’ knowledge about the individual. Besides the regular 
traveler, there would be the low-risk passenger, about whom sufficient information would be 
available to execute an extensive risk assessment (with a positive result). The high-risk 
category, on the other hand, would be characterized by either negative knowledge, or, more 
importantly, the lack of knowledge. This would then include individuals “with no paper trail” 
(Poole, 2009: 101), thus passengers with an airline ticket that was bought by cash or 
passengers who previously never entered a given country via an airport. In risk-based security 
governance, not being known to public authorities represents a form of threat that can be 
compared to what Amoore and de Goede (2005: 158) have identified as the increasingly 
suspicious notion of cash money in the international financial system. As they note, “the world 
economy is a deliberately open and porous one, designed to encourage the free flow of 
capital, investment and economic development” (Amoore and de Goede, 2005: 153). In a 
similar fashion, aviation enables the free movement of individuals and goods. But only what 
can be surveilled, traced, calculated, assessed and managed appears to be trustworthy. The 
conflict between privacy and security found here is indeed a serious one. As security is being 
enacted via the concept of risk, the relationship between security governance and privacy is 
growing even more tense, as risk seeks to translate personal information into security assets. 
Thinking about contextual integrity, aviation security policy turns into a mechanism of 
information-production. As Salter (2007) notes, airports enforce the surrender to a 
“confessionary complex”, which with the rise of risk is being further amplified. The 
exploitation of trusted traveler data only seemingly turns the power relations between 
passenger and security screening upside down. Offering the possibility to circumvent some 
invasive screening measures, the individual is free to do so by enrolling into one of the 
numerous public-private partnership programs, thus arguably regaining some of the lost 
ground in privacy negotiations. Only that there is no ground to be gained in terms of privacy, 
but only in terms of less distressing screening. Or, in other words: the paying customer who 
abandons privacy concerns and offers full surrender of personal information receives double 
benefits from the private economy and from law enforcement. For the multiple stakeholders 
in aviation, such a symbiotic relationship generates a number of advantages. Airlines would 
become enabled to enhance customer convenience and airport authorities might speed up 
screening operations, from which also airport operators could profit, as travelers could spend 
the saved time to explore the airside shopping opportunities. Lyon (2003a) has in fact foretold 
an increased convergence of once separated surveillance systems from private economy and 
law enforcement in the follow-up of 9/11. Several scholars have since then pointed out that 
contemporary security governance in transportation and mobility is indeed structured as a 
“decentralized, rhizomic system of surveillance, in which travelers are constructed as 
manipulable entries in remote databases” (Lyon, 2003a: 15). 
Bennett (2005; 2008), for instance, has analyzed the cascade effects of data collection, 
analysis and sharing that become triggered by the mere purchase of an airline ticket. Focusing 
on PNR treaties (Bellanova and Duez, 2012; Hobbing, 2010; for an analysis of PNR data, see 
Schreurs et al., 2008) and no-fly lists, he has pointed out that privacy practices in aviation are 
highly dependent on contextual factors that include the departing country as well as 
destination and itinerary and may even vary among different airports within one single 
country. A certain amount of those varying practices of collecting, processing and securing 
(and in the case of PNR: sharing) data is due to the highly fragmented nature of aviation. As 
Barros (2012) points out, national as well as EU legislation is complemented with binding 
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regulations (dependent on the membership of the respective country) from several 
international organizations (IATA, ICAO). Moreover, numerous countries have established 
distinct bilateral treaties for the purpose of establishing trusted traveler schemes and the 
sharing of passenger information as well. In addition to this fragmented legal situation, 
airports as the places of screening and control are often hybrid spaces that consist of a variety 
of public-private partnerships, outsourcing and subcontracting. Thus, empirically a large 
variance in collecting and handling of privacy-related passenger data already can be found 
today. The rise of risk in aviation consequently not only reinforces a general tendency in post-
9/11 security thinking, but also the ongoing convergence of the public and the private sector. 
Concepts like the “Checkpoint of the Future” and “Better Security” indeed enact a long term 
trend, as has been suggested by Lyon (2006a), and draw critique not only in terms of privacy 
infringements. Attention should also be paid to the social sorting power of risk in mobility, 
possibly favoring wealthy elites who profit from facilitated travel, easier access to services and 
preferred treatment. The poorer and less mobile parts of the population, on the contrary, 
appear to be risky from the start, merely for not creating strong data trails in the international 
aviation system. And in risk governance, leaving no paper trail at all equals being a potential 
offender. 
 
Conclusions: blurring the state and the market! 
A number of normative problems remain with the use of risk as a governing tool, one of the 
most pressing issues being its relation to privacy. Risk assessment is based on personal 
information, rationalized in the calculation of profiles in order to sort mobile populations. In 
aviation security, it comes into being via the collection and processing of passenger data which 
represents the ‘hard facts’ on which the probabilistic rationale of risk governance must rely. 
Among the increasing number of security-related societal areas that are governed by risk, 
aviation is one of the most widely recognized, representing an environment that Lyon (2006a) 
has described as laboratory in which emerging technologies are deployed at early stages, only 
to be later spilled over into other, wider societal areas. Data collection at the airport is 
increasingly characterized by sharing between the private sector and public authorities. 
Commercial trusted traveler schemes have been identified a major asset in risk-based security 
governance, providing a valuable source for more ‘hard facts’, and thus contributing to more 
fine-grained risk assessment. Public authorities (Accenture, 2007; European Commission, 
2011c) as well as private sector and industry initiatives (ACI/AEA, 2011; IATA, 2011; ICAO, 
2012) have recently explored the possibilities of increased information sharing and risk 
assessment in order to address pressing needs in aviation. 
Thinking about privacy, there is a double concern with this move. Not only do trusted traveler 
schemes require the disclosure of additional and sensitive personal data, but contextual 
limitations seem to put restraints on the individual capacity to circumvent data collection 
practices. Especially in “alienating and individualizing” (Augé, 2006) non-places like the 
airport, data collection is destined to be the way to enroll the passenger “into regimes of 
identification and authentication – through profiles, screens, anticipations and rules” (Adey et 
al., 2012: 173). Contemporary security governance enacts a shift away from discipline to risk 
(Amoore and de Goede, 2005: 150), aiming at statistical anticipation and precautionary 
measures rather than being incident driven (European Commission, 2012e: 12). At the airport 
though, pretty much both forms can be encountered. A priori risk assessment via data analysis 
cannot fully replace, but rather assist physical screening at the checkpoint. The individual thus 
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remains with the responsibility to ensure that both data profile as well as behavior are not 
deviant from the norm, unless one is willing to run the risk of being classified as a high-risk 
passenger and a potential offender. However, the general focus in risk regimes is shifting away 
from situational crime prevention that lays its scope on the immanent security breach in form 
of forbidden objects and materials, and towards an estimation of the likelihood of deviant 
individual behavior. Airports remain disciplinary spaces, but discipline is being altered. Turning 
the rationale of identifying high-risk passengers upside down, the exploitation of trusted 
traveler programs offers the possibility for passengers to enroll themselves not only into a 
scheme of futuristic technological gadgets, but also into a regime of self-governance, actively 
reducing their own risk score. Arguably, this might be the last bit of self-determined action for 
the individual, since aviation security as well as the spatial setup of the airport are strictly 
regulating behavior and movement. As Adey et al. (2012: 185) conclude, “this withdrawal of 
agency from the passenger reaches its apotheosis in contemporary aeromobility where the 
passenger has no choice but to yield to protocological control techniques that work to pacify 
the body such that it is light enough to be carried”, being cleared of all doubts in terms of risk 
because his or her identity has been revealed through the gathering of intelligence. 
The term ‘trusted traveler’, as it is commonly used, appears overly euphemistic, considering 
the fact that being trusted in aviation security actually means not being suspected to be an 
offender as much as everyone else. In exchange for this small but significant difference, a large 
amount of personal information has to be disclosed, depending on the nature and scope of 
the program. The large number of different trusted traveler schemes, the ‘messy’ and unclear 
international dimension of aviation security, including bilateral and multilateral treaties, as 
well as the changing actor constellation at airports make it difficult to answer the initial 
question of an impact of recent developments on privacy. However, this paper has argued 
that we find a number of different effects on the theoretical level. On the one hand, the scope 
on trusted traveler schemes as information assets in risk assessment reinforces the tension 
between the concept of privacy and security. Conceptualizing aviation security regimes as 
governance processes, it has been shown that commercial sector operations and law 
enforcement indeed converge in terms of data sharing, blurring the dimensions of privacy. On 
the other hand, the opt-in nature of trusted traveler schemes brings hidden data collection 
practices back to the realm of visibility and individual agency. However, it seems more than 
reasonable to question the voluntary nature of a self-determined submission of personal 
information when this enhances the chances of less invasive screening. In order to make a 
statement about concrete impacts of risk governance on privacy, empirical case studies 
appear destined to the tool of choice. Due to the fragmented nature of the topic, Privacy 
Impact Assessments (PIA) (Clarke, 2009) can help to put actual trusted traveler schemes into 
the applicable legal context and raise awareness for privacy issues in the aviation context, as 
well as stress available legal tools to ensure adequate data processing. 
Risk-based security concepts like “Better Security” and the “Checkpoint of the Future” aim at 
bridging the (already minimal) gap between situational crime prevention and a full-range 
encoding of the individual into a system of surveillance, calculation and prediction. The 
aviation sector seems indeed “driven by the desire to bring systems together, to combine 
practices and technologies and integrate them into a larger whole” (Haggerty and Ericson, 
2000: 610), with trusted traveler schemes appearing to be a key factor in this desire. Thus, 
passengers become partly persuaded and partly scared into the disclosure of personal 
information. Benefits like lounge access or fast lanes provide major incentives, while ever-
more invasive primary screening measures kindle the desire to be exempted from at least 
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parts of the procedure. From a privacy perspective, risk-based security frameworks have 
raised increasing discomfort in terms of data collection, sharing, and processing between 
public authorities and the private sector. As Thatcher (2008: 266) has noted, “already, the 
boundaries between the public and private sectors are being eroded as far as access to 
personal communications data is concerned and an artificial distinction between the two is 
increasingly difficult to draw.” 
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[Inquiry 2]  
Humor at the Airport? Visualization, Exposure, and Laughter in the “War on Terror” 
 
With the emergence of aviation as a target for terrorism and serious crime in the 1970s, the 
affective dimension of airport security arguably changed dramatically. While flying had been 
framed as the fashionable, elegant and careless way of travel for the wealthy elites in its primal 
days (Curry, 2004), the proverbial lift-off into the “jet age” (Fuller and Harley, 2004) of aviation 
in the 1960s has opened up air travel for the masses – and along with the benefits of increased 
revenue came the risks that emerged from suddenly having to manage large mobile 
populations. Under the impression of hijackings and bombings, the security screening 
checkpoint was quickly transformed into a space of seriousness. Since the fatal consequences 
of airport security breaches had been witnessed by then, checkpoint operations subsequently 
started to enact a ‘no bullshit’ approach completely devoid of aviation’s original ‘lightness’. 
Thus, flying has gone a long way from its carefree early days to being a key element in the 
contemporary paradigm of critical infrastructure and national security that must not be 
tinkered with – and certainly not be joked about. Over the past decades, ever more security 
technologies have found their way into the checkpoints of airports worldwide on a regular 
basis, with body scanners being one of the latest innovations (Abeyratne, 2010; Frimpong, 
2011; Nagenborg, 2011). 
While having been established in airport security in the US and other countries for quite some 
time now, body scanner technology has arrived at the European Union relatively late. Body 
scanners were mentioned in the draft for Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 for the first time, but 
were eventually removed from the final version due to pending concerns in terms of health 
protection, privacy and data protection uttered by the European Parliament (Mordini, 2010; 
Barros, 2012). Although the technology was officially off the political agenda for the time 
being, several EU member states established trial runs to explore the suitability of body 
scanners for the everyday airport environment. Being among this group of ‘test countries’, the 
German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) decided to deploy two machines during a trial 
run at Hamburg airport from 27 September 2010 to 31 July 2011. In the follow-up of the 
several trial runs in member states, the European Commission once again took the initiative 
and reported to the European Parliament and the Council in 2010 (European Commission, 
2010a), building on the national experiences and calling for harmonized legislation at the EU 
level. This time, the European Parliament supported the initiative, however not without 
implementing “provisions on the protection of health, privacy, personal data and fundamental 
rights to technological progress” (European Parliament, 2011: 7). Thus, on 11 November 2011, 
Regulation (EU) No 1147/2011 eventually added body scanners to the list of allowed screening 
measures at European airports. 
This paper looks into the social dimension and the interactive dynamics that emerge from 
body scanner technology in everyday use in an actual airport environment. In particular, we 
seek to address the encounter of humorous interaction between passengers and security 
personnel when faced with the notion of uncovering the fleshly body. We claim that a new 
mode of visualization through body scanners at the security checkpoint breaks open a rare 
space for humor in the ‘war on terror’, albeit a highly special and constrained one. We thus 
argue that aspects of exposure and shame become crucial in the crossing of the checkpoint, 
ultimately undermining the carefully engineered zones of different affective states at the 
airport (Adey, 2008a; Salter, 2007) and eventually creating a rift in an otherwise disciplinary 
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security regime. Within this rift, the use of spontaneously emerging jokes becomes enabled 
by the visual presence of the body. However, there is a sharp distinction between the venture 
of anxiety through a jest and the strategic upset of a security regime through humor. The 
‘bomb joke’ remains a threat to the seriousness of the ‘war on terror’ and thus remains 
excluded from the space of humor. 
This paper proceeds through the empirical encounters of laughter in an actual airport 
environment featuring body scanners. The ensuing section then sets the analytical stage with 
a brief conceptualization of distinct modes of humor, before the actual analysis sets the scope 
on the complex relationships between visualization, shame, exposure and the human body, 
as well as the emergence of particular modes of humor against the backdrop of affective 
engineering at the airport and the solemnity of the ‘war on terror’ in general. We argue here 
that unlike the strategic notion of carefully prepared and staged jokes, the type of humor 
encountered around the body scanners is a spontaneous and benign one that emerges from 
the bodily experience and seeks to handle an uncomfortable situation of visualization, shame 
and exposure. 
 
Laughter in the forbidden zone: empirical encounters 
In order to explore if and how social interaction would become affected by the use of body 
scanner technology, we conducted field research during the German trial run at Hamburg 
airport in June 2011. Being granted an access-all-areas status by the Federal Police, we tried 
to approach the screening checkpoint with a blank mind – but one thing that took us 
completely by surprise was the rather jolly atmosphere around the two body scanners that 
were in use at Hamburg airport. It took us by surprise even more so when compared against 
academic work on body scanners (Amoore and Hall, 2009; Magnet and Rodgers, 2012; Redden 
and Terry, 2013) as well as reports from actual airport practice (Harrington, 2014) that put 
emphasis on violations of bodily integrity and the potential for abuse of asymmetrical power 
relations between security personnel and passengers. As Harrington (2014) states for the US 
context, “just as the long-suffering American public waiting on those security lines suspected, 
jokes about the passengers ran rampant among my TSA colleagues.” The crucial point here 
seems to be the mode of joking. While reportedly racist and sexist were made about 
passengers in the US, most of the humorous encounters at Hamburg airport went on between 
security officers and passengers. 
In fact, every now and then, the interaction between the security personnel and passengers 
shifted into an openly humorous mode. This was not constantly the case, but nonetheless a 
noticeable distinction from the neighboring lanes equipped with metal detection portals. 
Drawing on personal experience as well as professional knowledge, humor was among the last 
phenomena we had expected to be confronted with. Indeed, as Kuipers (2011: 69) notes, 
humor is usually regulated by “humour regimes [that] are clearly bounded: they declare some 
topics off-limits and endow some with more rights to speak in jest than others.” This 
regulation is presumably even stricter in spaces of discipline such as the airport, that has been 
deemed as a “total institution” (Salter, 2008c; Molotch, 2012) and that enrolls passengers into 
rigid security regimes via surveillance, biometrics and the digital encoding of the individual 
(Adey, 2004a; 2004b; Lyon, 2003a; Salter, 2008a). Even more so, as Bissell et al. (2012: 704) 
rightly add, the regulation of humor at the airport is achieved via “the spatial ordering of the 
aeromobile environment, which determines where laughter is appropriate.” Adey (2008a) 
thus argues that distinct affective zones can be achieved through architectural planning. A 
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light and jolly mood is highly appreciated in the shopping mall parts of the airport, whereas in 
security operations, seriousness prevails and humor is explicitly banned – making a bomb joke 
in the face of a security officer can even lead to severe legal consequences (Martin, 2010). 
Thus, the question that emerged from our fieldwork encounters was: How was this ‘return of 
laughter’ to the screening checkpoint possible? Which contextual factors enabled the use of 
humor in a space which remains the last part of the airport where security is enacted on an 
interactive social basis, whereas the overwhelming part of the security framework relies on 
algorithmic risk calculations (Amoore, 2011; Amoore and de Goede, 2005; Lyon, 2006a; Salter, 
2008b) and biometric identifiers (Adey, 2009; Lyon, 2008; Zureik and Hindle, 2004)? 
Surprisingly, and contrary to the large account of literature on humor in general and in a 
multitude of everyday as well as special contexts, little explicit engagement with humor and 
security in the ‘war on terror’ has taken place so far. Some remarkable works that engage with 
the regulation of humor at the airport (Salter, 2011a; Bissell et al., 2012; Martin, 2010) do so 
from the perspective of a conflict approach to humor, thus setting the scope on how humor 
potentially can upset the regulations of the behavioral regime and expose and ridicule security 
screening. From this point of view, humor appears an improbable mode in the face of 
authority, as can be witnessed by the severe legal consequences of performing bomb jokes 
during screening. However, looking at studies that analyze humor in other seemingly 
improbable spaces like prisons (Nielsen, 2011), hospitals (Coser, 1959) or among sex workers 
(Sanders, 2004), the emergence of laughter in rather earnest contexts appears not to be 
improbable after all. But the ‘war on terror’ so far seems to be excluded from those funny 
notions and rather demands an unquestionable attitude of seriousness from everyone 
involved in it – from policy makers and practitioners to the individual who ultimately becomes 
the target and subject of security measures. And there appears to be little chance for laughter, 
as security regimes enroll the individual into behavioral protocols without room for deviance. 
The one who acts deviant by default draws attention and requires further scrutiny, risking 
serious consequences such as in-depth questioning, searches and even detention.  
In an attempt to break with this rigid protocol of solemnity and to open up a space for laughter 
by uncovering apparent absurdities in the narrative of the ‘war on terror’, Heath-Kelly (2012) 
puts forward the question “Can we laugh yet?” And although she makes some excellent points 
about comical contradictions in extremism prevention programs and the use of drones, it 
appears that on the practical everyday level, the question must be answered with a ‘no’ – we 
can’t laugh yet. We can make fun about security from a safe distance, but we cannot laugh in 
the face of the security officer. Obviously, comedians and cartoonist have engaged with the 
humorous potential of security technologies such as drones or body scanners. As Salter 
(2011a: 35) notes, “the shoe bomber, the No-Fly list, and the new millimeter wave scanner 
were each quickly made fun of through editorial cartoons, late-night comedians, on the 
Internet, and through commercials.” And yet there is little potential for humorous resistance 
against security practices that would certainly appear funny in an absurd way if not for the 
solemn backdrop of the ‘war on terror’. 
At the airport, this paradigm of seriousness has in fact been on the rise since the 1970s, when 
in response to the occurrence of bombings and hijackings, the security checkpoint was turned 
into an area of earnest scrutiny without margin for error (Harrison, 2009; Sweet, 2009; Elias, 
2010). Operating under the constant threat that carelessness could cause the next 
catastrophe, humor was explicitly banned from the checkpoint in particular. As indicated 
before, we had been taken by surprise when encountering the jolly atmosphere at the 
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checkpoint lanes equipped with body scanners, especially as opposed to the rather earnest 
and dull ‘business as usual’ at the neighboring lanes that featured regular metal detection 
portals. Humor has been identified as a transformative tool, able to render interaction into a 
“play frame” (Coates, 2007) that avoids, mitigates, or even resolves conflict. Given the need 
for more systematic research on the role of humor in the ‘war on terror’, this paper seeks to 
address a gap in terms of questions of the conditions under which humor can emerge. For the 
analyzed context of body scanners at the airport, we put forward a symbolic interactionist 
reading and claim that a rather benign form of humor emerged as a “coping strategy” 
(Sanders, 2004) that could momentarily break open both the power differential between 
traveler and security officer and the disciplinary frame of the airport itself. Furthermore, we 
argue that body scanners amplify the “panoptic gaze” (Foucault, 1977) that the individual is 
confronted with in an architecture that is driven by the overarching paradigm of maximum 
security. By uncovering the fleshly body and intruding the sphere of intimacy, body scanners 
appear to trigger the use of humor as an ice-breaker between strangers (Kuipers, 2008: 370) 
that unites passengers and security personnel in order to cope with anxiety and unease caused 
by the new visual element in screening operations. 
 
What we laugh at: different forms of humor 
In order to provide some conceptual clarity, this section explores the fragmented and “fuzzy-
edged category” (Nielsen, 2011) that is humor. Academic readings of humor include 
functionalist, symbolic interactionist, phenomenological as well as conflict approaches 
(Kuipers, 2008). Following Mulkay’s (1988) distinction of spontaneous and standardized 
humor, we advance here a contextual understanding that juxtaposes two distinct lenses: (1) 
the strategic, staged forms of telling ‘canned’ jokes that end with a prepared punchline and 
potentially attack the security regime of the airport; and (2) spontaneous, unplanned 
outbursts of benign laughter that emerge from situational context and that arguably can be 
traced back to the introduction of the visualization of the corporeal. As Fine and de Soucey 
(2005: 18) have noted, “it is not only that we joke in social settings, but that our joking is from 
social settings [emph. in. orig.]”, thus the ideal typical juxtaposition arguably can contribute 
to an understanding of how spaces of laughter can break open even within the regulated 
affective zone of the checkpoint and to why specific modes of exposing the ‘funny’ 
characteristics of security (i.e., the ‘bomb joke’) remain banned. 
 
A passenger steps out of the body scanner and at the far end of the machine, he is being 
instructed to stop and take a look at the monitor that displays the results. The security 
officer, with a big gesture and a smile on his face, points to the monitor and exclaims: 
“And here’s your photo!” The passenger seems confused for a second, but then his face 
lightens up and he responds: “I don’t really recognize myself...oh wait, now I can see it!” 
Both share a laugh. (Field Journal, 8 June 2011). 
 
This situation does not appear to be particularly funny to the uninvolved beholder. However, 
contrary to body scanners deployed at US airports, the devices at Hamburg airport2 featured 
                                                     
2 The deployed model was the “ProVision ATD” by L3 Communications, featuring a so-called “automatic target 
detection” software. See http://www.sds.l-3com.com/advancedimaging/provision-at.htm (accessed 31 
March 2014). 
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a privacy-preserving software that did not display the original image of the scan – the one that 
is often being referred to as a ‘naked’ image – but an abstract matchstick figure on which, in 
case of a detection, the according body parts for manual secondary screening were indicated 
with a yellow coloring. Thus, the passenger and the security officer never looked at an actual 
picture. More importantly, the transfer of the individual image into a generic matchstick figure 
removes the result from the realm of identification. But nonetheless the officer addressed the 
matchstick figure as a photo and the passenger joined in on that willingly distorted perception 
of reality. And as it made them both laugh, there must have been something funny to it. In 
order to get a better notion of the social dynamics behind the emergence of laughter in this 
particular context, we put forward a reading of the bomb joke “as a weapon, a form of attack, 
a means of defense” (Kuipers, 2008: 372) that in conflict situations can “[poke] a hole through 
often-undiscussed but official versions of everyday reality, exposing their contradictions and 
the arbitrary basis of their social power” (Paolucci and Richardson, 2006: 334). Hence, the 
reluctance of airport security to allow such a mode of desecrating the earnest nature of the 
‘war on terror’. On the contrary, the seemingly harmless joking around the body scanners that 
we found empirically rather suggests a symbolic interactionist understanding of re-framing a 
situation that appears uncomfortable for everyone involved in it. 
A sociology of humor has to cope with the fact that “disputes about the meaning of humour 
can never be settled” (Kuipers, 2011: 70). In order to conceptualize what is actually funny, one 
first has to come to terms with a terminology that features a plethora of fine-tuned concepts 
and labels such as joke, jest, funny, comic, mirth, jocularity, wit or satire (Palmer, 1994: 6), 
that carry different, but often overlapping notions. A lot of things can make us laugh – from 
plain tomfoolery to sophisticated observations – and the emergence of laughter depends on 
contextual factors as well as on the relationship between speaker and audience (Zijderveld, 
1968). Moreover, as Kuipers (2008: 389) notes, “there is no necessary one-on-one relationship 
between humor and laughter”, thus rendering laughter as the explicit aim of humor, but not 
as a causal effect. In order to work, humor needs to rely on a certain common ground and a 
shared definition of a situation (Nielsen, 2011) that eventually unfold the funny elements that 
make us laugh. A conflict approach reading of humor builds on an explicit aim that requires 
careful preparation and a notion of formalization. This particular mode of humor can be 
encountered in numerous forms – as written texts, comics, cartoons, images, in songs and 
movies, or as jokes and anecdotes. What they all have in common is the setting of a stage, the 
creation of a shared ground in which the punch-line will ultimately reveal the funny element 
and release the carefully constructed suspension. The punchline itself in this case unravels 
“humor as a radical activity that attacks social structure by delegitimizing its most sacred 
aspects (especially its traditional norms and institutions)” (Davis, 1995: 335). The careful 
setting up of a stage thus enables the speaker to make fun of elites, denounce social injustice, 
or utter complaints about particular issues or society in general (Zijderveld, 1968). What we 
find here is an “unmasking function of joking [that] consists mostly of the fact that a socially 
accepted or traditional meaning structure is exposed to a totally different meaning structure” 
(Zijderveld, 1968: 304), while the author/speaker hides behind the protecting wall of laughter 
without being held responsible for the obvious “gap between what is said and what is meant” 
(Coates, 2007: 32). This double move of speaking the truth/making fun has indeed been a 
powerful one throughout history. As Amoore and Hall (2013: 99) note in examining 
institutionalized forms of speaking the truth/making fun and their proximity to sovereign 
power, “the themes of subversion and mockery are found throughout the long and knotted 
cultural history of the fool, the clown and the trickster.” However, the use of humor works in 
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both directions of the social spectrum. Not only can making fun from the bottom of the social 
ladder expose the powerful elites, but humor can also operate from a position of strength – 
momentarily blurring the hierarchical space, for instance between managers and the 
workforce, or between a company and its customers.  
Bissell et al. (2012) have addressed one of the few humorous breaks in aviation security with 
their analysis of the 2009 Air New Zealand campaign, featuring an in-flight safety instructions 
video that “shows airline staff wearing nothing but G-strings, shoes, and body paint” (Bissell 
et al., 2012: 696). Referred to as the “Bare Essentials” safety video and being part of a 
campaign entitled “Nothing to Hide”, the strategic goal here becomes quite clear: apart from 
drawing the viewer’s attention, the reference to nudity demonstrates to the customers a 
maximum of transparency while at the same time the introduction of fun into the otherwise 
serious matter of emergency preparation establishes a friendly relationship between the 
company and the travelers – while still emphasizing the message that Air New Zealand cares 
very much about the safety of their customers. However, when measured against the 
backdrop of the carefully engineered zones of affective states to be encountered at the 
airport, it becomes clear that light and happy moods are actually something that is very much 
desired at all stages of air travel – with the crucial exception of the security checkpoint. 
The space of screening is set to momentarily strip the atmosphere of all that might interfere 
with the operation to unravel the truth about the traveler and their intentions. As Salter (2007: 
59) argues, “the power of the state to expel or exclude any traveler, even citizens with no 
cause or appeal, is internalized into an anxiety of the confession” and thus enacts an 
“emotional state of the passenger – affected by the airport environment – [that] is meant to 
literally close-off the passenger’s capacity to disrupt the security processing system through, 
for example, walking the wrong way, or by telling a joke or misbehaving” (Adey, 2008a: 445). 
While being heavily regulated within security operations, the restrictions on humor do not at 
all apply to other parts of the aviation experience, enabling Air New Zealand to bond with their 
customers through humorous videos and in general enabling airport operators to create an 
affective state of relaxation and passenger convenience, contributing to the purpose of the 
shopping malls that contemporary airports have been turned into. 
On the other side of the conceptual spectrum, the symbolic interactionist reading we put 
forward here “focuses on the role of humor in the construction of meanings and social 
relations in social interaction” (Kuipers, 2008: 377). Laughter can indeed emerge from intuitive 
interactions that cannot build on the time-consuming telling of a joke or an anecdote, but that 
rather happen in an unplanned fashion. In this case, the spontaneous reaction to the 
contextual environment, as opposed to the careful setting of a stage, suggests a common 
construction of an interpretive frame (Goffman, 1974). It is the non-reproducible situation 
that is instantly rendered funny by a remark, a look, a gesture, or even a lifted eyebrow and 
that only makes sense for the involved individuals in the specific situational context. A 
symbolic interactionist approach thus enables a reading of humor “at the heart of social 
analysis, crucial to the shaping of meanings, situations, selves, and relationships” (Kuipers, 
2008: 379-380). What we find here instead is the emergence of laughter that does not carry 
the notion of social critique or other strategic elements, but a form of humor that rather unites 
the participants of the particular situation, establishing a notion of community and shared 
burden, even when this practice does not change the situation after all. 
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A passenger, after stepping out of the body scanner and looking at the monitor that 
displays the abstract matchstick figure for a second, proclaims: “That’s me? It doesn’t 
show my belly!” He, the security officer and several surrounding people (both travelers 
and security officers) burst out in laughter. (Field Journal, 9 June 2011) 
 
Another passenger, before entering the body scanner, asks the security officer in an 
altered voice: “Is there anything I can do to look good?” Several people laugh at that 
remark, including the security officer. (Field Journal, 9 June 2011) 
 
A passenger makes an over-exaggeratedly sad face when looking at the results of his scan, 
then laughingly exclaims: “Can’t I see my picture? That’s a shame!” (Field Journal, 9 June 
2011) 
 
Those and similar situations occurred in quite a high frequency during our observations at the 
two security lanes equipped with body scanners, independent of gender, nationality, or 
ethnicity. A hint for a meaningful interpretation of those types of situations comes from Coser 
(1959), who has described laughter in reference to anxiety about oneself. She emphasizes that 
in order “to participate in jocular talk one has to have overcome one’s worst fears and be 
somewhat detached” (Coser, 1959: 179) from what is actually at stake. The issue at stake here 
– apart from the anxiety to be singled out and to be denied to continue the airbound journey 
– appears to be the bodily integrity and the expectation of becoming the target of a machine 
gaze. The misleading media coverage on body scanners supposedly had a major impact here. 
After all, German news media had published scan pictures of US machines without privacy-
preserving software and had been referring to the devices as ‘naked scanners’. Thus, it can be 
assumed that there was increased unease about the production of an accurate image of what 
lies hidden underneath the clothing, thus revealing the arguably most intimate parts of the 
human body and deeply intruding into the individuals’ intimacy. Uncertainty and anxiety 
about the aesthetics of the corporeal body prevail as the unveiling of the secrets of the flesh 
becomes inevitable. The spontaneous emergence of humorous comments in this context, so 
we argue, frames a shameful complaint against what is going on – a complaint that must not 
be uttered in a direct form, as open confrontation at the security checkpoint is not something 
a traveler would be advised to perform. As Bergson (1911) has noted more than a hundred 
years ago, the humorist appears as a moralist in disguise – expressing unease about security 
practices that intrude the individual’s most intimate sphere, although not in a confronting 
fashion, but in this case rather shifting to the presumably safer ground of simply laughing 
about oneself. 
The efforts to spontaneously turn a serious encounter into a jest thus can be interpreted as a 
coping strategy to protect oneself from contextual pressures (Sanders, 2004). As Tiessen 
(2011: 177) argues, “the mere presence of the scanners during the security check endows 
them with legitimacy as they participate in actively reshaping the whole security environment 
– the anxieties of the travelers, the apparent expertise and power of the security staff, the 
apparent efficacy of the security measures.” Once the dreaded situation is over, humor also 
appears as a form of relief. When passengers looked at the results of their scan, expecting the 
worst – seeing themselves naked, with all the deviance their own body would reveal from 
whatever ideal of beauty it would be measured by – but eventually rather seeing a matchstick 
figure with a smiley face, they were able to release the pressure by ironically referring to 
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themselves as ‘the one with the belly’ or ‘the one who thinks it was a shame that no actual 
photo appeared on the screen’. 
The multiple dimensions, modes and functions of humor in the realms of the social and the 
societal are certainly much more diverse than described in this section, but the construction 
of two ideal types arguably facilitates the analysis of our empirical encounters at Hamburg 
airport. The juxtaposition of strategic and spontaneous forms of humor adds an understanding 
to our initial surprise about the laughter around the body scanners and contributes to a 
reading of momentarily breaking up carefully engineered affective zones of air travel. 
However, laughter at the body scanner does not mean that security would not be taken 
seriously anymore. On the contrary, what we experienced was that the security personnel had 
an impressive sensitivity for the boundaries of humor. When the atmosphere was about to 
turn into open tomfoolery, they quickly stopped the joking (though, in some cases with a fine 
sense of humor themselves, as one security officer referred to the body scanner as “not a joke 
box” [“keine Witzbox”], Field Journal, 9 June 2011). After all, there is an almost ‘natural’ power 
imbalance between passengers and security officers at the airport, as the latter ultimately 
choose how social interaction can be (re-)framed. This puts considerable emphasis on 
questions of agency and institutional constraints. When, as Harrington (2014) reports, at US 
airports images from body scanners reinforced “all the old, crass stereotypes about race and 
genitalia size [that] thrived on our secure government radio channels”, this falls in fact well in 
line with the argument that “women, minorities, and the poor tend to be subjected to greater 
transportation burdens than their male, White, and relatively affluent counterparts” 
(Monahan, 2009: 298). How can we then explain the rather benign practices of joking we 
encountered at Hamburg airport, where fun was not primarily made of passengers, but where 
humor resulted from social interaction across the power gap? 
 
Mitigating conflict? 
As the socially constructed meaning of humor is deeply embedded in situational context, 
airport security depicts a distinct constellation that challenges humor by contrasting it with 
the seemingly absolute claim of security and its connected earnest atmosphere. The ensuing 
question then is: how are both modes balanced (Salter, 2011a: 35)? In explicitly addressing 
humor in conflict situations, Norrick and Spitz (2008: 1668-9) have identified four ways of 
concluding conflict sequences: (1) submission, (2) compromise, (3) stand-off or (4) withdrawal, 
with the two latter not solving the conflict situation, but rather postponing it (Norrick and 
Spitz, 2008: 1669). This leaves submission and compromise on the table. However, keeping in 
mind the inherent power differential between the traveler and the security regime of the 
airport, the unease about revealing the fleshly body to the artificial gaze of the scanner is not 
a conflict situation that offers leverage for bilateral negotiations. The traveler afraid of the 
body scanner might offer concessions, but protocol leaves no room for bargaining with the 
security officer. As Molotch (2012: 96) notes, a compromise disqualifies for security 
operations, as “standard security operating procedure assumes single and unvarying focus for 
all, a meta-message of authority not to be trifled with.” Security screening is part of the game 
of air travel, including the option of refusal – only that in this case, there would not be any air 
travel after all. The checkpoint requires absolute submission. Molotch (2012: 91) subsequently 
argues that “moving through security resembles a prison routine not only in the 
submissiveness required but also in the standardization of the equipment as well as the sharp 
limits on what can be done with it.” Thus, if “body scanners compel passengers to perform 
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submissiveness [emph. in. orig.]” (Tiessen, 2011: 177), laughter does not influence the 
outcome of the conflict situation, but rather serves as a “safety valve” (Coser, 1959) that 
mitigates the defeat that is submission to the scan. Such a humorous re-framing of situations 
that would otherwise not be interpreted as particularly funny arguably could lead to laughter 
at something that in other contexts would be dismissed as stupid or offensive. But while 
appearing as a “superficial and helpless gesture in the face of power” (de Goede, 2005: 389) 
from a conflict approach angle, a reading of laughter as a spontaneous attempt to relieve 
individual anxiety and nervousness (Kuipers, 2008: 389) seems to be a more appropriate 
interpretation. 
As Norrick and Spitz (2008: 1670) note, the attempt to introduce humorous elements into the 
conflict talk by one side can lead to either acceptance, a reciprocal shift to the level of humor 
or to rejection. By intuition, one would expect the latter from a conflict situation at the airport 
checkpoint. Not only from the notion that jokes about bombs have been banned from security 
operations, but also from the professional distance that security officers keep from their 
‘customers’. As one security officer told us during an interview, security staff tries not to 
engage emotionally with passengers and thus rather opts to “treat them like objects [own 
translation]” (Interview, 17 January 2013). Molotch (2012: 96) adds here that “for security 
personnel, accepting a display of good humor risks accepting passenger moves that are 
outside the serious business of proceeding in the prescribed order from point A to point B.” 
Part of the engineering of the solemn affective state of the security checkpoint is also the 
power differential between the traveler and the security officer. Though formally being the 
paying customer, the passenger has no option but to enact submission to the rules of the 
checkpoint, and the security officers are well aware of the fact that they are not to be fooled 
around with. Otherwise, they have measures to make sure that “if somebody likes to joke 
around, I can show them who is boss [own translation]” (Interview, 17 January 2013). 
However, what we encountered at Hamburg airport was not only acceptance and mutual jests 
– as often as not humor was in fact introduced by the security officers themselves. 
 
After a negative result of the scanning procedure, a passenger looks puzzled at the green 
“OK” symbol on the screen. When being asked: “What did you expect?”, he uncertainly 
responds: “I don’t know...maybe scissors in my stomach.” The security officer, with a 
pretended seriousness, replies: “Why, did you swallow scissors?” Then both burst out in 
laughter. (Field Journal, 8 June 2011) 
 
An obviously very nervous and anxious passenger steps into the scanner. Before initiating 
the scan, the security officer proclaims: “And now smile!” The passenger smiles. Similar 
events occur with a high frequency. (Field Journal, 9 June 2011) 
 
By default, a good security officer at the airport screening checkpoint must be a sensitive 
person with a talent to deal with the various different emotional states of passengers that 
approach the checkpoint. Traveling can be a lot of stress – for those who are not used to doing 
it regularly, but also for those who operate on tight schedules. Such sensitivity, obviously, is 
not always a given and the lack thereof can possibly result in degrading and discriminating 
practices, especially as the gaze of the machine targets the human body (Magnet and Rodgers, 
2012; Redden and Terry, 2013; Harrington, 2014). As Amoore and Hall (2009: 451) note, “it is 
the intertwining of security practices with new understandings of the body – no longer 
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machine, or territory, but digitised information to be ‘read’ – that critical challenges must 
grapple with.” In today’s airport environments that are indeed fully digitized with their online 
check-ins and automatic access controls, the screening checkpoint remains the sole space of 
mandatory social interaction – and at the same time the most likely space of conflict due to 
liquid bans, forbidden objects and delays. The use of humor thus appears a reasonable tool to 
mitigate the inevitable, but still remains highly unlikely when measured against the stakes of 
the ‘war on terror’. Given the specific nature of the funny interventions at the body scanner 
introduced by security officers, it becomes clear that the target of the humor here is indeed 
the flesh and the anxiety thereof. To request a passenger to smile during the scan while being 
perfectly aware that the result will not be a photographic image but a matchstick figure 
visualization – that will appropriately enough smile anyway – turns out to be a typical move. 
The activity of watching can be unpleasant not only for the watched but for the watcher as 
well. Or, more precisely: for the person who operates the machine gaze of the body scanner. 
Thus, we suggest that the use of body scanners opens up a space for humor from both sides 
of the power continuum. And while the passenger’s anxiety appears to be a reasonable 
explanation for the mitigating effects of spontaneous outbursts of laughter, the use of humor 
on the side of the security personnel seems to show a more general unease with the visualizing 
notion of the body scanner. We thus argue that what we can find here is an increased 
production of shame and exposure that leads to the momentary crumbling of the otherwise 
carefully engineered affective zones at the airport. After all, “the human body – its legal and 
moral status, its value, its meanings, and the way in which technologies modify it – lies at the 
heart of the body scanner debate” (HIDE and RISE Projects, 2010: 25). 
 
Zooming in closer on the body 
The encountered humorous breaks overwhelmingly were uttered as expressions of anxiety 
towards the body, rendering the fleshly confession and the submission to the machine gaze 
of the scanner as the focal point of both fear and relief that were eventually re-framed into a 
jocular interpretation. Body scanners have been connected with the violation of bodily 
integrity, inevitably crossing the commonly established line between the outer appearance 
and the highly intimate zone of the body. As Hildebrandt et al. (undated: 18) state, “one of 
the purposes of clothes is to cover parts of the human body that are considered extremely 
personal and exposure of which is only acceptable in intimate personal contexts.” The context 
of an airport screening checkpoint, however, is anything but personal. The very purpose of 
security regimes is to break up the individual, extract whatever information can be extracted 
and separate them from the sphere of subjectivity. The ensuing “data doubles” (Haggerty and 
Ericson, 2000) turn out to be partly machine readable, enabling algorithmic risk calculations 
and ‘smart’ monitoring of possibly deviant behavior, and partly remain within the 
dichotomous logic of suspicion/non-suspicion, which can only be cleared by zooming in on the 
physical and stripping the mobile body of all objects that are considered dangerous. However, 
what is left of the visuality of the body when it appears only momentarily in the code and then 
instantly re-disappears in the software that is set up to preserve the traveler’s privacy? It has 
been argued – in particular for the German trial run – that involuntarily exposing the hidden 
corporeal is nothing to worry about once the visualization of the flesh has been covered with 
a friendly-looking, anonymous matchstick figure (BMI, 2011). Thus, there is no actual ‘nudity’ 
to be found thanks to the privacy-preserving software features, but yet the notion of exposure 
remains connected to the scanning procedure. Juxtaposing the unveiled physical nudity that 
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becomes re-veiled through digital code with a psychological notion of nakedness arguably 
provides a better understanding for the production of shame and unease. 
 
Imposed “virtual” nakedness is an important threat to bodily and psychological integrity. 
Nakedness is more than nudity. While nudity is the simple state of absence of clothing, 
nakedness is a mental state, which implies being stripped of decency, to lack an element 
of protection. Nakedness involves objectification, the process of symbolically turning a 
person into an object to be appraised [emph. in orig.] (HIDE and RISE Projects, 2010: 32). 
 
Read through that lens, the unease with body scanners stems not so much from the actual 
production of a ‘picture’, but rather from the inevitable zooming in on the body. A procedure 
in which a machine enacts a gaze at the fleshly, corporeal intimacy that would never be 
exposed in contexts different than the most intimate, leaves the travelers in a puzzled state 
of mind, wondering “does it cross the lines of decency and their expectations for privacy?” 
(Tiessen, 2011: 168). In this double twist of targeting but not showing, of gazing but re-
concealing, we argue, lies a key element to understanding the unprecedented emergence of 
humor. Bellanova and González Fuster (2013) have tagged this simultaneous unveiling/re-
veiling of the flesh as “bodies-scanner setting”, as opposed to the original notion of the 
scanner that genuinely visualizes the body, and hinting at an arrangement that deliberately 
removes the ‘naked’ image from the checkpoint but leaves the scanning procedure as such 
openly and intimidatory on the table. In the crossing of the checkpoint, the body itself clearly 
remains the center of the screening operation, being a key element of authorization for 
proceeding to the next stage of air travel by revealing its harmlessness. Yet, in a move of 
seeing/not seeing, the specter of the flesh overshadows the scenery of the security 
checkpoint, as “disappeared elements haunt the stabilization of the setting and remain thus 
somehow present [emph. in orig.]” (Bellanova and González Fuster, 2013: 204). Introducing a 
matchstick figure in order to conceal the original image of the ‘naked’ body has been a crafty 
move to resolve a number of legal issues in terms of privacy, and maybe it even possesses the 
potential to disrupt the “logics of disembodied control at a distance” (Monahan, 2009: 287) 
that are so inherent to modern surveillance measures, and that enabled security officers in 
the US to (secretly) make fun of passengers over their secured radio channel. Indeed, as 
Harrington writes, “many of the images we gawked at were of overweight people, their every 
fold and dimple on full awful display.” Such depiction of the human body had been erased 
from the machines at Hamburg airport – but arguably, a smiling abstraction has nevertheless 
not resolved the unease of the machine gaze; the anxiety of the virtual strip; the unspoken 
evaluation of what is hidden beneath the clothing; and the scope on the corporeal, fleshly 
body, that otherwise would only be revealed in situations of utmost intimacy. 
 
A passenger steps out of the scanner and looks puzzled at the green “OK” symbol on the 
screen: “I can’t see anything!” The security officer replies: “That’s because everything was 
OK.” The passenger laughs nervously and says: “Oh, and I thought one could see the whole 
body.” (Field Journal, 8 June 2011) 
 
As Amoore and Hall (2009: 451) have noted, “the body does not remain ‘untainted’ by being 
exposed, even if the data collection leaves its surface intact.” Similarly, the argument here is 
that body scanners impose a bodily experience of scrutiny and mental ‘nakedness’ that has a 
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major impact on the traveler, even if there is no ‘real nudity’. The machine gaze appears to 
unfold a transformative power that affects how airport screening procedures are being 
perceived. Arguably, in the ‘haunted’ production of shame and exposure through unveiling/re-
veiling processes of visualization, we can find the urge to break the habit of the earnest. The 
reasons for that, so we would suspect, are to be found in the lacking ability to express the 
increasing amount of unease in direct confrontation. Thus, a symbolic interactionist reading 
of our empirical encounters puts forward a conceptualization of the realm of the funny that 
creates an exceptional break from standard protocol in the ‘war on terror’, and transforms 
the experience of nakedness into what appears as a collective complaint that remains 
unspoken, but nonetheless comes to the surface in spontaneous outbursts of anxiety and 
relief. As Coser (1959: 180) argues, “humor allows the participants, in a brief span of time and 
with a minimum of effort, mutually to reinterpret their experiences, to entertain, reassure, 
and communicate.” In the context of security screening, this mutual reinsurance appears to 
enable passengers to effectively cope with the gaze of the body scanner. After all, apparently 
we can find limited spaces for humor in the ‘war on terror’, and if only for the struggle with 
visualization, exposure and shame. 
 
Conclusions – exposure, shame, and the failure of affective engineering 
Before summing up the connection between visualization, exposure, shame, laughter, and the 
momentary crumbling of affective engineering, the empirical foundations of this paper should 
be given some consideration. Our data only provides insight into a very specific national 
context for a limited period of time. It thus might be argued that our analysis represents a 
situation that created a special exceptional state of social interaction – within the more 
general reading of the ‘war on terror’ as its own state of exception (Agamben, 2005). Thus, it 
appears difficult to generalize our findings, especially when compared to reports about body 
scanner practices in the US that included a malicious use of humor towards “the bodies of 
Othered subjects who fail to pass the checkpoint, or who are disproportionately adversely 
affected or violated in the screening process” (Magnet and Rodgers, 2012: 107). After all, the 
trial run at Hamburg airport temporarily transformed the screening checkpoint into a 
spectacular arena built around a new and presumably daring experience of the flesh. The 
environment in which we found ourselves might thus be mistaken for a glamorous break in 
the otherwise dull and never-changing routine enactment of screening protocol. However, the 
empirical encounter turned out to be a different one. Our field research fell into the final days 
of the 10-months duration of the trial run, when media attention had long shifted to other 
topics. Thus, the overall activity at the checkpoint rather appeared as ‘business as usual’. Yet 
still, except for the frequently flying business people, the situation of facing a body scanner 
turned out be a first-time experience for most passengers. And the security personnel 
operating the checkpoint lanes told us that they were not really used to working with the body 
scanners as well.  
As a consequence, it might be argued that the occurrence of humor and laughter could simply 
stem from the fact that the inhabitants of the checkpoint were faced with a new and 
challenging situation. Body scanners had not been deployed in Germany before, and unease 
towards an unfamiliar technology and an unknown screening procedure might have been the 
cause for nervous laughter. Moreover, the use of the body scanners was based on the 
voluntary nature of the travelers. Only two of the 12 lanes were equipped with the machines, 
and passengers were pointed to the voluntary basis of the trial run with signs and video 
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screens in the area in front of the security checkpoint. This could have prevented overly 
anxious or suspicious persons from stepping into the body scanner in the first place. We had 
to deal with those empirical constraints, but still faced the unique opportunity to conduct field 
work during the only regular deployment of body scanners at a German airport security 
checkpoint up to date.3 
As has been shown throughout this paper, the relation between humor and contemporary 
security regimes is a difficult one. Airports as particular spaces of the ‘war on terror’ have been 
turned not only into “difference machines” (Adey, 2008b), but also into places of affective 
engineering – allowing light and jolly moods in the commercial areas while enacting a strict 
and solemn protocol at the checkpoint. When it comes to the merciless mechanisms of 
screening, “bringing the fleshy, anatomical body into view gestures not only to the capacity of 
the visual to provide ultimate authentication but also to a fidelity to the truth of interiority, 
where the penetrative gaze can reveal that which is concealed” (Bissell et al., 2012: 697). 
Software solutions attempt to re-conceal the body once the image of the flesh has been 
produced, but, so we argue, the machine gaze itself produces a haunting imagery of mental 
nakedness, so that the corporeal dominates the checkpoint regardless of privacy-preserving 
tools and produces a deep anxiety that eventually vents in humorous breaks. Our symbolic 
interactionist interpretation of those breaks as a re-framing offers a reading that is distinct 
from previous attempts that conceptualized the use of humor as a conflict tool that challenges 
security practices. However, the rather benign form of humor encountered in our fieldwork 
turned out to be acceptable for as long as it did not desecrate the “confessionary complex” 
(Salter, 2007) of the airport. After all, one must on no account let the terrorist slip through the 
tight grid of security measures simply because one was joking around and not paying the 
adequate attention. Thus, taking up Heath-Kelly’s question once again: maybe we actually can 
laugh, but only in a certain and limited way.  
Or, putting the question differently: is there a politics of laughter involved in the crossing of 
the checkpoint? In fact, such a deliberate politics of laughter by default appears unlikely, given 
the lack of social cohesion and the institutional constraints of the airport security regime. 
However, the jocular re-framing of potential conflict situations allowed both passengers and 
security personnel to master the potentially violent scanning procedure in a dignified fashion. 
Thus, arguably, the admissibility of humor strongly depends on how the laughter emerges. It 
is fine to share a jest when confronted with frightening technology such as body scanners, 
making the process of visualization an unpleasant one for both the watched and the watcher, 
and it is also fine to reassure the startled passenger with a funny remark and signal that 
everything is alright. This in fact hints at a certain degree of ‘political’ agency that security 
officers were allowed to apply at Hamburg airport. But behold if humor is used as a strategic 
weapon to unmask the apparent absurdities in the ‘war on terror’. Telling a bomb joke is a 
powerful tool to unveil the “security theater” (Schneier, 2006) that is being performed at sites 
of security operations. As Martin (2010: 27) analyzes, “a bomb joke declares the concrete 
possibility of violence, but implies the passenger’s innocence [emph. in orig.]”, thus 
intentionally creating a false positive that unsettles the calm environment of security 
nonetheless. It is the move of telling one thing/meaning another that creates an upheaval in 
                                                     
3 Since the end of 2012, all major German airports offering connections to the USA have started installing body 
scanners, but not within the framework of the regular screening checkpoint, but merely for use as a 
secondary screening measure for US-bound flights, as required by the US Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). 
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the truth-finding complex of security and that has led to the fact that “at security, one must 
be cautious with humor” (Molotch, 2012: 94). 
To be sure, the asymmetrical power relations between security officers and passengers were 
at no point in question, and “the promise to build ‘anonymity’ into technologies […] in order 
to ‘protect privacy’ does not address the violence involved in uncovering, breaking down and 
writing the body into digital form” (Amoore and Hall, 2009: 451). However, the spontaneous 
use of humor by both passengers and security officers, so we argue, can be conceptualized as 
intuitive behavior that emerged from visualization, shame, and exposure. As a response to the 
targeting of the corporeal, humor has enabled the involved individuals to re-interpret the 
situation and create a jocular atmosphere that was able to briefly bypass the seriousness of 
security operations. After all, even the strictest behavioral protocol and affective engineering 
cannot fully prevent outliers. As Adey (2008a: 448) notes, “not everyone has to follow the 
route intended for them by the airport authorities, not everyone will be enticed to buy and 
more relevantly, nor is everyone limited in their capacity to act or feel.” Despite remaining 
reluctant to put forward a politics of laughter, we thus conclude that such a humorous mode 
appears not as inappropriate as could be expected from the literature on humor in security 
contexts. As has become apparent throughout this paper, the notion of the body is indeed a 
powerful one, endorsed by anxiety towards nudity/nakedness and the revelation of what by 
default should remain in the realm of the private and intimate. Thus, instead of a politics of 
laughter, it appears more appropriate to speak of an intuition of laughter – one that 
nonetheless performed exceptionally well in the face of the artificial gaze of the scanner. After 
all, “what turns nudity into nakedness is degradation” (HIDE and RISE Projects, 2010: 33), and 
such degradation depends heavily on the social practices and their particular contexts. In our 
fieldwork, the (veiled) notion of the flesh appeared indeed so strong that it eventually enabled 
spontaneous outbursts of humor and laughter, momentarily breaking open a space for benign 
humor in the otherwise solemn and earnest ‘war on terror’. Admittedly, it is a small space, 
and it calls for more empirical research in the distinct security regimes that incorporate body 
scanners, but it is a notable one nevertheless. 
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[Inquiry 3]  
Privacy and security – on the evolution of a European conflict 
 
Privacy and security have often been framed as conflicting concepts that must be conceived 
of as incommensurable and thus constitute a trade-off (van Lieshout et al., 2013). And 
although such a notion has been largely criticized for using under-complex definitions of both 
privacy and security, as well as for neglecting empirical examples of positive sum games and 
questions of whose privacy and whose security are affected (Valkenburg, 2014), the trade-off 
model appears quite persistent. Considering the contemporary nature of data-driven security 
measures, much digital ink has been spilled about the presumably weak standing of privacy in 
the face of a more or less overwhelming context of (inter-)national security (see for instance 
Bennett, 2005; Leese, 2013; Nissenbaum, 2010; Tsoukala, 2010). This paper analyzes how the 
relation between privacy and security has been framed and re-framed in the field of European 
security research, eventually ending up as a question of privacy by design. Privacy by design, 
so the argument goes, enables new security technologies to be both privacy-preserving as well 
as effective and efficient, and thus would ultimately serve as the silver bullet that resolves the 
conflict/trade-off. However, this paper puts forward the claim that the notion of privacy by 
design rather puts old wine into new bottles, as a closer look reveals that the core problem is 
not tackled, but only re-framed according to the general technical scope of security research. 
Thus, it appears that the new emphasis on privacy and the ensuing argumentative mitigation 
of the conflict merely intends to comply with the EU’s increased focus on normative security 
and at the same time renders research governance as a technological fix for the technological 
fix that security is conceptualized as in the first place. 
The paper proceeds by providing a brief overview of the emergence of security research at 
the EU level over the last decade and sheds light on its underlying rationalities, en passant 
retracing how the presumed trade-off between privacy and security was framed and 
eventually evolved into a privacy by design approach alongside the emergence of a more 
normatively coined EU ‘security project’. The paper concludes with a critical assessment that 
questions the suitability of privacy by design as the panacea that it comes advertised as. 
 
EU security research – on the emergence of a field and a conflict 
“Security research is the new guy in town” (Burgess, 2011: 2). As opposed to ‘traditional’ fields 
of research funded by the European Union, research that is explicitly dedicated to the security 
of the EU and its citizens has only been around for the relatively short term of about a decade 
(Burgess, 2011; Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2010; ECORYS, 2009), and has at times struggled to find 
its niche among related fields with a strong ‘security touch’, such as for instance Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs). However, fostered by ‘new’ and global threat 
scenarios, the quest for appropriate remedies has become an integral part of the realm of 
fundamental and applied research that is set to produce new tools and technologies, and thus 
to contribute to effectively establishing security in the European Union – or so the argument 
goes. Arguably, the need for reinforced security solutions has been catalyzed by the debate 
that was kindled by the events of 9/11 and their massive aftermath in terms of security policy 
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adjustments.4 In the EU, security is now conceived of as a cross-cutting concept that has to 
tackle widespread areas such as terrorism, serious and organised crime, cybercrime, cross-
border crime, violence itself, and natural and man-made disasters (European Union, 2010: 14-
16). Thus, security research has eventually been established as a key area within the European 
funding framework. 
This very framework, however, is currently undergoing structural change. In 2014, EU research 
funding has hit an institutional threshold as the established Framework Programmes (FP) 
come to an end with FP7 and will be replaced by an overhauled, streamlined, and arguably 
simplified and more efficient program entitled Horizon 2020.5 Official documents promise that 
this new framework will, amongst other, set clearer scopes on societal issues, most notably 
privacy and data protection (European Commission, 2011d). Thus, this structural change 
appears an appropriate break to analyze how the still emerging field of security research is 
being (re-)shaped alongside economic rationalities and the emergence of a European ‘security 
project’ itself, and how the relationship between privacy and security keeps evolving. In order 
to set out an analytical framework, this paper argues that EU security research funding follows 
two main trajectories: it is mainly conceived of as (1) a means to foster the European economy, 
and (2) as a primarily technical framework that aims to produce specific solutions to clearly 
defined security problems. In recent years, however, a third notion has been added to this 
dichotomy, as ‘security’ itself is now increasingly presented as a normatively embedded 
concept that needs to comply with human rights and civil liberties. This appears to be a major 
reason for abandoning the trade-off model and the search for new and integrative 
approaches, eventually ending up with privacy by design. 
‘Historically’ speaking, EU security research can be framed as a field that has been shaped 
through an inextricable entanglement with the industrial sector, as has been compellingly 
shown by Bigo, Jeandesboz, Hayes, and others (Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2010; Hayes, 2006; 
2009). Multiple companies and personalities from the branch have been involved in setting 
up of the field and the intensified cooperation between the Commission and the industry, 
taking off in 2003 with the establishment of the Group of Personalities in the Field of Security 
Research (GoP, 2004) and the initiation of the Preparatory Action on Security Research (PASR) 
in 2004. The GoP was eventually followed up by the European Security: High Level Study on 
Threats, Responses and Relevant Technologies (ESSTRT) in 2006 and the setting up of the 
European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB, 2006) in 2005 and the European Security 
Research Innovation Forum (ESRIF, 2009) in 2008, both of which further envisioned the future 
of security research at the EU level. 
Throughout the published reports of the aforementioned fora, particularly privacy and data 
protection have been framed as disruptive elements for security technologies and thus for the 
overall goal of a secure European Union. For instance, as Bigo and Jeandesboz (2010: 6) have 
pointed out, the ESSTRT final report frames the conflict such that “the underlying assumption 
is that intrusiveness is a requirement for efficiency, and that privacy undermines efficiency”, 
and the ESRAB report states that “research into ethics and privacy, and the trade-off between 
improved security and loss of privacy, will influence technology development and in parallel 
address aspects of how citizens perceptive security and insecurity” (European Security 
                                                     
4 It should be noted, however, that the notion of a post-9/11 ‘break’ in terms of security policy has been 
contested such that recent developments should rather be seen as part of a larger historical trajectory 
(Lyon, 2003a). 
5 For an overview of Horizon 2020, see http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/ (accessed 7 July 2014). 
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Research Advisory Board, 2006: 8). Thus, privacy and security were generally conceived of as 
incommensurable concepts, and it was very clear where the preferences for effective security 
research had to be placed – the need for security apparently trumped the need for privacy. 
Either security measures would work, and this would be because they would be based on a 
sufficiently large database that allowed for glimpses of the future and the next event that 
needs to be canceled out – or they wouldn’t work because privacy claims and the restrictions 
of the data protection framework would thwart their effectiveness. More or less independent 
of any actual conceptualizations of privacy, be it as the classical “right to be left alone” 
(Warren and Brandeis, 1890) that entails a “boundary control process” (Altman, 1977: 67), as 
the “claim of an individual to determine what information about himself of herself should be 
known to others” (Westin, 2003: 431) which in terms involves “a constraint on the use of 
power” (Regan, 2011: 498), or politically as the foundation of the democratic constitutional 
state (Friedewald et al., 2010: 62) - any position that values the (digital) personal sphere would 
be considered disruptive from an industry point of view. Especially when taking into 
consideration Helen Nissenbaum’s (2010) concept of privacy in context, one might indeed be 
inclined to say that threat scenarios were used to create a contextual override for privacy 
arguments. 
As mentioned earlier, such a trade-off model is certainly oversimplified, and arguably only 
represents a part of the full story. How come we find such a striking neglect of privacy 
arguments in official documents, then? The next section aims at unpacking the underlying 
notions of security and security research in the European Union. It will become clear that EU 
security research unfolds along a clear-cut economic agenda, and thus introduces a very 
specific and market-driven approach to the relationship between privacy and security. 
 
Economics and technologies 
First trajectory. Both FP7 and Horizon 2020 documents acknowledge the economic goals 
identified by the Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission, 2010b), framing “research and 
innovation as central to achieving the objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” 
(European Commission, 2011b: 2). The underlying rationale, as stated by the Staff Working 
Paper on Horizon 2020, is that “modern economic theory unanimously recognises that 
research and innovation are prerequisites for the creation of more and better jobs, for 
productivity growth and competitiveness, and for structural economic growth” (European 
Commission, 2011d: 7). For that purpose, a study on behalf of DG Industry & Enterprise has 
analyzed the global security market and the position of the European security industry, coming 
to the conclusion that “it appears vital to stimulate and create a proper innovation framework 
in the security domain and establish fast track development procedures for new market 
technology requirements” (ECORYS, 2009: xvii). As a consequence from those findings, the 
European Commission in 2012 adopted an “Action Plan for an innovative and competitive 
Security Industry” (European Commission, 2012a) in order to secure and extend market shares 
in a rapidly growing global security economy. 
In the same year, the Commission published a document on EU security research entitled 
“Safeguarding Society, Boosting Growth” (European Commission, 2012c). Overlooking its 
content, it quickly becomes clear that the emphasis lies on the latter part, as the document 
states that 
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our objective, notably through our Security Industrial Policy initiative, is to improve the 
global competitiveness of the EU security industry by stimulating its growth, invest in the 
research and development of future, world-leading security technologies and processes, 
and launch any effort necessary to overcome the current market fragmentation for 
security products in the EU and thus establish a true Internal Market (European 
Commission, 2012c: 1). 
 
In fact, the conceptualization of EU research funding as a policy tool for economic growth has 
always been out in the open. Particularly, the purpose of security research can be identified 
by its institutional location. The housing within DG Enterprise and Industry instead of the 
maybe more natural fit DG Research & Innovation indeed provides a clear statement and has 
been criticized for its “significant consequences for the way we understand and do research 
on security as an ethically charged field of research” (Burgess, 2011: 1). This general economic 
scope will likely be reinforced with the start of Horizon 2020. As the joint communication on 
the new framework states, “since the launch of the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), the 
economic context has changed dramatically” (European Commission, 2011a: 2), and now 
urges the EU to provide even stronger incentives, since “research and innovation help deliver 
jobs, prosperity, quality of life and global public goods” (European Commission, 2011a: 2). 
The ECORYS report on the competitiveness of the European security industry bolsters those 
general assumptions with factual numbers. The global security market is estimated to be 
worth €100 billion, with the size of the European market in the range of €26 to €36.5 billion 
(ECORYS, 2009: v). This translates into roughly 180,000 employees in the European security 
sector. Accordingly, security research receives a considerable amount of funding, with the 
security theme under the FP7 being worth an overall amount of €1.4 billion (European 
Commission, 2012c: 2) and the financial terms for the “Secure Societies” action under Horizon 
2020 alone determined at €1.7 billion. However, despite those efforts, the ECORYS report 
points out a “low aggregate level of EU funding for security-related research, technology 
development and innovation (ECORYS, 2009: x). In a comparative perspective, EU security 
research funding still remains “considerably below the efforts made in the USA”, leading to 
“potential weaknesses in the underlying competitiveness of the EU security sector” (ECORYS, 
2009: 38). This could in terms lead to a predicted loss of market shares to a low of 20% in 2020 
(European Commission, 2012a: 2), particularly with the Asian security industry massively 
catching up in the high-tech area, but also with considerable competition from Russia and 
Israel (ECORYS, 2009: 51-60). The remedy for such a threatening scenario appears quite 
simple: reinforcement of market stimulation through enhanced security research funding and 
faster product cycles (ECORYS, 2009: xvii). Thus, one might indeed be inclined to agree with 
Bill Clinton’s famous statement that “it’s the economy, stupid.” Economic prosperity has been 
the driving force behind European integration from the beginning, and why should it change 
within security research, of all things? 
The Action Plan for the security industry subsequently provides concrete steps of action in 
order to reinforce the competitiveness of the European security industry, suggesting the 
creation of a true Internal Market through favorable conditions, the enhancement of 
competition and lower production costs, as well as strengthened support for SMEs (European 
Commission, 2012a: 3). Apart from those issues, however, one of the most pressing concerns 
still appears to be the potential of privacy and data protection to thwart the effectiveness of 
security technologies and thus their successful market impact in the first place. Subsequently, 
the Action Plan takes up on that conflict and states that a major problem arising from the 
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societal dimension of security research is the social acceptance of security technologies – or 
rather the lack thereof, which could result in a number of negative consequences for the 
security industry, i.e. wasted investments (European Commission, 2012a: 5). Most strikingly, 
privacy requirements are regarded to hurt the security market on both supply and demand 
side. For the supply side (i.e. the European security industry), this would mean that its 
products might not reach their maximum ‘security potential’ due to constraints in data 
collection and analysis, and “for the demand side it means being forced to purchase a less 
controversial product which however does not entirely fulfill the security requirements” 
(European Commission, 2012a: 5). Thus, from an industry angle, the situation appears quite 
clear: privacy hampers security. Or rather, it hampers security technologies, as EU security 
research is indeed primarily locked in on the emergence of new technologies. 
Second trajectory. The rationale behind this scope becomes clearer when looking at how 
current security efforts within the EU are conceptualized as data-driven and risk-mitigating 
measures. As security policies increasingly emphasize the potential of databases, data-sharing 
and interoperability for the purpose of gathering knowledge and thus being able to prevent 
future risks (see for instance Amoore, 2009; Geyer, 2008; Leese, 2013; Marx and Muschert, 
2007; de Hert and Bellanova, 2011), Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have 
spilled over into security contexts – and with them issues of privacy (and data protection). 
Security technologies heavily focus on communication, social networks, and other forms of 
individual interaction with a digitized everyday environment, such as sensors or biometrics. 
The massive amount of personal and behavioral data constantly produced then serves as the 
basis for fighting crime and terrorism through various forms of data exploitation such as 
algorithmic profiling and probabilistic risk calculations (see for instance van Otterlo, 2013; 
McCue, 2007; de Pauw et al., 2011). Or, put more simply: security itself has indeed become 
dominated by the desire to accumulate data in order to predict the future and counter-act 
criminal and terrorist incidents. But when security is supposed to be enacted through 
mitigation of future risks, those risks first have to be identified.  
ICTs have emerged as the very tools to do so, and such a notion has obviously evoked critical 
reactions. Thus, ICT research ethics have specifically been concerned with the implications of 
the use of personal information in distinct contexts (Wright, 2011). Arguably, the increasing 
spill-over of ICTs into the realm of security is also the reason why privacy and data protection 
are framed as predominant ethical concerns of current security research within official EU 
documents. Whether or not this limitation of ethical concerns to one clear-cut area is by any 
means adequate remains questionable. It should clearly be noted that multiple other pending 
ethical issues such as autonomy, social inclusion, human dignity, or dual use and function 
creep/mission creep between the civil and the military realm of security also do require 
attention. 
However, when looking at the political and financial efforts put into security research over the 
last decade, one might indeed be under the impression that “our political masters, aided and 
abetted by the security industry, often appear willing to sacrifice some of the citizenry’s 
privacy in order to better secure society”, as van Lieshout et al. (2013: 120) have provocatively 
formulated it. Thus, how come the stark contrast of a presumed trade-off was eventually 
transformed and is now conceived of as a resolvable privacy by design issue instead of the 
irreconcilable conflict that it was before? 
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A normative turn? 
The answer arguably lies in the re-framing of the overall European ‘security project’. With the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and the ensuing legally binding status of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (European Union, 2000), the EU has – at least on paper – made a clear 
commitment to human rights and civil liberties. For the (broader) field of security, this 
commitment is reflected in the European Internal Security Strategy (European Union, 2010) 
of 2010 and the Stockholm Programme that provides the current concrete policy framework 
(2010-14) (European Council, 2010). The Internal Security Strategy, for instance, explicitly 
states that “Europe must consolidate a security model, based on the principles and values of 
the Union: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, democracy, 
dialogue, tolerance, transparency and solidarity” (European Union, 2010: 8). And the 
Stockholm Programme puts forward a Europe built on human rights, and goes as far as to 
claim that when it comes to security measures,  
 
“basic principles such as purpose limitation, proportionality, legitimacy of processing, 
limits on storage time, security and confidentiality as well as respect for the rights of the 
individual, control by national independent supervisory authorities, and access to 
effective judicial redress need to be ensured and a comprehensive protection scheme 
must be established” (European Council, 2010: 10). 
 
This strengthened emphasis on normative aspects of security can also be found in the FP7 
security scheme, claiming that “the potential impact of the resulting technologies and 
activities on Fundamental Rights, ethical principles and societal values should be addressed as 
part of the proposed research” (European Commission, 2012d: 10). Again, especially privacy 
and data protection have thus been officially tagged as norms that potentially become 
infringed by security technologies (European Commission, 2012b). Apart from such official 
statements, the predominantly technological security tools that have emerged from the FP 
frameworks in recent years have become the target of normative interventions due to their 
potential negative impact on society (Geyer, 2008; Guild and Carrera, 2010). 
Third trajectory. Alongside this new scope on the normative dimension of security, research 
funding, or rather the governance thereof, is also undergoing change. Security research now 
has to be ‘ethically compliant’ in order to take into account possible negative impacts on the 
societal level. Security research projects are thus to be accompanied by the explicit coverage 
of ethics boards in order to ensure that research is in line with normative principles. 
Subsequently, research ethics have come to enact a key role in the governance of security 
research, and are set to establish safeguards against detrimental societal impacts of security 
technologies at an early stage during research and development. In EU research funding, a 
dedicated ethical coverage of the research process has been introduced as “fundamental 
ethical principles” (Stengel and Nagenborg, undated: 2) since FP5 (1998-2002). Particularly, 
fields such as medical and biological research have a long history of a need for ethical 
coverage, as has become apparent by the emerging possibilities of ‘engineering’ human life at 
the genetic or molecular level. Security research is joining those fields as one of the areas that 
has be monitored and advised closely. As Burgess (2011: 2) notes, “security comes with its 
own special ethical baggage”, since it carries the potential to inflict curtailments on 
fundamental societal and individual values. In fact, numerous scholars have in recent years 
engaged with the threatening and negative consequences of new and emerging security 
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technologies (see for instance Salter, 2008e; Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008a; Monahan, 2006b; 
Lyon, 2006b; Amoore and de Goede, 2008b). 
However, on the other hand, security itself represents an important value as it “embodies the 
social and cultural needs of a society, its hopes and fears, its past and its ambitions for the 
future” (Burgess, 2011: 2). Read through that lens, security represents its own ethics as an 
overarching prerequisite for any society. Much has been written on the problems that can 
arise from over-emphasized security and ensuing detrimental impacts on human rights and 
civil liberties (for a comprehensive account, see  Waldron, 2003). Adding to that list of 
potential negative consequences, security research 
 
can include particular measures that have as a secondary effect an increase in insecurity 
– such as the development of scanning devices that cause unease, weapons systems that 
provoke fear or insecurity among innocent bystanders, or surveillance systems that are 
experienced as too invasive (Burgess, 2012). 
 
Thus, security research appears a Janus-faced phenomenon that possesses the potential of 
both detrimental and beneficial outcomes that indeed come as “inseparably intertwined” 
(Burgess, 2012). The delicate balance of the ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ of security for society 
subsequently underlies constant challenges through security research and the technological 
tools that emerge from it. A close look reveals, as mentioned earlier, that nearly all security-
related research projects within FP7 do feature a technological scope, as “the Security theme 
supports R&D actions oriented towards new methodologies and technologies.”6 Due to the 
sketched potential detrimental impact of security technologies on societies, coupled with the 
financial volume of security research funding, the stakes for particular security research ethics 
appear exceptionally high (Burgess, 2011). This constellation is indeed reflected in official 
documents – and once again it is predominantly framed in terms of privacy. The last call fiche 
for the security theme of FP7, for instance, states that “if ethical issues, including privacy are 
raised, they should be addressed in the core of the proposed activity” (European Commission, 
2012d), and the EC document on ethical and regulatory issues in research policy dedicates a 
whole chapter to “New Security Technologies and Privacy” (European Commission, 2012b: ch. 
2). 
This emphasis on privacy arguably comes from the aforementioned data-driven nature of 
contemporary security technologies that build on the collection and analysis of large amounts 
of data, as well as from the well-defined legal applicability of the data protection framework 
that gives privacy concerns a ‘procedural advantage’ over other normative concerns when it 
comes to security technologies. The interesting fact is now, that with this ‘new’ scope on 
morally right security, the original conflict between security and privacy becomes rather 
reinforced than mitigated. In other words: with the increased emphasis on the importance of 
privacy, the privacy side of the original equation has been upgraded and is now not so likely 
to be overridden by security anymore. And since there no longer seems to be an a priori choice 
which part of the equation should be more cherished, the decisive question then becomes: 
how to possibly resolve this dilemma and reconcile privacy and security such that their 
relationship complies with the upgraded normative take on security within the EU? The 
answer appears indeed an intriguing one: if it is not possible to overcome the conflicting 
                                                     
6 http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/about-security_en.html (accessed 7 July 2014). 
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positions of the trade-off (however oversimplified they appear), why not abandon the model, 
after all? The ensuing move beyond, as enthusiastically announced, has eventually resulted in 
privacy by design. 
 
Privacy by design: a technological fix for a technological fix? 
In the effort to effectively govern emerging technologies from security research, the 
Commission has identified three main dimensions of regulatory privacy protection: (1) 
technical, (2) legal, and (3) self-regulatory (European Commission, 2012b: 20). 
Characteristically for the legal dimension is its rather spatial scope, as it is based on the 
European Convention on Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights/Council of Europe, 
2010) and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (European Union, 2000), rendering its 
power strongly connected to the jurisdiction of the EU. Within this jurisdiction, legal privacy 
and data protection provisions possess an enforceable status and thus provides strong 
incentives for any supplier of security technologies to stay within the explicitly formulated 
boundaries of data collection and processing. However, in times of global data flows, such a 
(supra-)national regulation appears hardly up to the task of effective privacy protection.  
The self-regulatory dimension of security research governance, on the contrary, is based on 
voluntary commitments from the private sector. Self-regulation towards technology 
development that fulfills ethical requirements then is set to be achieved through the 
involvement of stakeholders and the establishment of ‘soft’ regulations (European 
Commission, 2012b: 20). The scope within self-regulatory governance lies on non-enforceable 
concepts such as “market self-regulation, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and 
governmental incentives for research that can drive technology towards more ethical 
development” (European Commission, 2012b: 20). Albeit admitting the potential of voluntary 
forms of research governance, Székely et al. (2011: 183) have pointed out that monitoring and 
supervision of self-regulation within the area of emerging technologies appears a highly 
difficult task.  
Thus, the official position of the European Commission with regard to security research 
governance can be summarized such that “weaknesses in self-regulation and legal governance 
suggest technological governance as a good site for concrete, operationalized engagement 
with tensions between the protection of privacy and the pursuit of security” (European 
Commission, 2012b: 24). One might be inclined to say that this preference in fact appears a 
technological fix to right the technological fix that is security research in the first place. Now 
how to achieve such technological reconciliation? From the official documents, it becomes 
quite clear that Ann Cavoukian’s concept of privacy by design see for instance (Cavoukian, 
2009a; Cavoukian et al., 2010) is now considered to be the silver bullet for the old clash 
between security and privacy. Thus, researchers and developers are encouraged to tackle 
possible privacy and data protection issues pro-actively from the very beginning in order to 
avoid costly adjustments later on. 
In fact, the ESRIF final report in 2009 made an early effort to bridge the gap between privacy 
and security and stated that “ESRIF advocates implementation of a ‘privacy by design’ data 
protection approach that should be part of an information system’s architecture from the 
start“ (European Security Research & Innovation Forum, 2009: 31). How does this work? 
Privacy by design starts with the assumption that “privacy is good for business” (Cavoukian et 
al., 2010: 405), and develops the idea that privacy can be conceived of as a positive sum game. 
This is a crucial notion, as it stands opposed to the postulated zero sum game that is central 
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to the hitherto dominant trade-off model. Furthermore, privacy safeguards then should be 
implemented proactively and early within the development and design of information 
processing technologies, and be built in a way that they last throughout the entire product life 
cycle.  
Central in such a conceptualization of the relationship between technology and privacy/data 
protection is the assumption that privacy principles should be incorporated early in research 
and development in order to avoid costly retrofits at later stages (Cavoukian, 2009a). It is 
exactly this presupposition that is now mirrored in EU security research. As stated by the 
Commission, privacy by design “should be recognized as a guiding and technologically neutral 
principle, suitable for flexible applications, in a general provision mandating that existing 
privacy and data protection principles be integrated into ICTs” (European Commission, 2012b: 
26). Just as well, the Action Plan for the security industry suggests to make use of a privacy by 
design approach (European Commission, 2012a: 11). This falls also well in line with recent 
discussions about privacy-preserving data mining and privacy-enhancing technologies (Custer 
et al., 2013; Aggarwal and Yu, 2008). 
But does it really resolve the original conflict, namely the presumable choice between 
improved security or the protection of privacy? There are a number of issues to be found in 
the relationship of ‘security and/vs privacy’ that might not be elegantly resolved through 
privacy by design. A key element in privacy by design are the Fair Information Principles (FIPs), 
that are set “to limit collection, use and disclosure of personal data, to involve individuals in 
the data lifecycle, and to apply appropriate safeguards in a continuous manner” (Cavoukian 
et al., 2010: 406). Thus, as Schaar (2010: 267-8) argues, this means “the separation of personal 
identifiers and content data, the use of pseudonyms and the anonymization or deletion of 
personal data as early as possible.” Such practices are undeniably suitable for organizational 
and economic contexts. However, as has been argued throughout this paper, data-driven 
security technologies derive their added value exactly from the information surplus that is 
accumulated through collection and processing of data that could eventually be connected to 
possible criminals or terrorists in order to cancel out future risks. And we should remember 
that by the logic of security experts and policy makers, the more information one can get, the 
better the prediction of the future and thus the better our overall security will be. In other 
words: security cannot thrive on informational parsimony. FIPs on the contrary radically take 
away the possibilities that come with advanced analytics in security contexts. This stark 
contrast stunningly reminds of the early days of security research, when the “trade-off 
between improved security and loss of privacy” (European Security Research Advisory Board, 
2006: 8) was openly framed as a major obstacle for the field. But how to achieve both effective 
security and non-intrusive privacy, then? 
Certainly, there has been considerable progress in the techniques for data analytics. For 
instance, algorithms that allow for privacy-preserving ways of data mining (Aggarwal and Yu, 
2008) have been on the rise in recent years. But even with such privacy-friendly methods of 
data collection/analytics, the tension between privacy and security cannot be fully resolved. 
The “dimensionality curse” (Aggarwal, 2007; Aggarwal and Yu, 2005) states that in order to 
fully preserve privacy, the amount of personal attributes would need to be reduced to such 
an extent that the utility of processing the data is lost. Hence, the contradicting interests 
between privacy on the one hand and the benefit of being able to process data on the other 
hand cannot simply be resolved using technical means. Thus, a certain conflict remains 
between efficiency in terms of the generation of security knowledge and the preservation of 
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privacy. In simple terms, the more (individual) attributes are reduced from the dataset, the 
less utility will emerge from analytics. Is the turn to privacy by design merely old wine in new 
bottles, then? Even if it does not convincingly resolve the tension between privacy and 
security, the transformative framing of the old ‘conflict’ tells us a lot about the current state 
of affairs with regard to privacy and security. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has shown that the relationship between the concepts of privacy and security has 
come a long way from an early conceptualization as a sharp trade-off towards a contemporary 
framing as a technological issue that appears resolvable through privacy by design. However, 
this paper has put forward the claim that the current re-framing is not particularly well suited 
to actually mitigate or resolve the tension between privacy and security, but rather pays 
tribute to the technological scope on security, while at the same time acknowledging the 
increasingly normative take on security with the EU. 
The trade-off model has always been troubled by the oversimplified claim that it was possible 
to put forward to unspecified concepts and outweigh them against each other. And while 
privacy has long been conceived of as “a moving target” (Friedewald et al., 2010: 61), the 
conceptualization of security is shifting as well. To stay within the metaphor, the second target 
is also starting to move quite rapidly, as the notion of security is undergoing deep-seated 
normative transformation. When thinking about the current relationship of privacy and 
security, it appears only appropriate to take into consideration the changing state of security 
between abstract concepts, concrete technological applications, economic desires and 
normative prerequisites and implications.  
Is security merely a driver for economic growth and prosperity, or does it indeed come as an 
intrinsic value that has to be handled with care in order to avoid detrimental effects on societal 
values? Is privacy a value that is still trumped by the seemingly overarching desire for security, 
or does it have the capacity to challenge the paradigm of security through the EU’s confession 
to more human rights and civil liberties based security measures and the further incorporation 
of ethics into EU funded research? The ensuing constellation appears a puzzling one: 
depending on the perspective, security (technology) is regarded as either a serious threat for 
privacy or an opportunity for massive economic revenue – but should security by default not 
be a value itself? A basic need for any society to ensure its present and future prosperity and 
a safeguard for its individuals to flourish and realize their potential?  
It remains up for discussion whether privacy by design can provide a true reconciliation of 
privacy and security, or whether it solely serves as a veil that is set to obscure major concerns 
with regard to data-driven security technologies. It appears that such a technological 
approach to the governance of security research (and subsequently to ‘security’ itself) falls 
well in line with the general technological scope of EU security research. It remains open 
whether this ‘technological fix for a technological fix’ will strengthen the position of privacy 
and data protection, or whether security will further trump normative considerations and civil 
liberties/rights. To end on a critical note: privacy-by-design might not be the silver bullet that 
it is regarded to be right now, but might rather be a concept that at first sight appears to be 
easily applicable within the general technological paradigm of security, but only seemingly 
soothes the conflict between privacy and security. 
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[Inquiry 4]  
Body scanners in Germany: a case of failed securitization 
 
With Regulation (EU) 1147/2011 of 11 November 2011, the European Union has established 
the legal framework for the regular deployment of so-called ‘Security Scanners’ at EU airports. 
As a number of incidents of unlawful interference with aviation had revealed the limits of 
traditional security screening technologies in detecting criminal and/or terrorist attempts, a 
push had been made by stakeholders from aviation as well as policy makers towards a 
technology that arguably is more capable to detect hidden dangerous objects on passengers 
(Mordini, 2010). The machines – better known to the public as ‘Body Scanners’ or ‘Naked 
Scanners’7 – have since then been put to use in several member states, most notably in the 
UK and the Netherlands. Other countries like Germany, France and Italy have tested devices 
in trial run set-ups, but have not (yet) implemented the European regulation into national law, 
since they have deemed body scanners as not suitable for everyday use in an airport 
environment. This paper analyzes the German context, where body scanners have been tested 
in a trial run at Hamburg Airport from 27 September 2010 to 31 July 2011, after which the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) decided not to implement the devices, claiming that they 
had not met the requirements of airport security authorities. This paper puts forward the 
claim that this failure of implementation relates to privacy claims that eventually disrupted 
the technological prerequisites of body scanners. 
 
Body scanners as securitization 
In order to understand the particular outcome of the German case, it is helpful to 
conceptualize the process of establishing a new security technology as a long-term 
securitization move, going back to research and development and the funding thereof. 
Scrutinizing how the securitization process failed in Germany, this paper thus contributes to 
an understudied area within securitization theory, as the major part of research analyzes 
successful securitization processes (Salter, 2011b). As to measure whether a securitization 
process can be deemed successful, Williams (2011) suggests a concept of intensification that 
moves beyond the dichotomy of normal politics vs exceptional politics, enabling the 
researcher to analyze more fine-grained securitization processes that remain below the level 
of extremity. According to this argument, existing issues that already have been securitized 
within the airport environment cover a wide range of dimensions that include materials (metal 
detection; the ban of liquids), objects (X-ray scans of suitcases and hand luggage; lists of 
forbidden objects), data (trusted/registered traveller programs; Passenger-Name-Record 
information, Advance Passenger Information), biometrics (iris scans; hand vein recognition) 
and space itself (smart CCTV surveillance; armed security guards). Arguably, the 
implementation of body scanners at the checkpoint intensifies security by expanding the 
                                                     
7 The EU uses the term 'security scanner' as a “generic term used for a technology that is capable of detecting 
metallic and non-metallic objects hidden in clothing; whereas detection performance lies in the scanner's 
ability to detect any prohibited object that the person screened may be carrying concealed in their 
clothing” (European Parliament, 2011: 4). In order to avoid terminological confusion, this paper shall 
proceed to use the term 'body scanner', as it more accurately describes the functional logic of the 
technology – to depict the human body free from clothing in order to search dangerous and forbidden 
objects. 
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object dimension or even adding another dimension of securitization to this already 
impressive list, located on the axis between objects and biometrics. Although not being 
approached as an identifier, with the implementation of body scanner technology the human 
body itself becomes a target of careful scrutiny in order to reveal its possible hidden dangers.  
Another suggestion to measure the success of securitization moves comes from Salter 
(2011b), who claims that the answer should be looked for in policy change and/or new, 
upgraded or converging executive competences. Following this argument, what can be found 
empirically is that at the European level, body scanner technology has been successfully 
implemented in the legal framework that provides the basis for aviation security which then 
has to be enacted by the member states. But while at the supranational level, the process has 
been completed, policy outcomes on the national level are varying. In the German context, no 
policy change in aviation security has occurred and authorities have not been willing to use 
body scanners on a regular basis. Thus, this paper claims that we are facing a failed case of 
securitization on the national level and seeks to understand the specific reasons for this 
failure. 
From a Copenhagen School perspective (Buzan et al., 1998), the story of the failure to 
implement yet another layer of invasive screening technology at German airports is in fact a 
quick one to tell. As the empirical coverage of the trial run had shown, the machines had 
simply produced a too high number of false positives (passengers who had been wrongly 
identified as a threat), leading to an increased level of manual secondary screening, and thus 
turned out to be too slow for a security framework that is driven by an overarching paradigm 
of speed (Adey, 2006). While these results were in fact somewhat sobering for the authorities 
that originally had been in favour of the technology, they nonetheless quickly backed up the 
trial run. In a press statement released after the end of the test, the German Federal Minister 
of the Interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich, said: “The Federal Police will continue to closely 
accompany developments in this area, so that we will hopefully soon have machines available 
that meet our security demands as well as can process the number of passengers [own 
translation]” (BMI, 2011). Thus, the official position was to emphasize the dedication to stick 
to body scanner technology as a future remedy for aviation’s cross-pressures in terms of 
security, speed, cost-efficiency and customer convenience. While in the run-up to the trial run, 
doubts about privacy, images of the ‘naked’ human body and data protection as well as health 
issues had been uttered by representatives of the civil society, the authorities and the security 
industry reacted quickly and tackled those issues (Barros, 2012). The machines deployed in 
the German trial run most notably featured a privacy-by-design approach, replacing the 
images of ‘naked’ bodies with matchstick figures. Critique in terms of data protection had also 
been dealt with, as the possibility to store images had been removed. As Friedrich had framed 
it in a previous press statement: “Individual rights are to be maintained – this requirement is 
fully met. […] All data will be erased immediately after screening [own translation]” (BMI, 
2010). Moreover, health issues were not confirmed by several studies on radiation, since 
devices in the EU were not using X-ray technology like comparable machines in the US, but 
terahertz technology. As a consequence, the main narrative of evaluation of the trial run in 
the public discourse was predominantly framed in numeric terms. Considering the overall 
costs, capacity, and false positives rate of the deployed machines, no reasonable cost 
efficiency could be established, subsequently leading to the non-implementation of the new 
screening layer. 
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Arguably though, a turn towards sociological approaches to securitization theory can 
contribute to a more detailed understanding of the specific conditions that have led to the 
failure of the implementation of a new security technology in one member state, while the 
securitization process has been successful in others. Bigo and other authors of the Paris School 
(Bigo, 2001; Bigo, 2008a; Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008b; Bigo and Walker, 2007) have identified a 
gap that needs to be addressed and filled in order to analyze how security comes into being 
in complex contemporary assemblages. Turning away from a scope on how security is being 
enacted through discursive states of insecurity and the creation of political realms of 
exception, they suggest a shift towards agencies and professionals of security, and their role 
in shaping security through bureaucratic processes and expert knowledge, thus involving a 
broader range of actors that usually do not appear at the level of public discourse. In this effort 
to connect IR theory and “the problem of the international” (Bigo and Walker, 2007) with 
political sociology, such an approach to securitization is rather interested in the untangling of 
practices and the contribution of professional knowledge. From this point of view, the 
Copenhagen perspective reflects only a certain amount of what happens in securitization 
processes, while the Paris framework proceeds beyond the surface of language. A scope on 
the practical dimension can provide value-added by “explicitly ‘uncovering’ dimensions of 
security formation that are commonly left implicit” (Huysmans, 2002: 52), or as Salter (2011b: 
117) puts it: “a solely linguistic model cannot account for the politics of the securitization 
process.” 
Hence, this paper is based on a series of expert interviews (N=25) with representatives of 
stakeholders from the aviation security sector (airport operators, airlines, German Federal 
Police, private security companies), as well as experts from research and development and 
the security industry, who were able to provide in-depth detail knowledge on the trial run and 
the complex assemblage of actors and agencies in German aviation security. This paper argues 
that a long-term securitization move can be retraced to early stages of research and 
development, but that the ensuing securitization process was eventually disrupted by the 
privacy-by-design approach that was set to handle the doubts in terms of intimacy and images 
of the ‘naked’ body. While those doubts had effectively been tackled on the political and legal 
level with the use of matchstick figures in place of the original body images, this privacy-
preserving solution induced a massive technological challenge on the level of research and 
development as well as industrial design which could not effectively be resolved. The 
machines with built-in privacy safeguards merely marked identified areas of the human body 
on the matchstick figure, indicating a need for manual secondary screening to the screening 
officer (Mordini, 2010). However, this procedure requires a highly reliable and accurate 
automatic threat detection in image analysis in order not to produce any false negatives 
(passengers with dangerous objects that are not identified as such). Since this requirement 
could not be met by the available machines, in an effort to prevent security breaches in a real 
airport environment during the trial run, the specifications for the level of threat detection 
had to be reconfigured and produced an exceptionally high number of false positives, leading 
to considerable delay in the screening process. As a consequence from those experiences, 
body scanners were eventually rejected by the German authorities – not as a direct 
consequence from privacy requirements, but as a consequence from the technological 
challenges imposed by the adjustment on the political level. Privacy-by-design had been 
leading to a causal chain of improper automatic threat object detection, an increased rate of 
false positives, and a considerably slowed down screening procedure. Linked to scarce 
Leese – On security, once more 
101 
 
resources within the airport environment in terms of space and economic pressures, the 
conditions for a regular deployment of body scanners had effectively vanished. 
 
The fragmented field of aviation 
In sociological approaches to securitization research, several authors have taken up Foucault’s 
thoughts on security governance and have pointed out the importance of a profound 
understanding of power relations among sector-specific actors that struggle over the shaping 
of apparatuses of security (Huysmans, 2002; Balzacq, 2010; Bigo, 2001; Bigo, 2002; Bigo, 
2008a). Considering the Foucauldian (1980: 194) notion of the “dispositif”, researchers are 
facing “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much 
as the unsaid.” A central argument brought forward by supporters of a sociological reading of 
securitization is that speech act analysis is only able to capture a certain amount of 
securitization processes (Bigo, 2001). And more importantly, that this part of the discourse is 
merely the one that is enacted by agents that possess enough power and resources to 
articulate themselves in what could be called the ‘official’ or ‘visible’ discourse. This is not to 
say that speech does not matter – on the contrary, the Copenhagen School has greatly 
contributed to the evolution of security studies. However in order to achieve a more profound 
understanding of how securitization comes into being at the ‘grass-root’ level, the Paris School 
can complement the analysis with a scope on security professionals and their expert 
knowledge in their particular field. As Salter (2007: 50) notes, this approach is particularly well-
suited for aviation security, and more specifically for the screening checkpoint as the spatial 
arrangement where aviation security is enacted. Accordingly, this paper seeks to go beyond 
the speech act and shifts the scope of analysis to the operational level of aviation security. As 
Foucault (1980: 195) adds, a crucial element in this complex assemblage is the “formation 
which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent 
need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function [emph. in orig.].” Being a murky 
and fragmented field that features a multitude of stakeholder constellations and jurisdictions, 
a sociological approach to securitization is primed to analyze this strategic function within 
overlapping power structures and obscure networks that constitute securitization processes 
in aviation (Salter, 2007). In order to analyze security as a “dispositif emanating mainly, but 
not only, from a specific field of professionals” (Balzacq et al., 2010), Bigo et al. (2007) suggest 
to start with a topology of the field to be scrutinized.  
Such an approach has particularly been applied in the works of Salter (2007; 2008c) in order 
to clarify diffuse powers and authorities at the airport as a specific form of governmentality. 
Regarding the two major cross-pressures (i.e. secure and efficient movement vs cost-benefit 
ratio) embedded in a general paradigm of risk assessment and risk management, security (and 
its potential breach) at the airport is being treated like a regular business asset (Salter, 2008c: 
20). Dealing with securitization processes, stakeholder agendas and power relations are 
converging into the question of “how is it that international mobility and civil aviation came 
to be a problem that needed this array of solutions?” (Salter, 2008c: 22). Neglecting an overall 
teleological agenda of securitization in fragmented and dispersed aviation environments, 
Salter (2008c: 23) thus draws on the metaphor of the “rhizome” (Deleuze, 1992) that denies 
centralized control over a network of networks and rather constructs a framework that 
consists of autonomous, yet connected agents and agendas.  
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In this complex assemblage, the screening checkpoint in aviation security enacts Foucault’s 
analysis of contemporary governance as a matter of “allowing circulations to take place, of 
controlling them, sifting the good and the bad” (Foucault, 2007: 65). Technology has been at 
the core of airport checkpoint set-ups for the purpose of scrutinizing the individual ever since 
aviation has been threatened by criminal and terrorist attempts. Airport security regulates 
and directs populations that are on the move, or more figuratively, ‘flow’ through the spatial 
arrangement of the airport. The valve of the screening checkpoint is set to sort out dangerous 
individuals from the passenger flow in order to prevent potential security breaches (Adey, 
2004a; Adey, 2006; Jones, 2009) since the 1970s, when the first hijackings had emphasized 
the vulnerability of the aviation system and called for responsive action, eventually leading to 
metal detection and luggage screening (Sweet, 2009: ch. 2). In post-9/11 security regimes 
aviation has quickly been framed as critical infrastructure (Aradau, 2010) and thus has been a 
target for a number of securitization moves in the ‘war on terror’. Airports in particular have 
been at the centre of public attention in recent years, as numerous (successful as well as 
thwarted) terrorist and criminal incidents have catalyzed the claim to upgrade screening with 
more capable technologies. As airports enact a key role in the international system, 
representing virtual borders (Lyon, 2003a: 13) as well as “symbols of mobility” (Adey, 2004a: 
500), new security policies and the implementation of new and emerging technologies have 
indeed changed the landscape of aviation security in the aftermath of 9/11. As Szyliowicz 
(2004) somewhat drastically puts it, aviation security today very much equals homeland 
security, which on the other hand has become a problem of the international, as internal 
security and its external dimension increasingly converge (Eriksson and Rhinard, 2009). 
Highlighting an often neglected area of security studies (Guittet and Jeandesboz, 2010), 
technology is a major factor in the checkpoint-centred security apparatuses of contemporary 
aviation. Enabling authorities to scrutinize, identify and sift the passenger flow, the 
technology-driven security approach at the airport provides both sophisticated surveillance 
systems and at the same time fosters the security industry, thus turning the attention to the 
role of high tech companies in the shaping of security (Lyon, 2006a: 406-7). In terms, this 
technocratic framework leads to a practice of increasingly implementing emerging 
technologies that have not been sufficiently tested. Accordingly, Bonß and Wagner (2012: 47) 
argue that some technologies have not been deployed at the airport yet simply because 
improperly designed machines would disrupt standard procedures in screening, leading to 
additional expenditures in terms of time and money. However, as Buzan and Hansen (2009: 
54-7) note, key events have always played a role in shaping the evolution of security (studies). 
Airport security can indeed by reconstructed as an incident-driven chain of policy moves 
(Lyon, 2003a: 16). More recent policy changes in the ‘war on terror’ have featured responses 
to such terrorist attempts as the 2001 shoe bomber, the 2006 liquids plot or the 2009 
underpants bomber (Jacobson, 2012: 36). Thus, as part of an emerging European security 
agenda, aviation became a key part of post-9/11 EU level efforts. 
Prior to 9/11, the European Union had not played a role in aviation security which was until 
then enacted via intergovernmental standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) and its European subgroup ECAC (European Civil Aviation Conference), as well as the 
International Air Transportation Association (IATA). Only in the aftermath of 9/11, the 
European Union became actively involved in legally structuring the field and tackling security 
issues (Barros, 2012). Regulation (EC) 2320/2002 established a common ground for binding 
regulations in EU aviation security. In 2008, when Regulation (EC) 300/2008 was set to 
replenish the former legislation, body scanner technology was included in the draft regulation 
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for the first time as an additional permitted screening measure at airports. However, with 
pending questions on health protection, privacy and data protection, the European Parliament 
blocked the draft regulation and called for a comprehensive ethical and legal impact 
assessment (Mordini, 2010: 173), eventually leading to the omission of body scanner 
technology in the final version of the regulation. The issue then remained on ice for roughly a 
year, while in the meantime provisional trial runs were established in several member states. 
Outside the EU, a number of countries (most notably the US, but also Canada and Russia) 
made a push towards the implementation of body scanners. Moreover, Japan, Australia, South 
Korea, China and India announced that they were planning to purchase machines (Barros, 
2012: 64). 
Following the underpants bomber incident on 25 December 2009, however, several member 
states started to reconsider the use of body scanner technology, with the Netherlands 
emerging as the front-runner (Barros, 2012: 64). On 15 June 2010, with COM(2010) 311 final, 
the European Commission reported to the Parliament and the Council on the unresolved 
status of body scanners, summarizing the national experiences and calling for “a harmonised 
approach [that] should incorporate EU fundamental rights standards and a common level of 
health protection to allow adding this technology to the existing list of eligible equipment for 
screening persons at airports” (European Commission, 2010a: 2). In a report issued on 30 May 
2011, the European Parliament supported the EC’s initiative to harmonize the legal framework 
and the plan to include body scanners in the list of allowed screening measures at European 
airports. However, the Parliament made a number of claims concerning a possible 
implementation, “demanding to adapt the provisions on the protection of health, privacy, 
personal data and fundamental rights to technological progress” (European Parliament, 2011: 
7). Specifically, the report called for an opt-out possibility from primary screening with body 
scanners, as well as the use of non-ionizing radiation in deployed devices. Moreover, the 
machines should rule out the possibility to store or retain images or data, especially not in 
connection with individual profiles. Most notably, the Parliament stated that “only stick 
figures should be used and [insisted] that no body images may be produced” (European 
Parliament, 2011: 9), but in general the report agreed to the European Commission’s desire 
to implement body scanners on a regular basis. 
Thus, on 11 November 2011, Regulation (EU) 1147/2011 eventually added body scanners to 
the list of allowed screening measures at European airports, updating the list provided by 
Regulation (EU) 185/2010. While the first three demands of the European Parliament had 
been adopted in the final regulation without revisions, the issue of ‘naked’ images of the 
human body remained unresolved. Regulation (EU) 1147/2011 leaves member states with the 
choice whether to implement machines that operate with a human reviewer or machines with 
privacy-preserving software that only display matchstick figures and that feature automatic 
threat object detection. In the former case, the human reviewer, located in a separate room, 
is still able to see the ‘naked’ body image and in case of detection of a forbidden object is set 
to communicate with the screening officer at the checkpoint, indicating the body parts on 
which to perform a manual secondary screening. Remaining irresolute on the delicate issue of 
privacy, the EU has thus passed the decision on how to deal with concerns of ‘nudity’ to the 
national level. Although EU legislation on aviation security has made considerable progress 
since 2002, the overall field still remains complex and unclear. As Barros (2012: 57) states, 
“EU, international organizations, states, and private companies are interacting in the global 
field of aviation security, which is far from institutionalized and structured”, and in which body 
scanners have been used in a number of distinct ways.  
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Due to the federalist organization of the German state, 20 different public authorities and 
agencies are involved in the national level of aviation security (Giemulla and Rothe, 2008: 49). 
The national aviation security act (LuftSiG, 2005) distributes the responsibilities for security 
measures at German airports among three main pillars. Paragraph 5 entitles the Federal 
Aviation Authority to secure access to the airside area, including checkpoint operations and 
the decision on the deployed screening measures. At the majority of German airports, this 
task is enacted by the Federal Police which is formally subordinated to the Federal Ministry of 
the Interior. However, the Federal Police has the possibility to subcontract screening 
operations (LuftSiG, 2005: §5(5)), effectively leading to a situation in which screening 
operations are being carried out by private security companies. The two remaining pillars in 
the overall security framework address airport operators (LuftSiG, 2005: §8) that are obliged 
to protect the physical integrity of the airport, provide perimeter defence and ensure that 
screening can be carried out in an adequate fashion, as well as airlines (LuftSiG, 2005: §9) that 
are obliged to secure grounded aircraft and to ensure that only authorized individuals can 
access aircraft. After all, the security framework requires custom-tailored solutions for every 
single airport, as considerable differences in size, architectural style, available space and 
involved stakeholders do occur empirically.  
 
Studying technology 
An analysis of how security technology comes into being, as Guittet and Jeandesboz (2010: 
236) note, has to carefully scrutinize “the diversity of groups of professionals who actually 
intervene into technological development, the overlapping arenas through which 
technological systems are funded, developed, marketed, promoted and acquired, as well as 
the multiple logics which underpin these processes.” Setting the scope on body scanner 
technology, a complex assemblage of stakeholders has been involved in the process, coming 
not only from the specific aviation sector but also from the broader field of security. As Guittet 
and Jeandesboz (2010: 236) add, “one needs to distinguish between designers (e.g. 
engineers), marketers and promoters of technological systems, as well as between the agents 
responsible for acquiring technological systems (procurement administrations), for 
supporting research in the private and public sectors, and for using these systems – with the 
additional caveat that all of them intervene, through different arenas and interfaces, into 
technological processes.”  
The trial run at Hamburg airport was designed as a research project, initiated on the political 
level by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and enacted on the practical level by the Federal 
Police. As one Federal Police Officer put it: “It is not our own research project, but the research 
project of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which has engaged the R&D department [of the 
Federal Police] with the task. We are just present at the airport and make our contributions, 
as a part of that research group [own translation]” (Expert Interview, 9 June 2011). This 
framing of the trial run reflects a securitization move as a long-term plan that includes 
research and development and the participation of the security industry. This way of 
cooperative implementation of security measures can be retraced at the European level as 
well. As de Goede (2011: 10) argues, “EU funding often prioritises this kind of precautionary 
and technologically advanced security research. The European Security Model is fostered 
through research funding and market integration.” While on the EU level, this approach is 
realized in the Security Theme of the FP7 Framework (Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2010), similar 
structures can be found on the national level with the German Research Programme for Civil 
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Security (BMBF, 2007; BMBF, 2012). Funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF), the program emphasizes the chances of security as an “innovation chain” 
(BMBF, 2012: 2), covering a long-term period from basic research to industrial design. 
Moreover, the initiative has fostered a special interest area of research on terahertz 
technology since the start of its high tech strategy in 2007 (BMBF, 2007: 102). As part of this 
strategy, the public sector made a push towards the industry in search of cooperation. As one 
representative from the security industry stated, public authorities had started to make 
inquiries to the industry following a number of significant terrorist incidents in aviation (Expert 
Interview, 12 January 2012). Since then, a number of projects (QPASS, TEKZAS, TeraCam, 
TeraTom, TeraHz-Videocam, TeraHz-Videocam TWO) from the area of ‘Detection of 
Hazardous Objects’ have targeted the development of body scanners and related applications 
to detect dangerous objects at security screening, often with a special focus on aviation.8 
The industry reacted to this trend with the intensification of their own research agenda, while 
regularly checking back with the authorities. Said one expert from the security industry: “We 
have been constantly communicating with the authorities, we have been reporting to the 
authorities: What do you need? What is necessary? And so on. So we were informed about 
the authorities’ plans, and they were informed about our activities [own translation]” (Expert 
Interview, 12 January 2012). The Federal Police itself has become an associated partner in the 
TeraHz-Videocam TWO consortium, enabling the authorities to closely monitor and advise 
research and development. As one involved expert said: “We see each other at project 
meetings, we have the possibility to straightforward call the R&D department of the Federal 
Police and to tell them: We have this or that idea, what do you think of it? Is that something 
you want to have? [own translation]” (Expert Interview, 15 March 2012). Thus, research and 
development on body scanners, funded by the government and in close cooperation with 
aviation security authorities, was progressing well in Germany. However, the turning point 
eventually came when the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) launched images 
of ‘naked’ bodies to the media that had been produced by body scanners deployed at US 
airports in autumn of 2008. Originally meant to demonstrate the capabilities of the machines, 
the images lead to public outrage and broad debates about privacy and human rights not only 
in the US, but also in the European context (Abeyratne, 2010; Frimpong, 2011). 
The security industry was taken by surprise by the events. As a representative from the branch 
said, their presentation of a new body scanner machine at the ACI Airport Exchange fair in 
Berlin, 27-29 October 2008, was severely affected by the pictures that at this point had been 
re-published by all major media outlets. Hence, he admitted that “[they] had to be more quiet 
than planned during the exhibition [own translation]” (Expert Interview, 12 January 2012) in 
order to avoid attention and critique. Added another expert from research and development: 
“Well, the debate had a lot of influence on us [own translation]” (Expert Interview, 15 March 
2012). As a consequence, further efforts in research and developments took a turn towards 
privacy-preserving software solutions with automatic threat object detection, so no images of 
‘naked’ bodies would have to be displayed any longer. Said one representative from the 
security industry: “With the neutral depiction, it is possible to dispel the rightfully uttered 
doubts. There is nothing objectionable about this matchstick figure [own translation]” (Expert 
Interview, 12 January 2012). But the turn to privacy-by-design soon revealed major hurdles in 
automatic image analysis. Algorithms that were found to work properly in a laboratory 
environment with predefined boundaries and parameters, indeed struggled to perform in a 
                                                     
8  http://www.bmbf.de/de/12917.php (accessed 7 July 2014). 
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real airport environment. As one engineer clearly stated: “In my opinion, image analysis is not 
possible in an automatic fashion. Not with our current knowledge [own translation]” (Expert 
Interview, 15 March 2012). Regarding the developmental stages of image analysis and object 
recognition, another engineer added: “If you ask me about the time frame to realize such a 
system, I can’t give you a straight answer [own translation]” (Expert Interview, 14 February 
2012). Thus, the security industry quickly realized that the respect for privacy issues had 
resulted in a system in which software turned out to be the weak link. The machines could 
distinguish whether an object had been found or not, but were not able to assess whether the 
found object posed a threat or was merely a handkerchief in a pocket. As one expert from a 
private security company put it: “It was easily possible to analyze the terahertz images, but 
with this artificial brake, that has become impossible [own translation]” (Expert Interview, 16 
January 2013).  
Thus, while on the political level, policy makers had efficiently tackled privacy concerns, body 
scanner technology itself had suffered a setback from the implementation of matchstick 
figures that replaced the original ‘naked’ terahertz images. From a research and development 
perspective, it became clear that airport environment testing would be necessary in order to 
make progress in automatic threat object detection. As one engineer admitted: “A trial run in 
a real environment is necessary to gain experience [own translation]” (Expert Interview, 14 
February 2012). Accordingly, the trial run at Hamburg airport was eventually framed as a 
research project, but only confirmed what involved stakeholders had expected in the first 
place. Said a representative from the Federal Police: “Everyone from the R&D department, 
but also from the Federal Police, who knew what had happened in the laboratory 
environment, were pretty clear about what would happen during the trial run, and which 
problems would probably occur [own translation]” (Expert Interview, 9 June 2011). Since the 
machines were merely able to make a binary distinction between detection or no detection, 
the false positives rate was leaping up and manual secondary screening slowed down 
checkpoint operations considerably. As an expert involved in the trial run stated: “We are 
facing a high rate of false positives, caused among others by the software. One must not forget 
that we are enacting a trailblazer position here in terms of privacy with the pictogram solution, 
but at the expense of the scanner’s performance [own translation]” (Expert Interview, 9 June 
2011). With regard to the decreased performance of the machines, a representative from the 
security industry added: “It is clear that the capacity of such systems is very important. 
Whoever buys such a machine is interested in as much capacity as possible [own translation]” 
(Expert Interview, 12 January 2012). So while from a research and development perspective, 
the trial run provided valuable experiences, the ensuing failure in terms of capacity eventually 
resulted in the numeric evaluation of the trial run and the non-deployment of body scanners 
in the German context. 
Thus, privacy claims seem to have been surprisingly successful in the German context. And 
this success seems to be spilling over to other contexts as well. The US have also started to 
turn away from designs with ‘naked’ images. Mandated by Congress as part of the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, body scanners at US airports are set to feature 
privacy-preserving software, leading to similar problems in automatic threat detection. 
Rapiscan as one of the large manufacturers of body scanners at US airports has not been able 
to provide an adequate software for its machines in a timely manner. As a consequence, all 
Rapiscan machines are being removed from US airports and stored until the company can 
deliver the required new software version (TSA, 2013). Arguably, the success of privacy 
advocates in the case of body scanner technology might be due to the highly symbolic issues 
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of bodily integrity, shame and nudity that have been raised after the introduction of body 
scanners. Usually, civil rights are in a weak position when faced up against overwhelming 
security concerns (Tsoukala, 2010; de Goede, 2011), but in this particular context, privacy 
claims have prevailed in the struggle over a highly controversial new screening technology. 
While on the EU level, designs without privacy-preserving software have been allowed for 
national implementation, the German authorities have opted for the use of scanners with 
built-in privacy protection in the form of a software that does not depict the ‘naked’ body. 
However, this decision has eventually crossed a long-term securitization process, leading to 
the rejection of the machines, as they were deemed as not suitable for everyday use. 
 
Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to analyze the question why body scanner technology has not been 
implemented at German airports, while it has been the case in the EU legal framework as well 
as in other member states such as the UK and the Netherlands. Going beyond the discursive 
level of speech acts, the paper sought to overcome the narrative chain in public discourse, 
which remained in plain numeric terms. Instead, the analysis applied a perspective that 
focuses on practices and professional knowledge from aviation security and the security 
industry. Conceptualizing the developments accompanying the implementation of body 
scanners in the EU legal framework and the (non-)implementation on the national level as a 
securitization process makes it possible to retrace very accurately how securitization in the 
German context failed. The securitization move was first initiated by the Federal Ministry of 
the Interior, emanating from long-term funding of research and development of terahertz 
technology that had been fostered by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The 
trial run of body scanner technology at Hamburg airport was itself framed as a research 
project, testing the capabilities and limits of a technology that had to be modified because of 
a number of public concerns, including privacy, data protection and health. Those issues were 
resolved on the political level, leading to the implementation of privacy-preserving software, 
which eventually resulted in major detection problems. Since automatic threat recognition 
software has not been able to keep track of the capabilities that body scanners theoretically 
provide, available machines turned out to be inappropriate for everyday use at the airport.  
Turning the scope of securitization analysis towards technology itself, the very element that 
was set to be implemented eventually prevented a successful securitization process as it had 
to be adopted to changing political parameters. Public authorities as well as the industry had 
not estimated how privacy issues would ultimately unbalance the complex dispositif of 
aviation security in this case. Securitization in a Foucauldian understanding is not a 
straightforward process induced by powerful elites, but a dynamic and sometimes 
unpredictable development. Such an understanding can in terms lead to distinct policy 
outcomes and practices within the EU. As de Goede (2011: 16) notes, “indeed, a European 
security culture is not coherent and homogenised, but may be uneven, disjointed or even 
internally contradictory.” Empirically, the European structures of enacting security through 
research funding and industrial cooperation can be found in a similar fashion on the national 
level. The German Research Programme for Civil Security (BMBF, 2007; BMBF, 2012) is 
focused on providing a long-term technological fix for the increasing number of national and 
international threats and uncertainties that have been identified in a post-9/11 order. On the 
EU level, the FP7 Security Theme enacts a very similar approach (Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2010; 
de Goede, 2011), thus raising questions whether the security agenda is fully being relocated 
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to the supranational level. While most notably the European Commission has pushed towards 
a European security solution at the expense of fragmented national frameworks (Kaunert and 
Léonard, 2012: 422), the German government has established parallel structures. Those 
structures have eventually fostered distinct developments in terms of privacy-preserving 
safeguards in body scanner technology, further contributing to an incoherent EU security 
framework. Turning the attention to the technological aspects within apparatuses of security, 
the analysis of a failed securitization process in the German context has shown that while on 
the legal level, privacy-by-design was the only claim that had not been fully implemented 
during the struggles over body scanner technology on the European level, the issue has 
eventually affected the field of aviation security from the bottom perspective of technology 
itself. Not only in Europe, but also in the US, recent developments have shown a tendency 
towards a built-in privacy approach that does not produce images of ‘naked’ bodies at all, but 
that instead depict privacy-friendly matchstick figures. As a consequence from this tendency 
however, the industry experienced an operational set-back, as automatic threat detection in 
image analysis turned out be a lot more challenging than expected.  
Thus, it turns out that privacy claims have effectively foiled the implementation of new 
screening technology at German airports, preventing further intensification of security 
screening. Taking up Wæver’s original notion of a normative desire for de-securitization, this 
actually seems to be a welcome change in a sector that is becoming increasingly dominated 
by new technologies and proactive approaches (Williams, 2011). As Wæver (1995: 56) 
emphasizes, “the trick was and is to move from a positive to a negative meaning: security is 
the conservative mechanism – but we want less security!” Recent developments in the 
European security agenda show a clear tendency towards relocating securitization agendas 
into the realm of research and development (Bigo and Jeandesboz, 2010). As technological 
tools are increasingly colonizing the realm of security, it becomes even more important to 
carefully scrutinize how complex assemblages are dominated and enacted by technologies, 
and how these technologies connect public and private agencies, policy makers, security 
professionals and the civil society. Further building on Wæver’s (1995: 57-8) question what 
efforts could be undertaken to keep issues off the agenda of securitization or even de-
securitize, the EU’s as well as national scopes on research and development turns out to be 
problematic on a distinct level. As it is by definition a long-term process which is disconnected 
from the level of emergency and urgency that characterizes securitization moves within the 
discursive arena, its mechanisms are sometimes difficult to retrace. Research and 
development remain below public perception for a considerable time span before their 
outcomes eventually reach the surface of the public level, and by that time have often 
produced fully designed and market-ready tools. Given considerable time and resources, 
emerging technologies more often than not are going to realize their original goals. As one 
expert from a private aviation security company said: “When computing power increases, 
when the detection performance increases, and accordingly the false positives rate decreases 
– then the use of body scanners is definitely the right choice going into the future [own 
translation]” (Expert Interview, 9 June 2011). Securitization moves that stay below the original 
notion of exception and seek to intensify security or to converge once distinct competences 
pose some analytical obstacles. A closer look at how technology comes into being and 
contributes to securitization processes can provide help in understanding the European 
security agenda and thus should be an integral part of the still emerging research area on 
European internal security. In the case of body scanners, it seems that privacy-by-design could 
indeed spill over to other member states and lead to an ex-post failure of further securitization 
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in the aviation sector, unless technological progress on the software level catches up – which 
in fact could be expected to happen sooner or later. 
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[Inquiry 5]  
Governing airport security: an empirical account between economic rationality and 
the public good 
 
On a virtual trip through Toronto International Airport, as Rigakos and Greener (2000: 145) 
have pointed out, an occasional traveler “will have come under the gaze of three federal 
policing agencies, one municipal police service, a quasi-public security force, four privately 
contracted security companies, and an unknown number of in-house airline security agencies 
all working alongside one another.” For more than three decades, scholars have now been 
concerned with the transformation of policing and the provision of security. But besides a 
shared insight that we have faced, and are still facing considerable change, the rise of private 
entrepreneurship and its impact on the governance of security have evoked distinct 
interpretations. While some have emphasized the chances of local and (partly) private forms 
of security governance (Shearing and Wood, 2003a), others have called for the re-
establishment of a normative primate of the state in an area as delicate as the security of its 
citizens, and have doubted the beneficial regulatory capacities of the market (Loader and 
Walker, 2006). Airports as concrete sites for enacting international security have been 
deemed as spaces of “profound social and political significance” (Lyon, 2003a: 13) that not 
only provide global connectivity, but also “epitomize” the multitude of distinct relationships 
between public and private actors in the provision of security (Lahav, 2008: 81). Within a still 
emerging research agenda at the intersection of political and economic contexts (White, 
2012), this paper seeks to contribute to an enhanced understanding of the mechanisms of 
security governance by providing empirical insight into practices at German airports. The out-
contracting of security provisions in Germany is realized via a principal/agent setup that 
formally leaves a state body (the ‘Bundespolizei’) in charge of security operations, and thus 
stands in stark contrast to radical forms of privatization that can be found in other European 
countries, for instance in the UK. From this particular legal setup, a number of rather unique 
consequences emerge, thus rendering the case study fruitful for reflections about the 
relationship of the state and the market in terms of security provisions. The analysis lays its 
particular scope on screening operations at the security checkpoint, generally conceived as 
one of the most vulnerable spaces within the airport security framework (Jones, 2009), and 
claims that we can find major operational flaws in this specific mode of out-contracting, both 
alongside economic and political rationalities. 
In order to closely examine the relationship between the police and private security 
companies at the airport, a total of 24 expert interviews with representatives from the 
aviation security branch – among them a considerable number of executives and staff from 
the private security sector – have been conducted from May 2011 until January 2013. Using 
this insider knowledge to create an account of German airport security, the paper finds that 
despite the overall security framework of modern airports is driven by neo-liberal economic 
rationalities, an overall approach of risk-management, and trends in technologies, the ‘human 
factor’ within this complex assemblage remains strangely neglected. Exposed to the 
regulatory mechanisms of the market through out-contracting, the private security companies 
that work the checkpoint face considerable economic pressure that effectively forces them to 
cut costs – and they do so primarily in staff expenses. As one representative from a private 
security company metaphorically described the situation: “Our role at the airport – well, one 
might frame this with the anatomy of the buttocks. One buttock is the Federal Police, and the 
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other buttock, that’s the passengers and the airport operator. And the little brown thing in 
the middle, that’s us”9 (9 June 2011). It obviously seems a bit over the top to say that 
international security is enacted by scat, but the empirical insight indeed reveals how both 
economic and political pressures become re-located into the realm of private firms and their 
staff. Read through that lens, international security and its high-priority safeguards against 
major terrorist attacks such as 9/11 then boil down to the work and individual accountability 
of private security agents, whose work conditions have been criticized as inadequate (Lippert 
and O'Connor, 2003; Seidenstat, 2004). Thus, this conceptual shift to market regulation 
arguably undermines the expensive and technically sophisticated overall security framework 
of (German) airports. 
 
Between necessary virtues and neutral nodes: security governance 
Security and how it becomes enacted in contemporary societies has come a long way. Due to 
the legacy of the Westphalian system and its state-centric angle, thinking about security often 
carries a certain notion that the state has been responsible for, and in fact has been in charge 
of, the provision thereof throughout history. Yet still, the last couple decades have brought 
about a considerable change of the role of the state. This thesis of a recent “transformation 
of policing” (Bayley and Shearing, 1996) has been challenged, as others argue that new forms 
of security governance have not emerged only lately, but rather must be conceptualized as an 
ongoing phenomenon that can be traced way back (Jones and Newburn, 2002). However, 
scholars have been quite unanimous about the accelerated dynamics in this change and the 
rise of the private security sector. Empirical insights into the re-organization of police work 
and ensuing forms of “managerialism”, “consumerism” and “promotionalism” that depict the 
commodification of security (Loader, 1999), into the emergence of new spatial setups such as 
gated communities and other forms of private property as well as hybrid spaces of “mass 
private property” (Shearing and Stenning, 1983) that are as often as not patrolled by private 
security companies, and into the changing dynamics of cooperation between multiple public 
and private security agencies have been along the major lines of inquiry. On a more general 
level, and alongside those tendencies, a shift from traditional repressive policing towards 
preventive, risk-based forms of policing (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Feeley and Simon, 1992) 
and an increased use or even lead of technology have been pointed out (de Pauw et al., 2011; 
Marx, 1988). Overall, the academic field of security governance across such disciplines as 
criminology, sociology, political science and the law appears as rich and numerous as security 
governance itself. 
It is possible, however, to distinguish two major trajectories of theorizing the shift from a 
supposed state monopoly of security towards contemporary assemblages that consist of a 
multitude of both state and non-state actors. Mainly around the works of Johnston, Shearing, 
Wood and others (e.g. Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing, 2006; Shearing and Wood, 
2003a; Shearing and Wood, 2003b), a skeptical view towards state-centric provision of 
security has evolved. The state, in this reading, appears not a suitable primary actor for often 
delicate security tasks, as public authorities are often inflexible, bureaucratic and not 
particularly sensitive to the specific needs of distinct social environments. Thus, authors of 
this school argue that security as a public good can be enacted considerably better through 
individual configurations, for instance on the local community level (Shearing and Wood, 
                                                     
9 All interviews have been conducted in German. Quotes have been translated by the author. 
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2003a). Moving away from a theoretical primate of the state then allows for an arguably 
better suited mode of empirical analyses. In an effort to scrutinize how state and non-state 
actors co-operate in distinct context, they propose to look into particular “nodes of 
governance” from an unprejudiced angle, thus ensuring that “no set of nodes is given 
conceptual priority” (Shearing and Wood, 2003b: 404) in any analysis. 
A distinct reading of security governance builds mainly on the works of Loader and Walker 
(e.g. Loader, 1997; Loader and Walker, 2001; Loader and Walker, 2004; Loader and Walker, 
2006), who conceive the state as a normative anchor of security provision in otherwise a-
moral forms of governance that are increasingly determined by neo-liberal market 
imperatives. Despite being aware of the potential shortcomings of the state as a “meddler”, 
“partisan”, “idiot” or “cultural monolith” (Loader and Walker, 2006), scholars who follow this 
reading highlight the state and the democratic foundation, legitimation and direct 
accountability of public authorities as central elements in dispersed networks. This emphasis 
is based on the general notion that security and policing “represent a limit case of the 
freedoms and pleasures of consumption” (Loader, 1999: 387). The empirical findings of this 
paper indeed suggest that economically induced practices of out-contracting create working 
conditions that stand in stark contrast to a normatively founded account of security provision.  
Subsequently, this paper argues that an ‘anchored’ conceptualization of security governance 
serves as a more adequate reading of practices of out-contracting screening duties at the 
airport. After all, “the need for economic regulation should be re-examined from time to time” 
(Starkie, 2002: 63) – or at least the relationship between public and private agencies should 
be re-evaluated. Such a re-evaluation necessarily must take into account concrete legal 
frameworks as well as ground-level practices. By looking both at how the particular German 
principal/agent setup of out-contracting has come into being, and through the analysis of 
expert knowledge from the field, this paper seeks to provide such an account, and to pin-point 
the normative and economic flaws of out-contracted airport security provision. Security 
governance at the airport, so it will be argued, could actually benefit in both normative terms 
as well as from the political rationale of effectiveness, if it was removed from the unmitigated 
regulative forces of the market. Before proceeding to the actual analysis, the next section 
locates the particular space of the airport and its characteristics among the axis between a 
state monopoly and the privatization of core aspects of security. 
 
High-risk, low-cost hybrids 
As several authors have emphasized, there is little conceptual use in dichotomous thinking 
about security governance either in terms of the state/the public or in terms of the 
economy/the private, when in fact numerous forms and constellations can be found 
empirically. As Dupont (2006: 87) points out, it appears more suitable to think of a “continuum 
approach, with the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ at each end, and various unpredictable 
combinations of pluralization and commodification in the middle.” Thus, where does the 
airport locate among this continuum? The organizational structure of modern airports has 
been described as a “fragmented array of horizontal, vertical and lateral linkages” 
(Frederickson and LaPorte, 2002: 33), with a considerable amount of private service 
provisions, and particularly privatization and out-contracting of security tasks to private firms. 
Moreover, as Starkie (2002: 64) emphasizes, “airports, many of which have been treated in 
the past as public service organisations directly controlled by government administrations, 
have increasingly been restructured as public enterprises, or have been privatised.” Thus, 
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airports fall in line with what Shearing and Stenning (1983) have deemed “mass private 
property.” Those hybrid properties carry a strong notion of public space, but in fact are owned 
and/or operated by private companies. Prominent examples for such places are shopping 
malls and sports arenas, as well as transportation infrastructures such as train stations and 
airports. Especially the latter venues have been identified to operate between the public 
purpose of providing mobility infrastructure, and the need to generate economic revenue. In 
terms of security provision, private ownership carries considerable consequences. In some 
cases, public authorities remain in charge and as such govern private space, in other cases 
they cooperate and share/split tasks with private companies. More often than not, private 
policing even completely replaces public services, as most notably can be witnessed in 
shopping malls or sports arenas. 
Along this notion of hybrid space, Rigakos and Greener (2000) have tagged airports as 
“bubbles of governance” that enact highly differentiated forms of security governance in 
order to be able to cope with the “myriad threats to social order” that create “myriad 
opportunities for the selling, trading, and contracting of security provision” (Rigakos and 
Greener, 2000: 146). Crucial for this understanding of bubbles is the notion that they 
represent spatial spheres which are governed by particular modes of public-private 
relationships. However, those relationships are relevant only within the bubble – once the 
individual leaves the bubble, they are no longer subjected to its mode of governance. Building 
on this very relationship of the individual with what used to be the state, but now consists of 
a multitude of public and private actors in unique constellations, Shearing and Wood (2003b) 
have used the term “denizen” to emphasize the changing constellations of governance that 
dominate everyday life contexts. Distinguished from the notion of citizenship, the concept of 
denizenship disconnects the fixed link to the state and rather refers to being governed through 
changing constellations of the public and the private. Individuals would then enter or pass 
through distinct spheres such as private homes, public streets, or hybrids such as malls or 
airports on a daily basis, and thus possess “multiple denizenships depending on the number 
of domains of governance through which their lives are regulated” (Shearing and Wood, 
2003b: 408) – subsequently opening up a research agenda of how particular denizenships 
impact individuals and their conceptions of, and attitude towards the provision of security in 
distinct spatial constellations. A common argument from the aviation industry highlights the 
assumption that air travel should be regarded a voluntary option and that the entrance into 
the bubble of the airport and the acceptance of its particular denizenship would remain within 
individual agency. Thus, the purchase of an airline ticket would come with the mandatory 
requirement of subjecting oneself to security screening, and on a more general level with the 
notion that passengers would subject themselves to the overarching security regime based on 
a notion of space.10 
While such a presumed voluntary nature of air travel in times of ultimate global connectivity 
appears highly doubtful, the security regime of the airport is in fact worth looking into. As 
“high-reliability organizations”, airports have been compared with the likes of nuclear power 
plants or electricity transmission infrastructure (Frederickson and LaPorte, 2002). Such 
organizational forms can allow for no margin of error due to the potential catastrophic 
                                                     
10 Such a notion of informed consent has been repeatedly expressed by representatives of the aviation branch, 
most notably at a conference on risk-based passenger security frameworks, Oestrich-Winkel, 15-16 May 
2012, and at an NCAS workshop on “New passenger security concepts”, Frankfurt, 25 July 2012. The 
author has been present on both occasions. 
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consequences in the case of failure of service provision. Thus, the scope for screening at the 
airport is on maximum security. The far side of the checkpoint has been described as a “sterile” 
space (Salter, 2008a: 13) that must by no means become contaminated by dangerous 
individuals and/or objects. In order to ensure this sterility of the airside area, airport security 
opts for the mitigation of risk. As the acceptance thereof is beyond question, and complete 
avoidance of risk (or, in other terms: absolute security) cannot be achieved, the mitigation 
approach has evolved as the most suitable operational mode for airport security. There are 
ongoing efforts to relocate the assessment and mitigation of ‘risky’ travelers to an early stage 
in both temporal and spatial terms (Leese, 2013; McLay et al., 2010; Salter, 2008b), but for 
now, risk mitigation at the screening checkpoint is enacted via physical scrutiny for dangerous 
objects and banned liquids. For this purpose, a considerable and ever-increasing arsenal of 
high-tech solutions that include full body scanners and trace detection for explosives offer 
assistance. Thus, airport security can be conceived of both in terms of risk-based and 
preventive approaches to policing (Lyon, 2006a; O'Malley, 2006; Salter, 2008b), and in terms 
of a strong innovation-centric account of security that strives to constantly implement the 
latest security technologies (Barros, 2012; Jones, 2009) in order to counter high-impact events 
such as hijackings and other criminal and/or terrorist incidents. This form of technology-led 
policing can in fact be described as part of a larger trajectory across many spheres of police 
work, but has arguably been reinforced in post-9/11 security efforts (Lyon, 2003a). 
But while sophisticated and expensive technologies can serve as a capable supporting cast, 
the eventual decision whether to prevent any passenger from proceeding past the checkpoint 
remains within human agency. In case a potential security breach has been detected, manual 
second screening is set to determine the actual threat. Thus, security boils down to an 
individual decision, made under time constraints, as screening should not take up too much 
of the passengers’ (shopping) time. It appears only reasonable that in an optimal scenario, this 
decision should be made by an experienced, well-trained and highly motivated screening 
agent. Thus, how can we make sense of the practice of out-contracting screening operations 
to private security companies, when prize competitiveness most likely negatively impacts the 
quality of the product – the provision of security? Scholars have intensely criticized out-
contracting and private security provisions at the airport (Frederickson and LaPorte, 2002; 
Jones, 2009; Lippert and O'Connor, 2003), but little in-depth study of the nature of the public-
private relationships in question has been conducted. The common position of critique might 
be summarized such that out-contracting relocates the provision of security into a highly 
competitive market environment in which the price is the dominant criterion and thus turns 
screening operations into low-cost labor. Ensuing consequences such as little organizational 
identity, inadequate job training and high staff turnover, so the argument goes, diminish the 
overall quality of security provision to a level that might actually produce security breaches 
and thus threaten international security. And while this argumentative chain appears widely 
accepted, there remains a need for empirical research that scrutinizes how airport security 
governance becomes enacted in specific assemblages of the state and the market. The next 
section seeks to establish such an empirical account. Or, put in different terms: “in gauging 
the impact of private actors on state sovereignty, we must consider who has been setting the 
agenda, who is delegating, and who is the agency” (Lahav, 2008: 95). 
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Out-contracting along economic and political contexts: an empirical account 
Drawing on the notion that “political and economic processes and institutions are interlinked 
and should be studied as a complex and interrelated whole rather than as separate spheres” 
(Gamble, 1995: 517), White (2012) has suggested to set an analytical agenda for a “new 
political economy of private security” that unfolds along the dimensions of the political and 
the economic, but ceases to conceptualize them as distinct categories. In such an agenda, 
rather than reproducing traditional angles, “dichotomies between politics/economics, 
states/markets and structure/agency are consciously broken down and reframed within an 
integrated approach” (White, 2012: 86), thus allowing to think of security governance in terms 
of “private security providers as political economic actors moving back and forth within a 
political economic dialectic” (White, 2012: 96). Adding an explicit account of the economy to 
any analysis of security governance can provide not only a better understanding of the 
targeted question, but also provide an instrument of critique. Not least of all, economic 
analysis has the potential to identify market failure and thus justify intervention (Ogus, 2004: 
31), thus serving as an additional layer besides normative forms of critique. 
Historically speaking, the emergence of security governance at German airports can be 
retraced to changes in the legal framework of aviation in the 1990s. The provision of security 
at airports has in fact traditionally been a monopoly of the state throughout most of Europe. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, however, and due to the ever-increasing numbers of flights 
and passengers, authorities slowly began to conceive of their tasks in more economic terms. 
As Ericson (1994: 171) points out, during this period governments began to realize that “there 
are finite resources that impose limits on security provision” and thus searched for new and 
more cost-effective ways of policing the aviation sector. The 1988 UK aviation deregulation 
act has been deemed a trail blazer towards a wave of privatizations across European airport 
security (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer, 2003: 9). However, German authorities remained 
skeptical and reluctant to the potential outsourcing of security tasks. It was only in 1990, 
“when budget constraints of the state made changes in the distribution of the financial burden 
seem inevitable” (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer, 2003: 11), that political action was undertaken. 
Subsequently, an aviation security fee was introduced in order to compensate for costs in 
terms of personnel and expensive screening technologies such as metal detectors. However, 
airport security remained within the realm of the state for the time being. By 1992, out-
contracting of screening operations eventually became a legal option, but it was only in 1995 
that screening operations were eventually carried out by a private security company for the 
first time, with the airports of Stuttgart and Hamburg being the frontrunners for this new 
mode of security governance. The choice of out-contracting over outsourcing has prevented 
a complete turn towards privatization, though, and has led to the principal/agent setup still in 
place today. 
Since then, out-contracting of checkpoint operations has become a standard procedure at 
German airports, the renewed legal framework for which is provided by the Federal Aviation 
Act (“Luftsicherheitsgesetz”, LuftSiG, 2005). According to §5, the Federal Police 
(“Bundespolizei”) is in charge of screening operations at most German airports.11 However, 
the police as security provider are entitled to out-contract most of their actual tasks, as long 
as they retain a supervisory status at the checkpoint (LuftSiG, 2005: §5). Thus, with the 
                                                     
11 Due to the federal organization of the German state, in some cases state or local police authorities are 
assigned with this task (Giemulla and Rothe, 2008). At Munich airport, for instance, the Bavarian State 
Police (“Bayrische Landespolizei”) is in charge of the screening operations. 
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exception of core statutory powers such as identifying or detaining individuals, private 
companies are eligible to execute what might be described as ‘police work light’. Or, in 
concrete terms: searching passengers and carry-on luggage for dangerous and forbidden 
objects, but referring to the actual police in case further action has to be undertaken. The role 
of private security companies in this relationship might thus also be compared to ‘deputy 
sheriffs’. As one interviewee put it: “We are just the first wave. We detect, and then we notify. 
That’s it. The very moment a conflict arises, problems occur, we pass the torch. That’s a matter 
for state authority then, that’s what we have it for” (9 June 2011). Osborne and Gaebler (1993) 
have famously described such constellations as “steering/rowing”, with the state steering at 
a distance while the rowing work is executed by other (private) agencies.  
In terms of the quality of policing, Hainmüller and Lemnitzer (2003: 22) have argued that in 
such principal/agent relationships, the provision of security performs considerably higher than 
in genuine privatization environments, as “due to the right institutional incentive structure 
(rigid monitoring and powerful sanctioning), the regime is still compatible with the security 
goal.” In their analysis of German airport security, they thus come to the conclusion that 
Europeans fly particularly safe, especially compared with the US system before the federal 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was founded as an institutionalized reaction to 
9/11. However, while there are good arguments for the performance of principal/agent setups 
on the theoretical level, this paper claims that on the empirical level, quite the opposite can 
be found. Considerable problems emerge from the practice of out-contracting that might 
eventually render the human factor – arguably the weakest link in the socio-technical 
assemblage of airport security – even weaker. Following an analytical agenda of new political 
economy, those problems can be located along the interlinked dimensions of the economic 
and the political. The former, as will be argued, triggers a causal chain of high competition and 
ensuing low wages in the private security sector, leading to an inadequate pool of workforce, 
high turnover and subsequently little long-time expertise. Arguably, this is also the reason why 
job training for screening duties at the airport is kept to a minimum. Along the latter 
dimension unfolds a number of issues related to democratic legitimization and accountability. 
With practices of out-contracting, responsibility for security breaches is relocated to the 
individual level, where it can be retraced to the failure of particular screening agents, and 
further reinforces pressure on an underpaid workforce. Thus, political and economic contexts 
combined appear to stand in stark contrast to the provision of security as a public good and 
provide adequate reason to question the current governance of airport security in 
principal/agent setups. 
 
Economic trigger, causal chain 
Due to legal provisions, the Federal Police are obliged to invite tenders for screening contracts 
every five years. Bids from private companies have to include, among others, concepts for job 
training, implementation, quality control, networks and communication. However, as one 
representative from a private security firm clearly puts it, “the price is a killer criterion” (8 
November 2012). Moreover, not the Federal Police themselves are in charge of the decision 
which private company might be best suited for the job, but the decision lies within a federal 
procurement office which, due to the lack of expertise in the field of security, is likely to judge 
by the solid number that is the overall price for the offered service provisions. In fact, as 
admitted by several interviewees, other factors will regularly be trumped by budget 
arguments and the contract will eventually be awarded to the lowest bid. And while this 
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market-based mode of price regulation might in economic theory indeed lead to more cost-
effective services, the private security sector tends to struggle within such a highly competitive 
environment. After all, the provision of security remains a high-reliability task that requires 
adequate resources. However, price dumping has evolved as a common strategy, sometimes 
deliberately used to break open new business opportunities. As argued by a representative 
from a private firm: “You can always say: OK, we really want this contract, this is a matter of 
prestige. And then you say: OK, then in this case we won’t make a profit, but we will accept a 
loss” (8 November 2012). Those factors combined have on the one hand led to a considerable 
number of bankruptcies, and on the other hand have severely affected the image of the 
private security sector. Said one respondent: “Quality is expensive, and we all know that this 
is true for security and security firms. But one also has to say that at least in part this is the 
private companies’ own fault. They have ruined their reputation in the context of public 
tenders and dumping offers” (8 November 2012). 
Just as well, this negative image is due to the low wages in the private security sector. 
Interviewees unanimously stated that staff expenses are the most effective adjustment in 
order to be able to compete in aggressive bidding environments. As one interviewee pointed 
out: “To be fair, one has to admit that this is a sector that does not pay well. In my opinion, 
there is a clear discrepancy between job specifications and payment. I find this quite 
remarkable, I mean the employees are really struggling to maintain a regular standard, 
financially speaking” (31 May 2011). Certainly, not all private firms are willing to cut even 
deeper into the expenses for their workforce, but even those who refuse to do so have to 
admit that their wages are comparably low. Said one executive from a private security 
company: “There are a lot of tenders where we have to admit that we are too expensive. But 
I mean, you can’t really save money by cutting costs for personnel. They have to live off of 
something, and they are not well paid anyway. If you cut into that – that is just impossible” (8 
November 2012). This spill-over of market rationalities into the security domain has been 
criticized both from organizational and normative angles. The normative claim here goes 
beyond the standard argument for adequate pay and working conditions. Alongside 
privatization and out-contracting runs a particular mode of shifting responsibilities “to a newly 
constituted, insecure working population and, in so doing, to externalize the risks associated 
with changing market demands and unstable future funding levels” (Lippert and O'Connor, 
2003: 340). In case of a security breach (either a real one, or as part of a “real test” carried out 
by the Federal Police), individual responsibilities are in fact retraced to the individual screening 
agents in duty at the point in time, and disciplinary consequences range from additional 
training up to termination of the contract. This rather political question of democratic 
legitimation of security provision and accountability of private companies will be taken up 
again in the next section. 
But considerable critique has also been uttered from an organizational perspective. While 
“contracting can work well when there are organizations skilled in providing the services 
needed” (Frederickson and LaPorte, 2002: 39), this particular skill largely depends on available 
financial and human resources (Frederickson and LaPorte, 2002: 36). As has been shown, 
bidding practices put considerable constraints on the availability of sufficient financial 
resources. From there, a direct link can be drawn to an apparent lack of adequate human 
resources in airport security. As one respondent pointed out: “Who applies for those jobs 
anyway? Half of the employees in the security sector comes straight from the employment 
office. That shows the level which we operate on” (8 November 2012). And while from former 
unemployment no lesser job performance can be extrapolated, such arguments have been 
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put forward during several interviews. Moreover, this particular characteristic has arguably 
been reinforced by the mode of job training within German airport security. Screening agents 
(“Luftsicherheitsassistenten”) are not required to complete a regular two or three year job 
training, as is the case for many other professions in Germany. On the contrary, their training 
is provided by a mere multi-week training course with an overall volume of 160 hours. The 
training course framework and its contents are determined by the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, but the actual training courses are carried out by the private firms – and this is what 
makes them a popular target for the employment offices. Low level qualification requirements 
and in-house training qualifies the private security sector as a fashionable opportunity for the 
state to attract and retain citizens in employment.  
Thus, formerly unemployed applicants for screening duties at the airport receive considerable 
financial support from the employment offices – which is paid directly to the private security 
firm. Said one executive from a private company: “Those are the candidates they send to us 
for applications. And in order to ensure that we accept them, the employment office lures us 
into it by paying for the job training” (6 June 2011). One might indeed be inclined to say that 
those are not the best starting grounds to obtain a qualified and motivated workforce. As 
another executive added, “payment takes care of the rest. With this level of wages you only 
attract certain levels of society” (4 December 2012). Thus, working conditions and low wages 
in the security sector considerably reduce the pool of potential employees and arguably 
impact the quality of security service provision. As admitted by a private firm executive: “It is 
difficult to make a general statement here, but one can observe that the quality of the 
employees has not been increasing over the last couple years, but rather decreasing” (4 
December 2012). After all, as Lippert and O’Connor (2003: 339) emphasize, “one can cost-cut 
and downsize only so far; beyond a certain point, organizations fail to produce or perform 
service functions.” 
Or so the common argument goes, at least. But do underpaid employees necessarily produce 
lesser performance results? It would in fact appear short-sighted to equate inadequate 
working conditions and payment with inadequate quality of security. As one interviewee 
points out: “I believe a screening agent is an expert for their job, and that is to produce 
security. And I would claim that they know how to handle their tasks, and that they handle 
them well, and that there is no reason to believe that the same screening agent would do a 
better job if they were employed by the state” (20 December 2012). This is obviously a valid 
objection. The initial problem of supposed low levels of service becomes clearer, though, 
when looking at the level of staff turnover the private security sector has to cope with. For the 
Canadian context, Lippert and O’Connor (2003: 343) have pointed out extremely high turnover 
rates in out-contracted airport security screening between 121 and 300 percent per year, and 
numbers for the US context vary from an annual average of 126 percent up to peaks of 416 
percent at single airports (Seidenstat, 2004: 281). The reasons for this level of turnover 
arguably lie in structural limitations of the sector, such as “little chance for improvement, lack 
of adequate training, tedious and boring work, and other job-related factors” (Seidenstat, 
2004: 281), that put severe constraints on long-term career perspectives within airport 
security. Not surprisingly, interviewees have repeatedly pointed out that many employees 
merely view a job in the private security sector as a short-term, transitory option. As one 
respondent framed it: “Today, within private security companies, we have a lot of people, 
especially those who came from the employment offices, who are really glad to have a job 
again. But the minute they can find something better, they will be gone in the blink of an eye. 
That means you’ll have a high level of turnover. And that is not to say that turnover is high 
Leese – On security, once more 
119 
 
because people don’t like the job. On the contrary, many do like the job, and the flexible 
working hours – a lot of them actually do like working shifts – but they can just step up 
financially after two or three years, and they take that opportunity. As a consequence, within 
the private security sector, you merely have anyone who sees the job as a long-term career 
path and carries it out for longer than five years. Thus, you are stuck in a tread-mill and this 
creates a whole new level of training expenses, because you constantly have to train new 
people” (8 November 2012). Arguably, this is a major reason why the required job training for 
screening tasks at the airport contains a mere 160 hours. Turnover transforms the sector into 
a steam machine that constantly needs new fodder in order to maintain its operability. On the 
downside, however, the ensuing lack of adequate training raises major concerns. As one 
expert put it: “It’s an extremely responsible job that demands a lot from the employees, also 
in terms of concentration and thoughtfulness. It’s more or less a short-term training course 
job, although with an exam at the end. But with one month of job training, I’d be let loose on 
mankind in order to produce security for thousands of passengers” (6 June 2011). 
This quote fairly summarizes the multiple dilemmas private security providers at the airport 
appear to be stuck in. They have been reconstructed as a causal chain that had been triggered 
by the liberalization of the European aviation sector in the 1990s. Alongside the 
commodification of airports themselves and their ongoing transformation into global 
shopping malls with terminals attached to them, the provision of security appears to have 
suffered from such an approach. This is not to say that the current system would not work – 
but despite being kept on a short leash in the current principal/agent setup, private security 
is generally regarded to be more prone to operational failure due to budget constraints, even 
when under a managerial supervision. Thus, the economic context of the analysis appears 
rather bleak. However, as pointed out, such a one-sided analysis appears hardly adequate to 
the complex set of questions that emerges from structures of security governance along the 
public-private continuum. As Salter (2008a: 23) emphasizes, it is important to “measure not 
simply the economics or business cases but also the democratic and social implications of new 
modes of control and facilitation.” Or, as Loader (1997: 386) states, the organizational flaws 
pointed out in this section might indeed be overshadowed by a “wider, more diffuse unease 
about permitting market imperatives to determine the distribution and accountability of 
policing and security.” Thus, the next section addresses questions of political rationalities, 
dealing with issues of security as a public good, democratic legitimization and the relocation 
of responsibilities into the realm of the individual. 
 
The political context and the public good 
Large parts of the debates in security governance are concerned with questions of 
transformation processes and actor cooperation in policing. Within this context, several 
authors have pointed to a general uneasiness with security provision that is regulated within 
a purely economic mode (Loader, 1997; Loader and Walker, 2006; Zedner, 2006a). In a 
normative reading of security as a public good, indeed “there is something about security that 
means its provision cannot simply be left to the unfettered market” (Loader, 1997: 383). With 
security being a good that benefits society as a whole as much as its individual members, its 
provision then becomes connected to the overarching societal framework and subsequently 
to questions of political legitimacy and the state. Public authorities as agencies of the state 
are not bound by the constraints of an economic agenda that would distract them from 
security tasks – at least in an ideal world. But as has been shown, finite financial resources 
Leese – On security, once more 
120 
 
have been the very cause for the state to out-contract security provision at the airport and to 
become a consumer rather than a producer itself. Thus, what are the consequences of 
different actors carrying out classical police tasks? Arguably, the difference can be found in 
distinct modes of accountability – not so much in legal terms, but in terms of direct 
legitimation of public authorities and the lack thereof in the private sector. 
As pointed out by Shearing and Wood  (2003a: 216), “those who ‘act publicly’ act in ways that 
are accountable. In this vein, ‘private acts’ do not call for accounts or justifications of past 
actions. This is so because private actions are seen as furthering private interests, and as such 
are not usually a public matter.” The state, and subsequently its institutions – in this case the 
Federal Police – are expected to operate strictly alongside their pre-determined and 
transparent agenda. The police are to provide security. And if they fail to do so, they must 
present themselves accountable towards the citizens. What we find in this ideal typical 
connection is a direct link to citizenship and its role in the constitution of the state and the 
public sphere. However, recalling the notion of denizenship introduced earlier, individuals 
today are rendered subjects of changing forms of security governance that depend on the 
respective spatial context. As will be argued, the particular mode of out-contracting at German 
airports re-locates responsibilities and accountability not only into the realm of private firms, 
but eventually even into the realm of the individual. Thus, while private security providers at 
the airport find themselves confronted with very limited possibilities of flexibly managing their 
workload due to strict contractual requirements, the Federal Police themselves have 
withdrawn from being responsible for actual concrete security breaches. 
The deputy status of private security firms in the principal/agent setting at the airport is 
institutionalized in a hierarchical order. The Federal Police not only remain in charge of all 
statutory powers and critical decisions, but even become involved in the private firms’ internal 
organizational processes. What Hainmüller and Lemnitzer (2003: 12) have called a “rigorous 
institutional straightjacket” goes in fact as far as setting up work schedules for the private 
screening agents. Said one representative: “The private firms don’t have any choices in the 
organization of screening operations. They have to meet the exact requirements of their 
customers. Everything is regulated so specifically that the only thing open for decision remains 
the color of the uniform and the tie. Everything else is determined from the customer’s side. 
This means very little flexibility for managing work schedules” (4 December 2012). This critical 
stance mirrors the top-down hierarchy that is being exercised within airport security. One 
expert indeed went as far as to claim that this hierarchy was a legal misconstruction: “There 
is a construction flaw in paragraph five of the aviation security act. The flaw is that the Federal 
Police have the operative responsibility. […] They in fact run the private security company, 
arrange work schedules, assess the strengths of the employees and so on, although they lack 
the expertise for this task” (8 November 2012). 
Police work, as Ericson (1994) has pointed out, consists for a large part of the management 
and distribution of expertise and knowledge. However in the case of airport security, this 
knowledge is neither adequately transferred to the private sector during job training, which is 
set up by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, nor does it (positively) impact the everyday work 
of private screening agents. In a regular screening operations setup, only few Federal Police 
officers are physically present at the far side of the checkpoint, and are to be called upon in 
case conflict arises and their statutory powers become necessary. Apart from that, the role of 
the Federal Police is pretty much reduced to organizational tasks – for which, in contrast to 
actual policing, they have little skills. This fall in fact in line with Loader’s (1999: 375) analysis 
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of increasing police “managerialism”, only that the shift towards more business-like structures 
in this case does not target the internal structure of the police organization itself, but rather 
the internal structure of the private security provider. Organizational intervention is not the 
only impact of the police on the private sector, however. In order to exercise quality control, 
a system of audits has been established to ensure that contractual obligations are adequately 
executed. Said one interviewee: “Those processes are audited on a regular basis. And after 
each audit we can see that the screw has been severely tightened. This goes on and on in 
waves” (20 December 2012). Within highly commodified and privatized environments such as 
airports, audits enact an important function as numeric and quantified interfaces between the 
public and the private sphere. As Shearing and Wood (2003a: 216) have noted, the “audit as 
a technology has also been associated with the rise of ‘business planning’ processes, where 
devolved state authorities and providers set targets and render themselves accountable, in a 
future-oriented manner, for achieving these targets.” 
Thus, instead of the original chain of accountability that runs from the public authority to the 
citizen, out-contracting has added another layer. The chain now involves a series of accounts 
from the private firm to the public authority and from there to the (temporary) denizen. 
However, when looking more closely into how private security companies are managed by the 
Federal Police, it becomes clear that there is yet another layer to be found: individual 
responsibility. Apart from regular audits, the Federal Police also carry out so-called real tests, 
in which unknown persons, equipped with dangerous and forbidden objects, are sent through 
the checkpoint in order to determine whether they would be detected or not. As indicated 
above, consequences in the case of such a virtual security breach are severe. And more 
particularly: they are individual. Said one interviewee: “Real tests put the employees under a 
certain pressure that they are always attentive and always have to be attentive. Because they 
always have to reckon with somebody who carries something. That is the reality, after all. 
Whether this measure is appropriate, that is open for dispute. But tests are conducted on a 
regular basis, and then you have external people who carry something and hopefully they will 
be detected. […] And if they are not detected, we are obviously notified. As soon as one object 
is not detected, the employee has to undergo additional training. […] Then there will be a 
report, saying employee X has missed this or that” (8 November 2012). To clarify the 
dimensions of individual responsibilities, Salter (2007: 56) has pointed out that a screening 
agent at middle-size Ottawa airport in Canada carries out more than a million security 
decisions per year. And each one is a potential real threat as well as a potential test that enacts 
quality control on the individual level. Thus, a large amount of pressure is being put on the 
individual employee. Arguably, this pressure does not exactly contribute to enhanced working 
conditions. 
The political rationale behind the out-contracting of security provision at the airport has not 
exclusively driven by the desire to cut costs, but arguably also by a desire to introduce 
additional layers into the once direct accountability of police work towards the citizen. In case 
of a security breach, blame is unloaded on the individual screening agent, and to its private 
employer that has failed to comply with contractual obligations. Only after those two layers 
have considerably dampened the harm of the possibly severe consequences that an attack on 
the target of aviation can carry for international security, the police retain a mere symbolic 
form of accountability. Framed in Osborne and Gaebler’s (1993) terms: when steering to port, 
but the rowers turn to starboard instead, auditing mechanisms might have been insufficient 
and the organizational screws might not have been tight enough. The crucial point, however, 
is that the Federal Police have abandoned their core task of policing in favor of managing along 
Leese – On security, once more 
122 
 
a neo-liberal agenda that has freed them both from budget constraints and from the chores 
of actually producing security. However, as has been pointed out throughout the analytic 
account of security governance, this conceptual turn has come with a price tag. Negative 
consequences have become imposed on an underpaid, undervalued workforce, and 
ultimately on security as a common good itself.  
 
Conclusions: “more state, please”? 
This paper has located German airport security among the public/private continuum of 
security governance, analyzing how both political and economic rationalities have been 
combined into a principal/agent setup that frees the state from monetary and democratic 
pressures. Public tenders and ensuing bidding practices have in fact created severe financial 
constraints for the private security companies that carry out screening tasks, while on the 
political level, the accountability chain towards the citizen has been transformed and 
prolonged, adding additional layers to the link between denizens and airport security. And 
while the state from a formal perspective indeed remains the anchor in the principal/agent 
setup, the question arises whether the anchor has deliberately closed its eyes? Despite 
retaining supervisory status in the actual operation of the checkpoint, the Federal Police have 
not only out-contracted the rowing, but have out-contracted all the chores of having to deal 
with job training, working conditions and staff turnover. And more importantly, out-
contracting, while originally conceptualized as a policy tool for money-saving, has put severe 
financial constraints on the provision of security. Thus, which conclusions can be drawn from 
the empirical analysis? The German principal/agent model appears to be stuck between the 
notion of the state as the principal security provider and the commitment to fully-fledged 
privatization. At the same time, this particular setup seems not to solve the initial problems 
considerably well, but rather produces new problems. On the one hand, the state and its 
authorities have (deliberately) lost their direct accountability, and on the other hand, 
organizational constraints effectively hinder the unfolding of market self-regulation, as could 
be expected from true privatization. 
What to make from this rather harsh judgment, then? Facing the choice of whether leaving 
the provision of security to the unfettered forces of the market, or whether re-locating it back 
within the realm of the state, the latter option appears the morally right one. The state within 
airport security might indeed be better suited as a true normative anchor than as the 
organizational anchor in the current principal/agent setup. As a directly legitimized “necessary 
virtue” (Loader and Walker, 2006), public authorities have the capabilities to not only remedy 
unease towards market imperatives of security provision that do not necessarily represent the 
public interest (Loader, 1999), but also possess the capabilities to fix the apparent 
shortcomings of the current setup. The analysis along the trajectories of the connected 
contexts of the political and the economic has shown that the “question of whether any 
substantial transfer of authority to the private sector should be permitted without adequate 
safeguards for public protection” (Zedner, 2006a: 273) in the case of airport security should 
indeed rather be answered with a ‘no’.  
In conducting an analysis of the organizational shortcomings deriving from the 
implementation of economic rationalities into the policing of German airports, the economic 
agenda itself then can “be used to indicate what sacrifice would have to be incurred, in terms 
of aggregate social welfare, in order to achieve the given distributional objective” (Ogus, 2004: 
35), and thus complements a normative argument that unfolds along the re-location of 
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accountability for security provisions and the failure thereof into the realm of the private and 
the individual. Or, as Dupont (2006: 104) has framed it, “the power struggles and corporatist 
interests that fuel them contribute little to the optimization of security as a public or common 
good.” Reading security as a public good that benefits all members of society might in fact also 
require the commitment to carry a heavy workload for the realization of that goal. In other 
terms, it might mean that the state and its institutions would be obliged to row themselves, 
instead of just using the metaphorical microphone to shout out to the private security sector 
and tell an insecure workforce in which direction and how fast they are to row. To conclude 
with the now famous claim by Loader and Walker (2006: 167): “the state’s place in producing 
the public good of security is both necessary and virtuous.” 
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[Inquiry 6]  
The new profiling: algorithms, black boxes, and the failure of anti-discriminatory 
safeguards in the EU 
 
Data-driven analytics as a new practice of knowledge creation are on the rise – and not only 
in economic contexts. Reinforcing a general tendency of post-9/11 security policy making, the 
EU has recently fostered trends in intelligence collection, analytics and predictive data mining. 
The Stockholm Programme as the Council framework for the period of 2010-2014 formulates 
clear goals for “upgrading the tools for the job” in terms of data sharing and interoperability 
of databases in order to better enable law enforcement agencies to tackle terrorism and 
serious crime (European Council, 2010: 18-9). This trend has led to an increasing number of 
policy initiatives related to large amounts of information and the governance of future 
contingencies. As Geyer (2008: 1) summarizes the ongoing developments, “new ideas and 
proposals intending to allow public authorities to gather, store, process and exchange an 
increasing amount of personal data are being brought forward in high numbers and with 
increasing frequency.” European systems like the Schengen Information System (SIS I + II), the 
Visa Information System (VIS), and the pending EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive 
seek to collect and combine large amounts of personal information from mobile populations 
in order to scrutinize and assess the individual and the risk it possibly poses. Thus, data is 
rendered as a major asset in the fight against terrorism and transnational crime. The use of 
risk as a means for making the future actionable in terms of security governance has in fact 
become a rather ubiquitous measure, targeting wide-spread areas like insurance (Lobo-
Guerrero, 2011), the financial system (de Goede, 2008b), border control (Amoore, 2006; 
Muller, 2009; Salter, 2004), catastrophe and disaster management (Anderson and Adey, 2012; 
Martin and Simon, 2008) and large-scale events (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012), as well as 
international transportation (Lyon, 2006a; O'Malley, 2006; Salter, 2008e). However, a series 
of questions emerges from the notion of risk and anticipatory governance. As Anderson 
(2010a: 778) puts it: “how is ‘the future’ being related to, how are futures known and rendered 
actionable to thereafter be acted upon, and what political and ethical consequences follow 
from acting in the present on the basis of the future?” 
This paper engages with the still pending EU PNR Directive that is set to be one of the 
cornerstone policy tools of the Stockholm Programme. The system envisages, among other 
things, to make use of passenger data as a means to create new criteria for the identification 
of terrorist and transnational criminals and thus serves here as an empirical example for 
broader shifts in knowledge creation that the paper looks into more closely. Distinguishing 
between traditional profiling that performs confirmatory structure testing operations 
(‘deduction’), and new and data-driven forms of profiling as a way of structure exploration 
and knowledge generation (‘induction’) (Anrig et al., 2008: 66), it will be analyzed how 
different modes of scrutinizing mobile populations enact distinct modes of governing. It will 
then be shown how these modes are reflected in the so-called “real-time” and “pro-active” 
approaches to processing PNR data (COM(2011) 32 final: 3-4). While “real-time” use 
essentially enacts traditional profiling practices, the “pro-active” concept, as detailed in the 
proposal, explicitly aims at “analysing PNR data for the purpose of updating or creating new 
criteria for carrying out assessments” (Art. 4, 2(d)), thus establishing the prerequisites for 
making sense of large amounts of information via algorithmic exploitation and the data-driven 
creation of profiles as temporary hypotheses (Hildebrandt, 2008: 18). Connecting the findings 
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to Foucauldian thought on modes of governance eventually enables the analysis to 
demonstrate how new modes of knowledge creation impact the re-assembling of elements 
within apparatuses of security, empowering temporary and ‘mobile’ hypotheses of suspicion 
and at the same time disabling static types of anti-discriminatory legal instruments. 
Most scholars that engage with PNR data concentrate on issues of privacy and data protection 
(de Hert and Bellanova, 2011; Bellanova and Duez, 2012; Bennett, 2005). However, with 
respect to security, governance based on algorithmic analytics raises a number of issues that 
are seldom addressed by the social sciences. Excellent contributions to understanding 
profiling often remain on a theoretical level (de Vries, 2010; Rouvroy, 2013), tackle legal issues 
(Brownsword, 2008; Zarsky, 2011) or shed light on commercial sector practices (Gandy, 1993; 
Gandy, 2010; Cheney-Lippold, 2011). This paper thus seeks to re-connect theoretical insights 
into profiling with empirical evidence from EU security policy making and thereby to offer a 
conceptualization of the changing landscape of security governance. It concludes that with 
the ongoing emergence of data-driven profiling, the legal toolbox of the anti-discrimination 
framework suffers an increasing ineffectiveness. Due to dynamic algorithmic systems, possible 
cases of discrimination will be less visible and traceable, leading to diminishing accountability. 
 
Aviation, risk, and PNR data 
The aviation sector has been framed as a particularly perfect fit for anticipatory governance, 
both for its highly symbolic role in the attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, and for 
the applicability of the concept of risk in checkpoint-centered screening operations (Leese, 
2013). In the spatial bottle-neck of the checkpoint, the passenger flow becomes slowed down 
for the purpose of thorough scrutiny and access regulation to the secured sectors of the 
airport (Jones, 2009). The deployment of risk profiling in this context promises to enact 
preemption in terms of re-allocating screening resources to ‘risky’ individuals, while 
facilitating travel for low-risk profiles, and at the same time increasing cost-effectiveness 
(McLay et al., 2010). Specifically in aviation, screening policies necessarily must aim at 
minimizing Type II errors (false negatives), as an individual that was incorrectly assessed as 
harmless while being a potential offender poses the worst-case scenario and could cause 
devastating harm. Thus, risk assessment at the airport must be very rigid and is subsequently 
prone to produce exceptionally high numbers of Type I errors (false positives). This caveat is 
also referred to as the base-rate fallacy problem of security measures that have to deal with 
an overwhelming majority of ‘normal’ cases and therefore are not resource-effective 
(Cavusoglu et al., 2010). However, there are a number of real-life consequences for being 
incorrectly flagged as a high-risk individual in security regimes, resulting in intensified and 
potentially invasive control at all stages of mobility. Contextual factors in security operations 
moreover amplify the chances of being singled out from the passenger flow and being further 
scrutinized, both due to time constraints on the practical level and a dichotomous logic of 
suspicion/non-suspicion in security screening. 
Yet still, on several recent occasions, representatives from the aviation sector have called for 
more risk-oriented security policies, as for instance during the EC’s High Level Conference on 
“Protecting Civil Aviation Against Terrorism”12 (European Commission, 2011c) and the ICAO’s 
(International Civil Aviation Organization) High Level Conference on Aviation Security13 (ICAO, 
                                                     
12 Brussels, 27 September 2011. 
13 Montréal, 12-14 September 2012. 
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2012). From an industry point of view, both the International Air Transport Association (IATA, 
2011) and a joint venture of the Airports Council International and the Association of European 
Airlines (ACI/AEA, 2011) have presented concepts that seek to translate advanced passenger 
profiling into concrete screening procedures. Moreover, the aviation sector remains a key 
topic on the current political security agenda. Being mandated by the Stockholm Programme 
(European Council, 2010: 19), the establishment of a European PNR system is regarded one of 
the most important policy tools in fighting terrorism and transnational crime to be 
implemented until 2014.  
Such an EU PNR system has a long history by now, and its status remains unresolved for the 
time being. The Commission’s original proposal from 2007 (COM(2007) 654 final), already 
agreed upon by the Council, had been thwarted by the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty 
and the ensuing Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 December 2009, 
resulting in the dissolution of the pillar structure. However, as PNR data was considered a 
major factor in providing much-needed information for fighting terrorism and serious crime 
as well as for border control and migration issues, the Commission presented a new proposal 
on 2 February 2011 (COM(2011) 32 final). On 23 April 2012, the Council also presented a 
further advanced proposal (8916/12). The Commission’s proposal was eventually forwarded 
to the Civil Liberties Committee (LIBE), which rejected it with a vote of 30 to 25 on 24 April 
2013.14 Despite this rejection, however, the Commission quickly pointed out that the vote was 
merely a committee vote, and that adoption of the proposal still remains high on the agenda, 
as it is considered extremely important and urgent.15 The fact that an European PNR system 
is regarded as one of the core policy tools in the Stockholm Programme, as well as the 
persistence of the Commission with regard to the proposal render it possible that a (revised) 
version of the proposal could be decided upon in a plenary vote in the Parliament, thus 
increasing the chances for an adoption. In any case, it appears likely that the plans for such an 
EU PNR system will not be crossed off the agenda easily. 
What makes PNR data so valuable, then? Originally used for the commercial purposes of 
airlines, PNR files contain large amounts of data that are obtained automatically during 
booking, reservation and check-in – for instance the name of the passenger and their address 
and full contact information, forms of payment including credit card information and billing 
address, the complete travel itinerary and the travel status as well as frequent flyer 
information (Council of the European Union, 2012: Annex II). Thus, almost naturally, PNR data 
has drawn interest from public authorities. As de Hert and Bellanova (2011: 4) state, being 
“one of the most detailed and personal data sources, it has gained enormous symbolic and 
practical significance in the debate about data sharing, and has been the subject of several 
international agreements, national measures, political and institutional clashes, as well as 
strong academic interest.” In fact, PNR data as such have been collected by air carriers for 
handling bookings, flights and consumer information long before the first EU PNR agreement 
with the US on 28 May 2004 (with subsequent agreements in 2007 and 2011) has turned the 
data into a resource for security operations by the US Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), and has made PNR data the topic of broader public discussions. The European PNR 
Directive, similar to the EU-US agreement, is set to cover all flights from the EU to third 
countries and vice versa, possibly leaving member states with the option of an additional opt-
                                                     
14 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130422IPR07523/html/Civil-Liberties-
Committee-rejects-EU-Passenger-Name-Record-proposal (accessed 7 July 2014). 
15 http://euobserver.com/justice/119926 (accessed 7 July 2014). 
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in to obtain passenger data from all intra-EU flights (Council of the European Union, 2012: 2). 
The PNR data would then be collected by “Passenger Information Units” in the Member State 
of the origin or destination of the flight (Art. 4, 1) and be processed “against pre-determined 
criteria” (Art. 4, 2(a)), “against relevant databases, including international or national 
databases or national mirrors of Union databases” (Art. 4, 2(b)), “on a cases-by-case basis, to 
duly reasoned requests from competent authorities” (Art. 4, 2(c)), as well as “for the purpose 
of updating or creating new criteria for carrying out assessments” (Art. 4, 2(d)). The results of 
the processing would then be transferred to the defined competent authorities of the relevant 
Member States, and possibly on a case-by-case basis even to third countries (Art. 8). Data 
would be retained for a period of 30 days, but in an anonymized fashion for an additional five 
years, explicitly for purposes of the pro-active creation of new assessment criteria as defined 
in Art. 4, 2(d). This explicit scope highlights the significance of PNR data for new modes of 
data-driven profiling.  
 
Theorizing profiling 
Profiling is a powerful technique, and currently it experiences major changes that are related 
to the way in which knowledge about populations and futures is created. In post-9/11 security 
regimes, the efforts of policy makers to capture the future and fold it back into the present in 
order to render it actionable have reached new heights. The struggle with contingency and 
uncertainty in the ‘war on terror’ has been expressed in former US Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld’s statement about “unknown unknowns” in a speech at the NATO 
headquarters on 6 June 2002.16 Dealing with the unpredictability of low-probability but high-
impact events like terrorist attacks (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 93), security agencies 
strive to get a grip of possible futures in order to mitigate the probabilities of the occurrence 
of events. The commodification of uncertainty as risk has been a key step of establishing such 
agency, even if there is no presumed calculability in the first place. As Beck (2002: 40) puts it: 
“As soon as we speak in terms of ‘risk’, we are talking about calculating the incalculable, 
colonizing the future.” Such efforts to calculate what cannot be calculated have led to the 
notion of a risk society that makes use of anticipatory governance in order to “feign control 
over the uncontrollable” (Beck, 2002: 41). This pretense of real power over future 
contingencies, yet ontologically still grounded in the assumption that the world can be 
objectified, measured and calculated, has produced different modes of governing that 
considerably exceed the original notion of risk in an epistemological sense. 
Ewald (2002) has retraced a genealogy of risk modes that proceeds from providence to 
prevention and eventually to precaution, and points out that the latter, in the vein of 
Rumsfeld’s epistemological struggles, “bears witness to a deeply disturbed relationship with 
a science that is consulted less for the knowledge it offers that for the doubt it insinuates” 
(Ewald, 2002: 274). Precaution embraces contingency by moving beyond risk as a calculable 
objectification, however it appears still grounded in the assumption that the threat can 
somehow be known or experienced, even if it remains unclear what exactly it is and how it 
can be tackled. Such a notion of precaution stems from its origins in environmental protection 
(Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Beck, 2002). Anderson (2010a: 792) thus adds that 
precautionary measures seek to act before an identified threat reaches a point of irreversible 
damage, and such distinguishes precaution from preemptive measures. Preemption, as it 
                                                     
16 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm (accessed 7 July 2014). 
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embodies the logics of data-driven knowledge generation, ventures even further into the 
unknown, as it not merely acknowledges the fallibility of scientific knowledge, but strives to 
act “before the formation and identification of a determinate threat” (Anderson, 2010a: 792). 
With the threat in the current EU security agenda being predominantly defined as terrorism 
and serious crime, traditional forms of profiling, so the reading I put forward here, enact a 
scientifically grounded mode of risk by running predefined terrorist/criminal profiles based on 
expert knowledge against the collected data. In the profile as such we can find no truth claim 
(in the form of scientific knowledge), but rather the establishment of possibility in the form of 
a hypothesis that builds on past experience. The underlying assumption here is that a 
passenger who embodies certain characteristics could turn out to become a threat, even if 
there is no objectified statement about the nature or likelihood of that threat. Profiling is thus 
enacted in a confirmatory or hypothesis-testing way to explore whether certain patterns of 
characteristics are represented in the analyzed population data, and if so, to put the identified 
individuals under scrutiny. In summary, the profile as the original hypothesis that provides 
grounds for further scrutiny is based on professional expertise. The new mode of data-driven 
profiling, on the other hand, so I argue, fully enacts a preemptive approach that decisively 
departs from expert knowledge and embraces the possibilities of large-scale analytics. As will 
be shown in more detail below, the construction of the profile subsequently differs 
considerably from what we find in traditional profiling practices. To be quite concise here: 
both modes construct hypotheses of suspicion on which security becomes enacted. The 
decisive difference between them, however, is that the former mode falls into the scope of 
the legal tools of the non-discrimination framework due to its static nature, while the latter 
manages to constantly escape the current regulatory regimes due to the fluidity of adaptive 
algorithms. 
As a matter of fact, confirmatory profiling practices have raised considerable critique in terms 
of social sorting or racial profiling, as pre-defined profiles can include variables like gender, 
age, nationality, religious belief, etc. (Zarsky, 2011: 297). Tsoukala (2010: 44) points out that 
with confirmatory risk profiling “the target of social control shifts from the individual offenders 
to the members of deviant, ‘risk-producing’ groups, who are controlled on the ground of being 
suspects, at the present time, and potential offenders, in the future.” In risk-based policing, it 
has been shown that certain societal subgroups have been identified as high-risk parts of the 
populations and have been repeatedly discriminated against, for instance North African 
youths in French suburbs, football supporters in the UK or Roma people in Italy (Tsoukala, 
2010: 47-8). In terms of the ‘war on terror’, the debate on post-9/11 racial profiling against 
Muslims bears witness of such discriminatory practices (Harcourt, 2007; Harris and Schneier, 
2012). Indeed, as Zedner (2006b: 426) adds, traditional profiling based on professional 
knowledge and long-term expertise is prone to oversimplification on the theoretical level. 
Profiles might be flawed with regard to apparent causalities or the neglect of conflicting 
variables. Thus, a majority of factors can contribute to the production of Type I errors and the 
high-risk flagging of innocent individuals whose personal data just by bad luck happens to 
represent what is believed to be the profile of a potential terrorist or criminal. As Pallitto and 
Heyman (2008: 321) point out, the reliance on risk in mobility tends to reinforce certain social 
categories like ‘the other’, ‘the foreign’ or ‘the desperate’, thus slowing down parts of the 
traveling population. On the other hand, “scrutiny directed at terror prevention 
(securitization) is often relaxed – when it threatens the movements of ‘kinetic elites’” (Pallitto 
and Heyman, 2008: 326-7), thus connecting economic status to enhanced mobility. And while 
Adey emphasizes that mobility has always carried a strong notion of inequality, with airports 
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being genuine “difference machines” (Adey, 2008b), “dataveillance” (Amoore and de Goede, 
2005) based on large amounts of passenger information arguably puts profiling and its 
consequences on a new structural level. In confirmatory profiling practices, the 
aforementioned caveats in the theoretical construction of profiles that are derived from 
professional knowledge and experience are prone to skew the analysis towards groups that 
become framed as more ‘risky’ than others, and thus potentially reinforce social imbalances. 
Subsequently, policy makers have been careful to implement anti-discriminatory safeguards 
into profiling regimes. 
 
Profiling and non-discrimination 
The principle of non-discrimination, also referred to as “principle of equality” or “non-
discrimination clause” (Edel, 2010: 8-9), has been expressed as one of the cornerstones values 
of the European Union. It can be found throughout all major documents that lay the 
foundation of the normative framework of the EU and a broader geographical Europe, for 
instance in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (European Union, 2000: 
Art. 21), the European Convention on Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights/Council 
of Europe, 2010: Art. 14/Art. 1 of Protocol No. 12) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (Art. 18-25). More specifically, the EU legal framework is composed of several 
Directives that implement the non-discriminatory treatment of persons, but focuses primarily 
on labor market issues (Gellert et al., 2013: 68). This rather fragmented field is set to be 
overcome by the pending Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation (European Commission, 2008). Nonetheless, the non-discrimination framework 
that is applicable in the EU as of now lays down very specific regulations that ensure equal 
treatment of individuals within its jurisdiction. The PNR proposal itself refers to several of 
those safeguards, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, but 
also the proportionality principle and the EU Data Protection framework (95/46/EC). This 
scope on both non-discrimination and data protection does not come as a surprise, as “the 
issue at stake here is the discriminatory consequences of data processing operations” (Gellert 
et al., 2013: 63). 
In order to prevent discrimination, as is being pointed out in the document, the construction 
of profiles from PNR data underlies ethical constraints, as “no such decision should 
discriminate on any grounds such as a person’s sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation” (Council of the European Union, 
2012: 8). While the effectiveness of such limitations in profiling can be challenged on the 
practical level, at least from a theoretical angle, a strong safeguard against discrimination and 
the reinforcement of social categories can be found here. Moreover, the proportionality 
principle establishes a purpose limitation for the analysis of PNR data, as “the processing of 
personal data must be proportionate to the specific security goals pursued by this Directive” 
(Council of the European Union, 2012: 7). The list of anti-discriminatory safeguards for 
profiling in the proposal is capped off by a reference to the EU Data Protection framework, 
stating that “every passenger shall have the same right to access, the right to rectification, 
erasure and blocking, the right to compensation and the right to judicial redress” (Art. 11, 1), 
thus providing a legal toolbox for the challenge of discriminatory issues on the individual level. 
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However, as will become apparent throughout the remainder of this paper, those safeguards 
only unfold their full regulatory power when applied to discrimination that arises from 
traditional practices of profiling that sort populations on the basis of pre-defined individual 
characteristics. Data-driven forms of profiling produce a distinct form of knowledge that 
appears dynamic and implicit, and thus continually escapes the scope of the regulatory legal 
regime. As a shift in the mode of data processing occurs, profiling might no longer be grasped 
by the direct and indirect anti-discriminatory approaches of the law. Or, put differently: what 
we are dealing with here appears to be a distinct, fluid mode of governing. Thus, how can we 
conceptualize new ways of knowledge construction and the ensuing consequences for 
security governance? 
 
The ‘new profiling’ as data-driven governance 
As has been pointed out above, profiling practices exceed the original logic of risk in 
epistemological terms, yet their governance rationale appears to be stuck in the ontological 
premise of an objectifiable world. Such a rift between knowledge creation and political 
practice and power, so the reading I put forward, can be best understood through a 
Foucauldian framework of governance. In fact, as Aradau and van Munster (2007: 101) claim, 
“a Foucauldian approach does not portray risks as calculable/incalculable, but rather focuses 
on ‘how’ presumably incalculable catastrophic risks like terrorism are governed”, and thus can 
provide a better understanding of the shifts in profiling, and account for their implications for 
the governing of security. In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1976-79, Foucault (2003; 
2007; 2008) has analyzed historical shifts of modes of power and governing. He claims that 
disciplinary power “breaks down individuals, places, time, movements, actions, and 
operations. It breaks them down into components such that they can be seen, on the one 
hand, and modified on the other” (Foucault, 2007: 56). It is essentially the practice that 
Haggerty and Ericson (2000) have later identified as the “surveillant assemblage” of a digitized 
era – the underlying mechanism of contemporary surveillance that disassembles individuals 
into “dividuals” (Deleuze, 1992) that consist of separate data points, in order to scrutinize, 
calculate, circulate and re-assemble them for distinct purposes. With regard to unfolding its 
normalizing power, discipline then proceeds by enforcing the disassembled individual to 
conform with a model of desired behavior and desired characteristics. As Foucault 
emphasizes, “it is not the normal and the abnormal that is fundamental and primary 
disciplinary power, it is the norm” (Foucault, 2007: 57). Norms can be considered the result of 
(informal) social negotiations, shaped by tradition and often codified in law. In the case of 
profiling, the applied norm that is determined to detect deviance is constructed ex negativo 
from what is desired. Such negative norms are profiling tools that are traditionally built on the 
“domain expertise” of security practitioners (McCue, 2007), using expert knowledge to define 
suspicious characteristics. In the PNR proposal, this practice is implemented in the presumed 
competences to “process PNR data against pre-determined criteria” (Art. 4, 2(a)). Thus, when 
a representation of the pre-defined profile is found in the database, the corresponding 
individual would be singled out from the passenger flow and further scrutinized. By setting up 
the suspicious profile as deviance from the norm, disciplinary power then ultimately forces 
the individual back into the norm in order not to pose a threat to society anymore. 
However, in his analysis of contemporary security governance, Foucault proceeds beyond 
discipline and engages with the central question of how modern apparatuses of security differ 
from sovereignty and disciplinary power. Dealing with increasing mobility and the dissolution 
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of clear (national) boundaries of the exercise of power, the Foucauldian analysis thus turns to 
new ways of governing movement. In what has been deemed as the key step towards a 
“biopolitics of security” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008), Foucault suggests that instead of 
avoiding risks, security apparatuses embrace the concept of risk and profit from the 
emergence of (advanced) statistics, thus “finding support in the reality of the phenomenon, 
and instead of trying to prevent it, making other elements of reality function in relation to it, 
in such a way that the phenomenon is canceled out” (Foucault, 2007: 59). Starting from the 
population as the reference point, ‘normality’ is no longer defined by social or legal norms, 
but by the statistical normal distribution of characteristics. Such a turn then establishes “a 
plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different curves of normality, and the operation 
of normalization consists in establishing an interplay between these different distributions of 
normality and in acting to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable” 
(Foucault, 2007: 63). In terms of Anderson’s analysis of anticipatory governance, such an 
embrace of analytics empowers new modes of risk – in this case from traditional to data-
driven modes of profiling. Concerned with the detection of threats within the population, the 
latter empowers preemptive security measures that seek to act “over threats that have not 
yet emerged as determinate threats” (Anderson, 2010a: 790). Instead of applying old forms 
of knowledge in the form of professional expertise, data-driven profiling practices then 
produce a new form of knowledge that is not scientifically grounded and upholds no truth 
claims, but that derives directly from the analyzed population data. 
Information and the ensuing intelligence have quickly become a major resource in security 
governance, as increasing availability of data as well as computational power now provide the 
possibilities to make sense of large amounts of (raw) data that had not been accessible before. 
In accordance with this trend, the eagerness to collect and combine data from mobile 
populations turns out to be a major theme in current EU efforts to fight terrorism and crime 
(Geyer, 2008). The creation of an European PNR system can be regarded as yet another 
stepping stone in the direction towards a proclaimed age of “Big Data” (Anderson, 2008; 
Manyika et al., 2011) in the security sector. Where traditional profiling meets its limits due to 
constraints in actual knowledge about terrorists and criminals, data-driven analytics go 
beyond the limits of the known and seek to unveil and rationalize the unknown. Not only do 
they seek to render the future actionable, they also promise to provide a glimpse at the future 
by creating a new and distinct form of knowledge about it. 
Although Anderson (2010a: 790) rightly notes that such preemptive practices “break with the 
logic of risk […] as ‘calculable uncertainty’ based on the induction of frequency and harm from 
the past distribution of events”, we can find a different form of ‘riskiness’ in data-driven 
profiling that comes into being via the analysis of statistical patterns. In fact we can find here 
close similarities to business models in the commercial sector. Consumer information that 
might seem irrelevant at the point of collection can now be turned into valuable knowledge 
later and in combination with other data. Put simply: the larger the database, the better the 
chances to detect patterns that reveal correlations between individual characteristics and 
consumer behavior – allowing for targeted advertising, custom-tailored services and 
individual offers. However, profiles that are produced and refined by algorithms do not only 
allow for personalization in the commercial sector, but also for preemptive practices in the 
security sector (Rouvroy, 2013). Data-driven analytics on a large-scale basis, as envisaged by 
a European PNR system, lift security practices to a new and seemingly limitless digital level 
that “involves the classification, compilation and analysis of data on, for example, passenger 
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information and financial transactions on an unprecedented scale” (Amoore and de Goede, 
2005: 151).  
The underlying rationale of such a new mode of making sense of the world culminates in the 
confidence to be able to predict security futures, as long as calculations are executed based 
on a sufficient amount of data (McCue, 2007). The mathematical ‘law of large numbers’ 
provides legitimacy for algorithmic findings in the data, which then in a second step become 
re-translated into interpretations of the real world in the form of temporary profiling 
hypotheses. As opposed to the commercial sector, the consequences of data-driven 
knowledges in security contexts can be rather serious. The identified profile still remains in 
the realm of negative evidence that necessarily has to be looked into, as it represents a 
(undefined) form of deviance. However, the re-assembly of the digitally encoded traveler 
might produce non-representational knowledge in terms of categories that do not reflect 
patterns of social reality (González Fuster et al., 2010: 2). In other words: the results could be 
rather arbitrary. The ‘profile’ then would remain an abstraction that could turn out to be a 
coincidental correlation as well as a spur of previously undetected causality. However, 
although data-driven profiles can merely serve to indicate conspicuousness, the detected 
‘suspicious’ pattern in the security context must be scrutinized closer. And while the 
conspicuousness could possibly be unmasked as the aleatory correlation pattern that it is and 
the category would not stand in court, the instant consequences are material. As time 
constraints in security operations tend to put decision-making into the realm of urgency 
(McCue, 2007), ensuing actions become encoded in a dichotomous fashion – suspicion/non-
suspicion results in scrutiny/no further scrutiny, and detention/free circulation. In this respect, 
traditional profiling and data-driven profiling do not so much differ in their consequences, as 
they both slow down mobility for the affected individuals assigned to the profile and can lead 
to intrusive secondary screening. However, as will be further shown, the two forms differ 
considerably in the mechanisms of how profiles come into being (expert knowledge vs. 
analytics) and in the targets they offer for safeguarding against discrimination (static vs. fluid).  
The analysis of data-driven profiling requires us to rethink discrimination. As shown, the logics 
of discrimination in traditional profiling follow the establishment of a causal chain between 
indicators on the theoretical level and their representation in the population under scrutiny. 
By putting restraints on the choice of available variables for the construction of the theoretical 
foundations of profiles, undesired discrimination on the basis of certain characteristics such 
as sex, race or religion, possibly might be canceled out. However, with data-driven analytics, 
this is not the case. While still starting from the notion of the individual as an information 
source, the collective level of the profile becomes more prone to the production of arbitrary 
categories instead of real communities. As such categories come into being via probabilistic 
assumptions, de Vries (2010: 81) notes that the individual is likely to be left puzzled, 
wondering “what do I have to do with the 199 hypothetically similar people who are 
terrorists? [emph. in orig.]”  
Large-scale analytics, or the “crunching of numbers” (Ayres, 2007), proclaim the triumph of 
rationalization over biased and flawed human interaction. A human operator can deliberately 
or involuntarily discriminate, but a machine is free from such bias. Its truth lies in the 
seemingly objective algorithmic calculations and the results it produces based on the available 
data. It is a different form of knowledge about the world that is being produced here, though, 
a new form of truth regime that Rouvroy (2013) calls “data behaviourism”, seeking to 
eradicate the unknown parts of the contingency equation. In terms of Beck’s (2002) “risk 
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society”, algorithmic interpretations of the world do no longer attempt to feign control over 
the future, but seek to obtain control by applying rational calculations, and thus strive to gain 
access to a reality that has been measured and framed in numeric terms. Analyzing the impact 
of such a digital encoding of the reality, Hansen and Porter (2012: 417) note that numbers can 
indeed “complement and displace linguistically articulated norms.” Equally as important for 
the understanding of the effects of data-driven profiling is that numbers can be updated and 
replaced quickly and constantly. With the constant production of data in digitized everyday 
interactions, the information stored in databases possesses a rather dynamic character. As a 
consequence, data-driven profiles are no longer static categories but a fluid phenomenon, 
coming into being as “spontaneous germinations” (Rouvroy, 2013: 146).  
For instance, profiling algorithms based on Bayesian systems can handle and process 
“continuous streams of transaction-generated information to routinely update and adjust the 
system’s assessments of risk” (Gandy, 2010: 29). As opposed to deterministic types of 
algorithms that produce the same result over and over when run against the same database 
and which are likely to struggle in complex environments (Anrig et al., 2008: 79), such learning 
systems require a certain level of training through cross-validation by a human operator. 
However, once a Bayesian network is set up, updates in the database can be analyzed and 
incorporated automatically. This fluidity signifies a major change in the conceptualization of 
profiling, as it creates only momentary groupings that might be disappearing back into the 
white noise of the database in the next moment. Often referred to as neural networks due to 
their similarities to the human brain, such systems can pose considerable hurdles in terms of 
the interpretation of results. As their internal processes remain opaque and “the information 
‘learned’ from the data is somewhat hidden in the network and cannot be used as evidence 
for the result” (Anrig et al., 2008: 78), the outputs of data-driven analytics are presented in 
simplified numeric terms or graphical representations, or they even remain completely 
removed from the realm of human readability. However, what has been deemed as the 
overcoming of human irrationality, circumventing interpretation as a source of error and 
discrimination (Zarsky, 2011), then essentially puts data-driven profiling into a black box. 
Categories then come into being as part of autonomic machine behavior, processed and 
communicated between systems that do not require human intervention (Hildebrandt, 2008). 
Thus, data-driven profiling creates a rather separate technique of governing that differs 
considerably from traditional, expertise-based ways of profiling. As outlined, distinct modes 
of anticipation result in distinct accounts of the world. Knowledge as the reference category 
for sorting flows of global mobility can either rely on actual experiences from the past or on 
the analysis of the population as the subject to be governed in the present. As suggested, the 
different modes of profiling fall well into the Foucauldian analysis of power that 
conceptualizes a series of governmental types that proceeds from sovereignty to discipline 
and then ultimately to security (Collier, 2009). The typology of profiling introduced here 
should not be mistaken as a clear-cut analytical scheme, though. On the contrary, it appears 
more appropriate to interpret the distinction between traditional and data-driven profiling as 
the construction of Weberian ideal types. The artificial super-elevation of disciplinary vs 
biopolitical modes of governing is not likely to stand in empirical analyses of security regimes 
that seldom feature clear-cut, but rather overlapping modes of governing. As Foucault himself 
clarifies, “there is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security. 
Mechanisms of security do not replace disciplinary mechanisms, which would have replaced 
juridico-legal mechanisms” (Foucault, 2007: 8). Such a conceptualization of overlapping 
modes can clearly be found in the PNR proposal, as it seeks to deploy traditional “real-time” 
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(Art. 4, 1(a)) and data-driven “pro-active” (Art. 4, 1(d)) types of profiling in a parallel fashion, 
and moreover combining them with checks against remote databases and individual in-depth 
scrutiny. As Collier (2009: 79) emphasizes, the scope should thus lie on a “‘topological’ analysis 
of power that examines how existing techniques and technologies of power are re-deployed 
and recombined in diverse assemblies of biopolitical government.” An analysis of how 
profiling practices enact power over mobile populations in the name of the ‘war on terror’ 
subsequently must not stop at defining distinct governing formations, but has to proceed 
further and look into how patterns of correlation among different forms of power assemble 
contemporary apparatuses of security (Collier, 2009: 89). Understanding the Foucauldian 
framework as a problematization of spaces of government, the mode of governing such an 
assemblage becomes clearer when “tracing the recombinatorial processes through which 
techniques and technologies are reworked and redeployed (Collier, 2009: 93). The remaining 
part of this paper thus engages with the topology created by the relationships between 
traditional and data-driven types of profiling and the ensuing consequences for the non-
discrimination framework. 
 
Out of sight, out of mind? 
Arguably, the findings so far present major challenges for anti-discriminatory safeguards. First 
of all, with the data-driven creation of ‘suspicious’ profiles, we can find a loss of traceability. 
Increasing amounts of data and computational power have enabled security practices in which 
“data mining techniques remain a technological black box for citizens” (Hildebrandt and 
Gutwirth, 2008: 367). With only machine readable outputs of neural networks, it becomes 
increasingly hard to understand, let alone challenge categories that result from data-driven 
forms of profiling. Second, and maybe more important, we can find a loss of visibility. 
Contemporary practices of collecting and processing of data tend to blend into an 
environment of ubiquitous computing or “Ambient Intelligence” (de Vries, 2010) that interacts 
with the individual on an automated and invisible basis, thus enabling practices of profiling to 
increasingly operate out of sight. As data-driven profiles produce artificial and non-
representational categories rather than actual real-life social groups, the individual is likely to 
not even notify when they become part of a ‘risky’ category. Gandy (2010: 39) thus 
emphasizes that “most of the time, persons who have been victimized by a routine system 
error will not know precisely if, when, or how they have been discriminated against.” Only 
that in the case of data-driven profiling, the occurrence of discrimination will not be based on 
a system error but on the functional logic of correlative pattern discovery. Moreover, it can 
be assumed that a large percentage of the data used for profiling is collected by the private 
sector originally for business purposes (González Fuster et al., 2010: 4) and that security 
measures are merely a form of secondary use. PNR data had been collected by airlines long 
before security agencies were drawn to this additional data source in the aftermath of 9/11. 
However, in large-scale analytics, there can by definition be no such thing as ‘secondary use’, 
as every bit of information could become valuable in the future without revealing its utility in 
the present. Only as analytics unveil what is hidden in databases can the purpose of data 
collection be defined a posterio. Here we find a serious conflict with the European data 
protection framework. Neither the proportionality principle nor purpose limitations can apply 
to the reversed logics of data-driven profiling, as both start from the assumption that the goals 
of data collection and processing are clear in advance of the actual procedure. 
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Third and finally, from the losses of traceability and visibility results a loss of accountability. 
The PNR proposal clearly states that no decision shall be based exclusively on the basis of PNR 
data, but that further investigation must undergo human review (Council of the European 
Union, 2012: 16). However, this is a deceptive safeguard, as data-driven profiling in security 
screening relies on the assumptions that all revealed patterns must necessarily be scrutinized 
in order to find out whether they pose an actual threat. But as the output of neural networks 
is most likely only machine readable, the human operator must act on the basis of the 
translation of algorithmic terms into risk levels. Thus, the real-life consequences for the 
affected individual that falls into the generated category do not vanish, nor do they become 
mitigated by human review. On the contrary, the human reviewer themselves loses true 
agency, as they only enact what algorithmic categorizations indicate. What we are facing in 
the case of inductive knowledge generation is not ‘assistance’ in decision making, but rather 
a prescription of human reviewer conduct. As Matzner (2013) points out, cognitive systems 
that are supposed to assist human operators (such as airport security systems with visual 
alerts) are based on informational accounts of the world that are inaccessible for humans (i.e., 
large-scale analytics), and thus require a certain level of ‘trust’ in the applied algorithmic 
calculations. This results in what Brey (2005: 392) calls “semi-autonomous information-
processing systems”, in which the human operator, though entitled to an autonomous 
decision, is rendered likely to comply to the truth claims of the algorithm. After all, such an 
epistemological gap appears to be “intrinsic to the expected functionality and benefits of using 
cognitive systems as assistance to human operators” (Matzner, 2013). In a crafty move, public 
authorities thus take away their own agency when it comes to the level of security measures 
that is to be applied to the members of a risk category. But as agency is re-located into the 
realm of dynamic realm of learning algorithms, neither the engineer nor the operator can 
understand or even explain why someone has been singled out for secondary screening. As 
Introna (2013) puts it, “design decisions, encoded and encapsulated in complex nests of logical 
and control statements […] enact (in millions of lines of source code) our supposed choices 
based on complex relational conditions, which after many iterations of ‘bug fixing’ and 
‘tweaking’ even the programmers no longer understand [emph. in orig.]” Consequently, 
affected individuals effectively lose their ability to challenge decisions, as the accountability 
for the creation of the profile is hidden in algorithmic processes and the population of 
travelers. 
 
Data-driven governance and non-discrimination 
Thus, assuming that apparatuses of security always possess a strategic notion (Dillon, 2010: 
63), what can we learn from the re-assembly of profiling elements on the political level? Or, 
put differently: what are the governing practices of data-driven profiling? Deploying 
professional expertise as well as generating new knowledge for the sake of the paradigm of 
free movement of the ‘good’ parts of the population, the role of the law within this 
assemblage appears to be crucial as it diminishes due to the non-applicability of its tools. We 
encounter a tension between the law and ‘normality’, as normality does no longer derive from 
a static norm but is constantly re-configured. As normality transforms into a dynamic “mobile 
norm” (Amoore, 2011), deviance from that norm becomes equally dynamic. Security 
subsequently becomes governed through mobile profiles that serve as temporary hypotheses 
of risk. Those hypotheses are not up for contest, but rather must be re-connected to the real 
world in order to cancel out the possibilistic mode of threat that is created by the algorithm. 
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As has been shown, what we can find here is a deep-seated epistemological conflict between 
an anti-discrimination framework that conceives of knowledge as the establishment of 
causality, and data-driven analytics that build fluid hypotheses on the basis of correlation 
patterns in dynamic databases. This rift eventually causes a diminishing effectiveness of the 
anti-discrimination toolbox.  
There are a number of conceptual consequences from the outlined developments. It has been 
argued that in contemporary security regimes, the individual is not the central category of 
interest anymore, but that categories are the new way to cope with ever-increasing 
complexity and large-scale databases (Rouvroy, 2013). Thus, there is a lingering question 
whether ‘profiling’ is still the right terminology for data-driven modes of knowledge 
generation, after all. As traditional profiles are being replaced by non-representative 
categories, the disciplinary obligation to adapt individual characteristics and behavior to pre-
defined norms also vanishes. Hildebrandt and Gutwirth (2008: 368) note that “citizens are 
faced with profiling practices that make it possible to control and steer individuals without a 
need to identify them”, as individuals blur into the liquidity of constantly updated databases. 
This raises the further question whether the “dream of targeted governance” (Valverde and 
Mopas, 2004) has to be reconsidered. What matters in the assessment of risk is the category, 
not the individual that falls in and out of that category. After all, the preemptive category itself 
might only be momentary, collapsing back into the informational stream as databases are 
constantly updated and thus change the population and possible patterns of correlation that 
can be found therein. As Gillespie (2014) points out, “algorithms are made and remade in 
every instance of their use because every click, every query, changes the tool incrementally.” 
Generally speaking, we might be witnessing a further disappearance of governing from the 
public realm, where it can be challenged and critiqued (Rouvroy, 2013). In security 
governance, the future must necessarily be rendered actionable by folding it back into the 
present, but the technique of folding is undergoing change as its tools are re-assembled and 
re-combined. New forms of algorithmic risk assessment remove the mechanisms of security 
governance from the eye, leaving behind a new series of hyper-rationalized discrimination 
issues (Gandy, 2010) that pose major hurdles for the legal tools of traditional anti-
discriminatory safeguards. When measured against the claims of a “Europe built on 
fundamental rights” as expressed in the Stockholm Programme, policy tools such as the 
pending EU PNR Directive present a serious challenge for the ethical principle of non-
discrimination by fostering new and data-driven forms of profiling. As is noted in the 
Stockholm Programme, “basic principles such as purpose limitation, proportionality, 
legitimacy of processing, limits on storage time, security and confidentiality as well as respect 
for the rights of the individual, control by national independent supervisory authorities, and 
access to effective judicial redress need to be ensured and a comprehensive protection 
scheme must be established” (European Council, 2010: C 115/19). However, as has been 
shown, it appears highly questionable whether these safeguards can still be effective after the 
arrival of large-scale analytics in the realm of security. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has aimed at critically engaging discriminatory pitfalls that emerge from the 
application of data-driven analytics that produce temporary ‘profile hypotheses’ for the 
purpose of governing mobile populations. It is not exactly a new insight that “profiling through 
predictive data mining is already a reality worldwide, including the European Union” (González 
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Fuster et al., 2010: 1). However, the increasing amount of security practices that rely on 
algorithmic analyses of large-scale databases poses a rather bleak outlook. In the EU, systems 
such as SIS I + II, VIS and an European PNR system have been rendered as cornerstones for 
providing European law enforcement agencies with the tools of fighting terrorism and crime 
through new forms of future-related governance. Such data-driven security practices do not 
only imply practical consequences, but relate to the theoretical framing of changing security 
regimes as well. This paper has connected Foucauldian thought of governing to emerging 
technologies and their implementation on the political level in order to outline conceptual 
consequences for the specific case of profiling and its impact on the non-discrimination 
framework. Despite a rather theoretical scope, an effort has been made to connect the 
findings with empirical evidence from the EU security policy-making process. Using the 
European PNR proposal as an example for the assembly of distinct but nonetheless related 
and overlapping modes of profiling, it has been shown how changing types of knowledge 
generation unfold a distinct mode of governing that re-assembles the relation between 
normality, deviance, and the applicability of legal tools. From the perspective of a topological 
analysis, the role of juridical elements thus seems to diminish behind the opacity of black 
boxes, within which learning algorithms remove the dichotomous categorization of 
suspicion/non-suspicion from the visible and legally governable realm of debate, challenge 
and critique. A Foucauldian lens enables us to retrace how through data-driven profiling 
practices, we are witnessing a reconfiguration of normality and deviance in the context of 
security, empowering suspicion to become mobile and ever-adaptive. 
PNR data is easily collected at all stages of a journey, covering a temporal and spatial range 
from booking and payment up to special dietary requirements during the flight. Ensuing risk-
based security governance through profiling practices that becomes enacted on the basis of 
hidden data collection is in itself rather liquid and creates the profile/category only for the 
moment of scrutiny. It becomes visible just for a short period in which a high-risk assessment, 
derived from data-driven analytics, triggers real-life consequences that slow down mobility 
and set off potentially invasive secondary screening. Aviation is but one, although maybe the 
most striking example for the use data-driven profiling based on information about mobile 
populations. However, with the envisaged interoperability of European security systems and 
databases, it is likely that new forms of knowledge generations will be found on broader levels. 
Thus, can the non-discrimination framework and data-driven profiling be reconciled such that 
legal tools can regain their effectiveness? 
With regard to the challenges of black-boxed risk assessment (and also with regard to how 
such practices transform concepts of privacy), Hildebrandt and Gutwirth (2008: 367) call for 
transparency enhancing tools in order to re-open the black boxes of algorithms and shed light 
on the mechanisms of how profiles and categories come into being. However, such an 
approach could turn out to be difficult. As Introna (2013) puts it, “the algorithm is a black box, 
which when opened simply introduces more black boxes, which when subsequently opened 
simply introduces more black boxes, and so forth.” Since questions concerning how exactly 
profiles are brought into being are seldom answered by public authorities (González Fuster et 
al., 2010: 8), reverse engineering could provide another opportunity to re-open the black box. 
Such an effort must consist of “articulating the specifications of a system through a rigorous 
examination drawing on domain knowledge, observation, and deduction to unearth a model 
of how that system works” (Diakopoulos, 2013). However, due to the dynamic nature of 
algorithms, reverse engineering can provide only momentary snapshots of data-driven 
profiling practices that might not be relevant any longer at the point of discovery. As Gillespie 
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(2014) little optimistically states, “there may be something, in the end, impenetrable about 
algorithms.” If not for an indeed improbable uncovering of the realm of algorithms, further 
research then must engage with in-depth empirical analyses of how distinct modes of 
governing in security regimes become re-assembled and re-combined in order to advance our 
understanding about the creation of security knowledge. As Foucault (2003: 242) notes, we 
should in fact conceive of a biopolitics of security that “does not exclude disciplinary 
technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, 
use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques”, therefore 
accounting for further empirical dynamics. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“We went back stage; we learned about the skills of practitioners; we saw innovations come 
into being; we felt how risky it was; and we witnessed the puzzling merger of human 
activities and non-human entities.” 
(Latour, 2005: 90)
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The ‘so what?’ question 
The ‘assorted inquiries in aviation’ offered in this thesis have, at least this much I hope, 
provided some small insights into the many ways security unfolds. They have targeted a 
number of practices, social relations, and political agendas. They have looked into normative 
questions of justice, accountability, and responsibility. They have highlighted multiple 
political, social, and economic rationalities. And they have shown how the initially postulated 
paradox of security emerges and re-emerges as a defining paradigm of our everyday lives. 
Each one of them offers some very specific conclusions for the empirics studied, and at times 
even some more general thoughts. But the one thing they have not yet provided, and which 
is arguably the final missing piece in this thesis, is a connected conclusion on the theoretical 
level. Implications for how to think about security, that is. The narratives have not yet 
answered the one question that Thomas Diez, during my years as a PhD student, has put 
forward as often as painstakingly and precisely: ‘so what?’ The ‘so what?’ question probes 
academic work on multiple levels and could be re-framed in a number of slightly different 
ways: What is the relevance of my research? Does it provide added value? Where does this 
lead to? Can I create any political or social impact with my work? What would such impact 
look like? This list could be continued. In fact, I do think that in a research field as sensitive as 
security studies, such questions need to be asked and dealt with. Thus, in the last and 
concluding narrative, I seek to address the ‘so what?’ question by taking up on the first nine 
narratives and coming up with an approximation to a conclusion for security. Paraphrasing the 
title of this very project: what has this analysis of security been on? Is there a common frame 
that could serve as an outcome of this all? I remain reluctant to propose a definite answer – 
too fragmented, too dispersed, and too wide-ranging are the notions of security in both 
theoretical and empirical terms. However, I would like to propose a reading of security that 
appears suitable across all areas and that moreover highlights the need for a moral stance: 
security as normativity. 
 
Last narrative: security as normativity 
The last narrative closes the bracket. We have started out by exploring the value of security 
as a basic principle of social and political life, before diving into the manifold stories about 
how the impossibility of security plays out among various registers of ontology and 
epistemology, of politics and the economy, and not least of the social. In whatever way 
security becomes embedded into technologies, into questions of governing, and extends itself 
into the future, we must always keep in mind that security remains some sort of auxiliary 
construct for the sake of something else – be it ‘the good life’, epistemological closure in terms 
of (feigned) foresight, or just more money in the bank. Security might not have a specific 
agenda (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008b: 4), but despite the multiple facets it is used in, it retains a 
normative core – however one that is all too often overshadowed by its political 
instrumentalization. As Huysmans (2008: 178) puts it, “politics becomes fragmented and 
dispersed within the societal”, and this last narrative reaches out to re-capture such 
fragmentation and dispersion of security politics and re-fold them into a framework of 
normativity. Whereas the first nine narratives have been carved out in a rather descriptive 
fashion (with the occasional hint to the normative dimension, admittedly), this last narrative 
is prescriptive. 
The notion of security as normativity must not be misunderstood as an ontological quest. The 
question here is not ‘What should security look like?’ – public discourse has all too often been 
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reduced to such a simplistic yet borderless formula. The question should rather be: ‘How can 
we think and research security such that its value core persists and its detrimental potentials 
might be canceled out to the fullest extent possible?’ Put differently: how can security escape 
its own pathology? Again, we must keep in mind here that security, security politicalities and 
security socialities need by no means be congruent. This has become apparent by the empirics 
provided and their takes on the dispersed assemblage of actors, rationalities, and practices 
that constitute airport security. However, besides their thematic scope that targets the broad 
field of aviation, the analytical inquiries of this thesis are unified by a thread of normativity. 
They all take up on the ‘so what?’ question in one form or another. What do we make from 
academic analysis? Especially when considering the “normative dilemma of writing security” 
(Huysmans, 2002), critical security studies must never remain on a descriptive level, however 
abstract it might be. On the contrary, and this is where we have to return to the initial narrative 
of security as value, academia has to advance one step further and engage the normative 
consequences of security (and insecurity). As Browning and McDonald (2013: 250) claim, “if 
there is a consistency across critical security studies scholarship in this sense, it is that ethical 
commitments are evident (in commitments to resistance, desecuritization or emancipation, 
for example) but are insufficiently developed to provide a genuine account of what constitutes 
ethical action regarding security.” How to enact such ethical commitments, and how to 
provide a modest attempt to develop them, then? 
If, as Der Derian (1995: 26) claims, “a late modern security [is] comfortable with a plurality of 
centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities”, then an agenda of critical security studies 
must aim at unsettling those centers, at challenging those meanings, and at questioning those 
identities it produces. The tools for this have been laid out. As Salter (2008d: 30) notes, “critical 
theory questions the evolution of current systems in terms of the interests, actors and possible 
fields of action. In particular, critical theorists have challenged the labeling of particular issues 
as security issues by political or corporate elites and the attendant policy choices.” In order to 
establish the possibility for an ethics of security in the first place, we must then carefully 
unpack assemblages of security – we must understand how they have come about, we must 
understand how they amplify or mute certain actors and interests, and we must understand 
which governmental rationalities underpin them. Security studies must not refrain from such 
complexity. On the contrary, as Rose (1999: 276) claims, “to analyse, then, is not to seek for a 
hidden unity behind this complex diversity”, but to embrace messiness and expose it to moral 
judgment. 
As has been pointed out throughout both theoretical and empirical accounts in this thesis, 
security practices and discourses can indeed be ‘bad’. Any critical agenda of thinking about 
security in fact prescribes probing the very question whether security plays out good or bad. 
As the c.a.s.e. collective (2006: 456) argues, “uncovering the realities of security (or rather 
insecurity) entails locating human rights abuses, the oppression of minorities, the 
powerlessness of the poor and violence against women.” In this vein, Burgess (2009: 319) adds 
that security practices and discourses “have important ethical implications, the most 
consequential among which is the risk of discriminating, through information processing, 
entire categories of population.” Thus, moral judgment appears vital to any critical stance 
towards security as both a means of critique and an agenda-setting tool for some kind of 
‘better’ security.  
As we have seen, not only is security burdened with normative issues, but also is the more 
general notion of government. As Dean (2006: 11) frames it, “if morality is understood as the 
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attempt to make oneself accountable for one’s own actions, or as a practice in which human 
beings take their own conduct to be subject to self-regulation, then government is an intensely 
moral activity.” In this sense, ordering the social through the register of security presents a 
double challenge for normativity. Critique must be directed at the governing through security, 
as well as at security itself. This is not to suggest that security techniques, security practices, 
security technologies, or security discourses would present themselves as detachable from 
rationalities of government. Rather, security unfolds through more than one domain. 
Subsequently, any critical security studies agenda must open up to all possible registers of 
security – some of which have been touched upon in the narratives told in section I. of this 
thesis. In short: we must create an account of both rationalities and means of security. As 
Neocleous (2008: 5) radically puts it, we must “challenge the ways in which security has 
become the master narrative through which the state shapes our lives and imaginations 
(security risks here, security measures there, security police everywhere), producing and 
organising subjects in a way that is always already predisposed towards the exercise of 
violence in defence of the established order.” How can we do this? 
In order to answer this question as completely as possible, we must first turn to another, 
auxiliary question: which avenues of critique does security as normativity open up? Arguably, 
one can take multiple routes here. The first route would be to derive resistance from the 
notion of normativity. In order to empower such a normative imperative of resisting security, 
it becomes then necessary to first disassemble security such that it can be rendered visible 
and intelligible. The ensuing task must then be “to disturb and destabilize these regimes, to 
identify some of the weak points and lines of fracture in our present where thought might 
insert itself in order to make a difference” (Rose, 1999: 277), and critical academia is primed 
to do just that. Resistance challenges power. And more so, it challenges the distinct discourses 
and practices of security that have sought to establish such power in the first place. But it can 
only do so on an informed basis. We must then strive to provide an understanding of how 
security is shaped and re-shaped, how it is constantly transformed and applied according to 
governmental rationalities and political programs. As Huysmans (2008: 178) summarizes such 
a scholarly agenda of resistance: “in analyzing how power operates through dispersed, 
fragmented practices that nevertheless weave a diagram of constituting and governing 
societal relations, the total categories in which politics has been conceptualized in the 
constitutional framing of exception-state versus society, law versus politics, sovereignty-
collapse into a relational picture of various expert discourses, professional knowledges, 
institutional practices governing a biological and economic understanding of life, and a rich 
history of sociopolitical struggles.” 
A second route of security as normativity can be directly derived from such analyses. If, as has 
been shown throughout this thesis, a major trajectory of critique towards security consists of 
its often opaque and black-boxed character, both in terms of its emergence and of its 
functioning, then we must think about how to re-open security. Once its configurations have 
been rendered visible, it can be brought into the public arena and exposed to the fundamental 
principles of democracy. As Bigo (2012: 278) explains, “democratizing security supposes then 
to examine how these professionals deliver their different truth(s) about the danger in the 
world, and to put them in context.” Security as normativity must then challenge the narratives 
of security as technology, as economy, and as securitization through the lens suggested by the 
Paris school. It must look into the entangled multi-national networks of professionals of 
security, into security discourses that build on domain expertise, and at the intersections 
between those networks and the security industry. Building on that, it must also closely 
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scrutinize technologies. As de Goede (2011: 16) rightfully points out, “assembly with private 
spaces and technologies strengthens actual security practices, while rendering them less 
accountable”, thus calling for careful analysis of technologies. If, as Huysmans (1998: 249) 
argues, “in security studies the ethico-political dimensions are often buried under a technical 
logic of necessity”, such a logic must be rendered questionable by prying it away from the 
realm of practical expertise and exposing it to the normative principles of the realm of human 
rights. As Huysmans (1998: 249) rightfully adds, indeed “the question ‘What happens when 
we do this?’ slips out the interpretation” all too often. 
A third route for security as normativity once again derives from the former one. If security 
can be re-captured and folded into the scope of democratic principles, then it can in fact 
become emancipatory. Security as normativity in this vein must challenge marginalizations 
and exclusions that come into being through security in the first place. As Bigo (2012: 278) 
puts forward such a claim, “the voices of the ‘undesirables’, that [have been] excluded through 
security-based social sorting, need to be heard and sometimes listened to in order to change 
notions of danger, security, and normal activity, as a form of freedom.” While Bigo makes a 
powerful claim here, it might be argued that critical thought must not stop at those who suffer 
from security, but must also consider the multiple forces, stakes, and interests that have been 
marginalized along the way of shaping security in the first place. In such fashion, we must think 
again about the narrative of security as government and the ensuing narrative of security as 
assemblage. If security must be conceptualized as “controversy” (Schouten, 2014a) or 
“ambiguity” (de Lint and Virta, 2004), then what about the voices that have been muted in its 
constitution? And what does that tell us about the voices that have been heard? As Rose 
(1999: 279) compellingly frames the problematic: “something might be learnt from those 
insurgent, minority or subaltern forces that have often refused to codify themselves, that have 
resisted the temptations of party and programme, that have taken shape in the shadows, 
interstices and oversights of conventional politics and that have so often acted as laboratories 
for alternative futures.” Ultimately, if we pursue the potential for emancipation further, we 
must even ask if the challenge of normativity might not lead us to emancipation from security, 
as has been put forward by Neocleous (2008), for instance. Such a stance then re-connects to 
the narrative of security as securitization. As Huysmans (1998: 234) argues, calling for the re-
establishment of ‘normal politics’, “one has to decide not only how important security is but 
also if one wants to approach a problem in security terms or not.” 
Politics that are not framed in terms of security are normal politics. Securitization theory has 
intensely dealt with the rift between normality and exception, even up to the point where 
Taureck (2006: 57) distinguishes between “securitization the theory” and “securitization the 
normative practice” – the former dealing with matters of the exception and the latter dealing 
with attempts of re-establishing normality. If indeed, as the c.a.s.e. collective (2007: 571) 
claims, “the question as to how a political order that is constituted through a securitized limit 
can be resisted, challenged or unmade”, then such a challenge must necessarily work through 
the limit itself. The limit is all too often the reference point for a politics of security that 
appears to have forgotten how life can be conceived of as not constantly on the brink. As has 
been shown, the pathology of security is its inevitable reversal effect on our ontological state. 
Thinking and speaking about security always implies danger, uncertainty, and threat that is 
already on its way. Security as normativity, however, needs to opt for normality. If, as Dillon 
(2011: 780) claims, “security discourses specify the politics of peace in terms of the unfolding 
of burgeoning discourses of danger and spiraling security problematizations, threatening 
fields of formation, surfaces of friction, adversarial relations, irreconcilable enmities, and war 
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in the name of life itself”, then we must challenge such discourses. Security as normativity 
must unsettle the foundations on which those discourses are built. 
Normal politics, as opposed to the exceptional logics of threat, would then also require a 
different take on the future. A take that is not dominated by the permanent anticipation of 
the ‘event’ on all levels, thus empowering the full spectrum of security measures in order to 
intervene into the future or at least mitigate its effects through the layer of ultimate 
preparedness – even if such a bleak future has not, and might never, materialize. A fifth route 
for security as normativity would then be to challenge the logics of futurity that enact such a 
key role in discourses of security. This might well be the hardest quest there is for critical 
security studies. As has been shown throughout the narrative of security as future, both 
contingency and its political transformation are limitless. If probability is not enough, simply 
opt for possibility. If you cannot statistically extrapolate the event, then just imagine it. And if 
by doing that you might merely feign control over what by any logics can never be controlled? 
Maybe that is not the main point, and maybe it never has been. If, as has been laid out, security 
is a means of ordering the social, then its government must be legitimized through political 
modulations of the future. That is, through the canceling out of any conceivable threats. 
However, as the horizon of threats has been expanded beyond the limits of knowledge, there 
remains no border to what security must not do. As de Goede (2011: 17) summarizes this 
conflict, “precautionary security and proportionality are always in tension with each other 
[emph. in orig.].” Security as normativity would then have to challenge the politics of 
speculation and of possibilities in order to expose their epistemologically unfounded excess. 
This is not to say that security might not be about the future anymore. A security politics that 
is not about the future ceases to be a politics in the first place. However, a normatively more 
responsible security politics must refrain from circular logics of virtual, yet not necessarily 
materializing threats that empower a spiral of always new and ever more excessive security 
measures (Massumi, 2007). 
What might be a suitable mode to do so? We might need to be willing to acknowledge the 
fact that security is indeed always on the brink – simply because life itself is always on the 
brink. The contingency of life is what brought us here in the first place. As Rose (1999: 24) lays 
out, “the discovery of new problems for government – and the invention of new forms of 
government – embraces, recodes, reshapes those that pre-exist them”, and thus enables 
security politics through the constant discovery, construction, and transformation of new 
threats. If we are stuck in such circular logic, then is it indeed necessary what the c.a.s.e. 
collective (2007: 574) has suggested: to empower security as normativity by “exploring in 
which ways the political can be imagined against, beyond or outside of security”? Do we in 
fact need to aim for a security politics beyond security? Such a notion certainly seems 
tempting, especially if considering the manifold detrimental effects that security can unfold 
across all registers of the social. However, it would also to some extent neglect the 
complications of security as government and security as assemblage, and re-introduce the 
notion of an overarching security agenda that can somehow be overcome. Moreover, the call 
for a security politics beyond security would not necessarily resolve the issue, after all. If one 
governmental agenda would be re-placed by another, would that not rather shift than solve 
the problem? By claiming the need to go beyond security, we would claim the power and 
authority that we seek to challenge in the first place. Security as normativity clearly 
presupposes criticality – but, as Buzan and Hansen (2010: 660) argue, “one problem is that we 
have no yardstick for what is a ‘truly’ critical – or critical enough – account” of security. 
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Figuring out what is critical, after all, has been deemed a major stake for critical security 
studies. As the c.a.s.e collective (2006: 476) argues, “we need to ask ourselves, as researchers 
[…], what the claim of being ‘critical’ […] entails for our engagement with the political.” 
However criticality might eventually be conceived of, analyzing politics indeed brings about 
close proximity to politics, and such opens up possible ways to actively intervene into the 
politicality of security. Thus, a viable route for security as normativity appears to be the 
engagement with politics. Security, as has been argued, can effectively be challenged by 
scrutinizing and exposing the processes of its emergence. However, this is only the first step. 
Security as normativity, if taken seriously, entails a complete re-politicization of security. That 
is to pry security away from the realm of emergency and to “bring back social and political 
issues to the realm of the political” (c.a.s.e. collective, 2006: 476) through very concrete 
engagements with very concrete politics. After all, “being critical means adhering to a rigorous 
form of sceptical questioning, rather than being suspicious or distrustful in the vernacular 
sense of those terms” (c.a.s.e. collective, 2006: 476), and questioning is an integral part of any 
democratic politics. Political programs must necessarily undergo scrutiny and questioning, 
most notably through parliamentary debates and the media, before they can be molded into 
concrete legislation. Here we find one of the cracks in the processes of government that opens 
up space for critical thought and intervention. 
One has to be very careful about the modes of doing so, however. Particularly, the c.a.s.e. 
collective has dealt in depth with the consequences of political intervention from academia. 
As they argue, “engaging with bureaucracies and the professionals of politics is a ‘two-way-
track’” (c.a.s.e. collective, 2007: 564) that inevitably turns the researcher into an accountable 
actor themselves. Here, we must keep in mind the slippery slope of possibly contributing to 
processes of securitization through an engagement, however critical it might be, with 
discourses of security, thereby potentially reinforcing them involuntarily. Any attempt to 
actively intervene into the political shaping of security also brings about a second series of 
pitfalls. Can we, as academics, indeed claim to speak truth to power, and thus claim authority 
over how security should be concretely crafted? To think critically, as the c.a.s.e. collective 
(2006: 476) reminds us, “is also to recognize oneself as being partially framed by those regimes 
of truth, concepts, theories and ways of thinking that enable the critique.” If we take seriously 
the Foucauldian claim that power is relational and always emergent, then academic agency is 
not excluded from this. If we as scholars are willing to grasp such power, then we must be 
prepared for the accountability that comes with it. Security as normativity clearly must 
intervene, but it must be careful not to fall into the same political traps that it challenges. 
In fact, there are many routes to engage security as normativity (and certainly more than I 
have sketched out here). All of them are neither easy nor comfortable. On the contrary, they 
require us to step out of the ivory tower of academia and occupy a clearly defined societal 
position. Critiquing security can quickly turn oneself from a scholar into a target. Entering 
politics can be exhausting, dull, and frustrating. Nonetheless, security clearly appears to be 
worth the fight. If, as has been outlined here, we conceive of security as a powerful technique 
of government, then we might even be obligated to critically engage with the conduct of our 
own conduct. As Rose (1999: 41) painfully reminds us, to think about government is to think 
about ourselves and our role within assemblages of security: “are we to be governed as 
members of a flock to be led, as children to be coddled and educated, as a human resource to 
be exploited, as members of a population to be managed, as legal subjects with rights, as 
responsible citizens of an interdependent society, as autonomous individuals with our own 
illimitable aspirations, as value-driven members of a moral community”? Different 
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rationalizations of security request us to enact different roles. However, it remains within our 
own autonomy and agency to challenge those assigned roles. 
Conceiving security as normativity subsequently also means to conceive government as 
ethical obligation. As Rose (1999: 284) has it, “to the extent that we are governed in our own 
name, we have a right to contest the evils that are done to us in the name of government, a 
right that we acquire from our birth and life at the point of convergence of practices of 
government themselves.” As has been shown throughout this thesis, and running the risk of 
sounding redundant by now, there are multiple concrete ‘evils’ that come into being in the 
name of security every single day. More often than not, however, they remain hidden in 
entangled networks, in obscure practices, in remote databases, or in proprietary algorithms. 
In this vein, academia must not shy away from the task of analytically uncovering the multiple 
natures of security that we find empirically, and subsequently making them accessible to the 
public level. My modest hope is that the inquiries presented here can in some way provide a 
small contribution to this task. Security as normativity prescribes “to disrupt depoliticizing 
practices and discourses of security in the name of exceptionality, urgency or bureaucratic 
expertise, and bring them back to political discussions and struggles” (c.a.s.e. collective, 2006: 
476) – in short: to the principles of democracy. In this vein, an analysis of government through 
security, as Dean (2006: 37-8) puts forward, “enhances human capacity for the reflective 
practice of liberty, and the acts of self-determination this makes possible, without prescribing 
how that liberty should be exercised.” A truly ethical task it is then, indeed. 
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